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The offence of blasphemy and its implications is one of the critical issues in Pakistan 
today.  This research examines the historical setting and gradual amendment of 
blasphemy laws and their impact on religious communities in Pakistan.  The law of 
blasphemy belongs to two historical periods.  First, the era when the country was 
under military rule by the British during the colonial period: they originally framed 
Chapter XV of Offences Relating to Religion of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in 
1860.  Secondly, its application in an independent subcontinent gradually moved 
from its original intention in Pakistan after 1947.  In 1980s Pakistan, both the 
intentions of this law and its penalties were significantly altered, becoming the law 
which people now known as the law of blasphemy.  Since the law was amended, it 
has made people in all religious communities, particularly minorities, critically 
vulnerable to malicious or unfounded accusation and has been interpreted and 
applied to varying effects. 
This historical review shows how Pakistan, though claiming to be secular and 
to protect all religions and communities, has actually become an exclusively Islamic 
country.  Amending Chapter XV of Offences Relating to Religion was one of the 
important steps to Islamise Pakistan.  This research considers a range of legal, 
political and constitutional questions concerning the law of blasphemy and religious 
communities both in pre and post-colonial periods, exploring how the law and 
religious communities have been and are affected by politics and legislation.  In so 
doing, it will appraise politically significant religious laws, values and activities. 
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We have to see the reasons behind the incident [in Joseph Colony Lahore]. If anyone 
has committed an offence, the law is there [but] what about the riot and arson. Where is 
your [Punjab government’s] writ?  Nothing has been produced to establish causes of the 
incident… Whose responsibility is it to protect life, property and dignity of the citizens? 
      Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (The Nation, 11 March 2013) 
On 11
th 
March 2013, the Supreme Court of Pakistan took note of an incident which 
occurred in Joseph Colony, Badami Bagh, Lahore on 9
th 
March in which over 175 
houses, a church including religious books, and all the belongings of the Christian 
community were burnt and torched by a mob over a blasphemy accusation, defiling 
the Prophet Muhammad, which has not yet been prosecuted.  The Supreme Court 
rejected the Punjab provincial government and police authorities’ reports on the 
accusation and declared that the blank reports and totally unsubstantiated stories 
about the incident could not be accepted and, moreover, that the Christian 
community of the colony was damaged despite having nothing to do with the 
incident.  The Court also raised another important concern: no one had the right to 
take the law into his hands.  The disastrous consequences could have been controlled 
but why, asked the court, did officials stay inactive, unable or uninterested in 
protecting the Christians of Joseph Colony? 
This is just one example of many where Christians are prosecuted under what 
is commonly known as the blasphemy law.  The offence of blasphemy and its 
application to all religious communities such as Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus, and 
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including some Muslims, is one of the most critical issues in Pakistan today.  Various 
reasons behind the cases such as insult or personal advantage or animosity, which are 
readily labelled as religious conflict, have become a matter of life and death in 
Pakistan.  The nature of religious conflict and legal efforts to avoid or reduce it in 
Pakistan is not a sudden and very modern religious problem glossed as ‘blasphemy,’ 
as contemporary news and media imply today.  The issue is rooted in the history of 
Pakistan. 
Religious conflicts historically occurred between religious communities or 
within one religious community. For example Hindu-Muslim communalism 
regarding religious practices and religious differences was critically appraised in the 
Indian Subcontinent ruled by the British.  In post 1947 Pakistan, animosity between 
Hindu and Muslim comparatively dropped but religious conflicts remain yet in 
different mode and with different outcomes.  Before approaching the contemporary 
pattern of religious conflicts it is important to see what is the geopolitical context of 
Pakistan in South Asia. 
In 1947 Pakistan became an independent and Islamic nation of South Asia 
but its known history actually began in the third millennium BCE with the Indus 
Valley civilisation and its cities Mohenjo-doro and Harapa.
1
  The Indus Valley was 
first settled by Aryans in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent from 1500 to 
1200 BCE.
2
  The development of Hinduism, and significantly the caste tradition, 
started with the Aryans.  In 712 Arab Islam entered through Sindh.  Mehmud Ghazni 
                                                 
1
 Stephen Neill, A History of Christianity in India, The Beginnings to AD 1707 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 3-5. 
2
 John C. B. Webster, The Dalit Christians: A History (Delhi: ISPCK, 1992), 3. 
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invaded in the year 1001 and later conquered Punjab after having a vision of Islamic 
dominance.  Some regions were almost completely Islamised by Hindu converts to 
Islam, helping Islam become a major religion in India.
3
  By 1707 many Muslims, 
particularly under the Mughal Empire, ruled over north India but their power 
declined after the death of the sixth Emperor, Aurangzeb.
4
  The British came as 
merchants ‘for trade, but the constitution of the Company began in commerce and 
ended in empire.’
5
  During the era of Islamic supremacy in India, the Hanafi School 
of law was the legal code employed under the Ghaznavids (975-1187 CE),
6
 though 
some scholars such as Fayzee and Zaman suggest that the Hanafi law was well 
established and practiced under the Mughal emperors (1500-1700 CE).  They further 
note that the Islamic law known locally as the Muhammadan law is described in 
well-known texts such as the Hedaya and the Fatwa Alamgiria, which were the 
paramount authorities in Hanafi law in India.
7
 
British rule brought new political institutions, and when indigenous 
mechanisms were adapted to colonial purposes, they were incorporated within new 
systems of law.  Peters argues that between 1790 and 1807, the British transformed 
Islamic criminal law.  Certain homicide acts, stoning to death for hadd crimes 
                                                 
3
 Neill, A History of Christianity in India, 8, 63-7.  
4
 Akbar S. Ahmad, Pakistan Society: The Search for Saladin (London: Routledge, 1997), 6-7 
5
 Ibid., 11. 
6
 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2001), 48-9; Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 65. 
7
 The Hedaya was written by Burhanuddin Marghinani (d. 1197 CE) who lived and wrote in 
Marghinan, a small town Farghana, in Russian Turkestan. The Hedaya has achieved its legal authority 
in India. The Fatwa Alamgiria, composed by Shaykh Nizam Burhanpuri and his companions, is a 
collection of fatwas, the replies of jurisconsults to the questions addressed to them. The work was 
done by the orders during the reign of the Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir (1685-1707) in Delhi. 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 22; A. Asghar Fayzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 37, 50; A. Asghar Fayzee, Cases in the Muhammadan Law of India 
and Pakistan (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), xvii; Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 57. 
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including apostasy, were repealed and strict rules of evidence and the notion of doubt 
(shubha) were introduced.
8
  Some sources note that it was not that easy for Muslims 
to accept India under non-Muslim governance, for they were being colonised and lost 
much power.  Various fatwas, for example, were declared by Shah Abd al Aziz, a 
Muslim scholar, against the British as non-Muslim rulers in India, although by the 
1820s, scholars in Delhi agreed that as long as the practice of the Muslim faith was 




It was a challenge to see whether all communities could be protected when 
the criminal law was formally replaced with the new Indian Penal Code in 1860, 
which contrasted with what could seem certain arbitrariness in Hindu and Muslim 
law.  The shari’a was then restricted exclusively to the realm of the laws of personal 
status such as the law of marriage, divorce, children and inheritance for Muslims.  
This research is limited to discuss the control of religious conflicts during British rule 
of the region, written in Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of the Indian 
Penal Code, a code which continued to be practised in South Asia after the British 
had gone. 
British governance was criticized and challenged by Hindus and Muslims to 
get independence from British domination.  In 1909 the Muslim League was founded 
to protect the political and religious rights of Muslims in India.  Under the direction 
                                                 
8
 Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to 
the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 118-9; Zaman, The Ulama 
in Contemporary Islam, 22-3. 
9
 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘The World of Shah Abd al Aziz (1746–1824)’ edited by Jamal Malik, 
Perspectives of Mutual Encounters in South Asian History 1760–1860 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 298–314, 
esp., 307–14; B. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 49–52; William W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London: Trubner and 
Co., 1876), Chapters: 3 and 4. 
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of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, the Muslim League effectively 
capitalized on the elections of 1945-46, helping Pakistan constitute itself as an 




  This followed soon after religious 
communal violence started pushing minority groups in the western region to migrate 
to one or the other of the newly formed nations to join their co-religionists.
11
  Among 
those co-religionists, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians went to or stayed in what is 
now Pakistan as they were promised that they would be protected in Pakistan.  How 
can the current context regarding religious conflicts between and within religious 
communities be evaluated in the post-colonial period? 
 
Religious Conflicts in Pakistan 
During the post-colonial period, the category of religious offences took different 
directions under the new geo-political and socio-political status of India and 
Pakistan.  The major concern regarding the issue of conversion and application of 
Conversion Acts affected the application of religious offences in some Indian states. 
However, Pakistan faced major ethnic and religious conflicts within the Islamic 
community of East and West Pakistan based upon differences in religious views on 
shaping the constitution.  The religious difference in theological beliefs of Ahmadis 
and Muslims remained critical in West Pakistan.  It was a theological argument 
particularly related to the finality of the Prophet Muhammad, which finally split both 
sects, with the majority declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims in 1974.  Pakistan’s Islamic 
                                                 
10
 Akbar S. Ahmad, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (London: Routledge, 
1997), 55, 112. 
11
 Ibid., 166. 
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reformation in the 1980s brought major changes in the constitution and law as well 
as changes such as blasphemy laws which affected religious arguments, differences, 
discussions, conversion and even social quarrels and banal disputes among different 
religious communities.  It changed the nature of the 1860 law against ‘insulting 
religious feelings’ which have particularly affected non-Muslims of Pakistan and 
impacts on the entire country. 
This research is also influenced by my own personal experience and search 
for identity as a non-Muslim in Pakistan when I found myself silent, unable to 
answer questions about Christianity in some religious conversations and discussions 
with fellow students, mostly Muslims and one Ahmadi, in 1992-1996.  We were a 
happy group of young women enjoying and celebrating Christmas and the Muslim 
Eid: but given the religious difference I was usually regarded as the one lacking true 
religion.  They raised various apologetic questions: the Bible is not pure but is an 
altered and corrupted book; Jesus did not die on the Cross and did not rise from the 
dead; British and American Christians with whom I usually associated do not keep 
themselves in parda veil, and similar issues.  I was unable to answer freely and if I 
attempted to respond, I deliberately kept my voice flat, especially when comparing 
Christianity to other religions. 
I was shocked one day when one of my friends brought me an Urdu book 
written about Christianity especially comparing it with Islam.  I read the book, 
checking all biblical references, and realised that many references were misquoted.  I 
took that book back and asked whether misquoting the bible was a religious offence 
or not?  They were somewhat embarrassed, but no-one answered.  I was aware if any 
Christian had commented in such way in respect of Islam without taking care and 
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respect, the situation would have been different.  Misquoting or changing the context 
of some biblical references was not a big deal for my friends but it wounded my 
religious feelings and indeed changed my life.  Initially I became interested to learn 
more about Christianity and the social issues Christians face in Pakistan.  Later, I 
started to research the historical roots and causes of religious conflicts among 
religious communities: the result is this thesis on ‘A Study of the Evolution of 
Legislation on Offences Relating to Religion and its Implications in Contemporary 
Pakistan.’ Though my initial interest was to understand the nature of present 
religious injury, I eventually saw that the roots of religious conflict injury lay not in 
the last few years, but rather far back, in the law, colonial legacy, religious protest, 
political power and religious conflicts among and within religious communities, and 
that it affected not only Christians, but variously Hindus, Ahmadis including some 
Muslims. 
It is understandable that discussions arise when two different religions 
confront each other, as I experienced as a girl, but in contemporary Pakistan, 
religious conflicts have been turned into a very volatile affair, quickly resulting in 
legal accusations claiming religious disturbance, whatever the facts of the case.  For 
example, one of the recent blasphemy cases gained national and international 
attention in the news when 11 year old Rimsha Masih, an illiterate Pakistani 
Christian girl with Downs Syndrome was accused under section 295-B of 
committing blasphemy for burning pages of Nurani Qaida containing verses of the 
Quran and was arrested on 16
th
  August 2012.  It is important to see what kind of 
religious tension or conflict lay in the background to such an accusation.  After 
Rimsha’s arrest, Khalid Jadoon, a Muslim local cleric, said in a television interview 
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that he was disturbed by the church music and prayers of the local Christian 
community and had warned them that they will suffer if they continue such practices. 
He called for the eviction of all Christians from the neighbourhood because ‘Pakistan 
is an Islamic country given by Allah.’
12
  During the investigation of the case, Khalid 
Jadoon came under suspicion for changing the evidence, especially mixing pages of 
the Qaeda in the ashes coming from Rimsha’s home on 22
nd
 September 2012.  The 
main reason for doing this was, as Zubair the witness asserted: ‘Jadoon said that it is 
evidence against the Christians and a way to get them removed [from the area].’
13
 
Rimsha was later released by Islamabad High Court on the basis of lack of evidence 
or of the intention to commit blasphemy.
14
  Now she is free from the charge but 
actually not free from the fear of further attacks and has moved with her family to 
Canada.  This case attracted much attention and was mostly condemned by Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike.  It was the first time when members of Pakistan Ulama 
Council stood up for non-Muslims especially to condemn misusing the law against 
an innocent girl.
15
  Such condemnation, though showing the world that Pakistan is 
concerned that the law should not be misused, does not mean the country has 
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 “No Evidence Against Pakistan Blasphemy Girl,” BBC News Asia, 22 September 2012. 
15
 “Ulama Council Chief Demanded Bail for Rimsha,” The Express Tribune, 4 September 2012. 
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The Aims of the Research and Current Literature on the Issue 
The issue of religious offences and their implications for Pakistan, especially from 
the 1980s to the present, has been discussed in contemporary sources.  Over the last 
thirty years, current approaches have tended to describe Pakistan as an intolerant 
state especially in terms of not providing adequate protection for its religious 
communities from violence.  Some sources claim that the Islamic reformation 
brought under the military rule of Zia ul-Haq caused the recent intolerance while 
others dignify his intentions of reforming Pakistan.  Though elements of his laws 
have been changed, the most debated issue is the application of the law of blasphemy 
which prescribes the death sentence for defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad 
under section 295-C and life imprisonment for defiling the copy of the Quran under 
section 295-B.  The implication of this law has not only led communities themselves 
to protest for their security and human rights but also directed others to write on 
human rights and freedom of expression.  However, there is an absence of any 
examination of the historical roots of the law which would show how gradually not 
only the law but also the mode of its prosecution has been changed. 
Yet the focus of this thesis is not limited to blasphemy law in modern 
Pakistan, easy though it would have been to do that.  The thesis does not aim to give 
details and arguments about the scales of punishments such as death sentence or life 
imprisonment for assaulting God, Prophets and beliefs in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam.  The major reason for doing this research is to set out the historical 
promulgation and objectives of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of the 
Indian Penal Code.  Thomas B. Macaulay (1800–1859), an English Christian, 
historian and legislator and a member of the Supreme Council of India, played an 
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important role in introducing English education and preparing the penal code for 
British India between 1834 and 1838.
16
  This research particularly reviews how the 
legislation on religious offences was revised from 1837, applied in 1860 and 
practised till 1947 under colonial rule and in the post-colonial era in South Asia.
17
 
 One of the important foci is to examine the actual application and procedure 
of the law.  What kind of religious issues were tried under this law in the various eras 
since promulgation: the nineteenth century; the run-up to Independence; the early 
years of Pakistan; and the Zia ul-Haq era and beyond?  How were these various laws 
and clauses used, dropped, or annulled by later amendments?  This discussion covers 
a range of case studies to show the early objectives and procedure by taking a careful 
historical approach, especially the setting out and use of ‘intention’ necessary when 
prosecuting anyone for religious offence. 
Before embarking on this evolutionary procedure it is significant to note that 
Macaulay and his legislation for the Indian Territory were inspired by the ethical and 
political theories of utilitarianism usually associated with British social and 
philosophical reformers such as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and J. S. Mill (1806-
1873).  The general concept of utilitarianism is based on the view that the nature of 
each human being includes the desire to obtain happiness and avoid pain.  To ensure 
each relationship with other individuals will enable that outcome, specifically 
targeted legislation is necessary.  Bentham, in his Essays on the Influence of Time 
                                                 
16
 Stephen Evans, “Macaulay's Minute Revisited: Colonial Language Policy in Nineteenth-Century 
India,” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 23:4 (2002): 260-81; Wing-Cheong 
Chan, Barry Wright and Stanley Yeo (Eds), Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code: The 
Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 20, 34. 
17
 Thomas B. Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by Indian Law Commissioners (Calcutta: Bengal 
Military Orphan Press, 1837); Macaulay, The Indian Penal Code as Originally Framed in 1837 
(Madras: Higginbotham and Co., 1888); Macaulay, Complete Works of Thomas Babington Macaulay, 
Vol. 3 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1866). 
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and Place Matters of Legislation, urged that India be reformed through utilitarian 
ideology, by promulgating and reforming laws and judgments
18
 based on moral 
principles, hence his famous phrase, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ 
in Indian society.
19
  Though Mill’s theory, discussed in his book Utilitarianism, was 
influenced by Bentham, it was slightly different.
20
  For example, one of the examples 
of Mill’s utilitarianism is based on a standard of morality which is different from 
Bentham’s who reviews all forms of happiness: Mill argues for the importance of 
intellectual and moral pleasures as superior to physical pleasure.
21
   
It is not relevant to discuss the whole theories of early utilitarianism. 
However, it is sufficient to note that Macaulay, influenced by Bentham’s principles 
of utilitarianism for reforming Indian law and social life, used this as the basic 
principle for a rational and efficient legal system, as admirably set out in Eric 
Stokes’s, The English Utilitarians and India.
22
  Through Macaulay, utilitarianism 
                                                 
18
 Bentham, ‘Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ in Kartik Kalyan 
Raman, “Utilitarianism and the Criminal Law in Colonial,” Modern Asian Studies 28:4 (October 
1994) 739-91. 
19
 J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislations (Clarendon Press, 1879), Chapter 1; Jeremy  
Bentham, A Fragment on Government (London, 1776), preface (available at 
http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/bentham/government.htm) 
20
 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1909). 
21
 Ibid., 16-7. 
22
 For detail see ‘Macaulay as Law Member’ discussed by Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and 
India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 192, 225-9; modern scholars such as John Clive argue that 
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thus played an important part not only in the drafting of the Penal Code but also in 
modernizing and reforming British rule in India.
23
 
Macaulay’s Penal Code was accepted, subject to revision in 1837 and finally 
enacted in 1860.  It cannot be denied that the Indian Penal Code remained an 
impressive example of comprehensive law reform, despite retrograde changes 
introduced in the 1860 enacted version.
24
  Together with later colonial amendments, 
it was used in British South Asia and other British Asian areas until and beyond 
independence.
25
  Stokes argues that later reforms in the law resulted in the loss of 
some of his radical innovations, which will be set out in the following discussion of 
the legislation concerning ‘Offences Relating to Religion.’
26
 
Macaulay’s designation of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
shows his concern to foster multicultural understanding by attempting to ensure that 
the laws imposed by the colonial power matched the expectation of its colonial 
subjects.  Therefore, in the context of religious diversity, the law’s major objective 
was to bring harmony among religious communities and to control religious conflicts 
which occurred through ‘the differences among communities of feeling.’
27
  This aim 
encouraged the legislature to protect religious places, worship or objects including all 
funeral rites and to prevent religions discussions from causing violence. Various 
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rules and regulations, case studies and judgments and procedures have been found in 
legal documents published in the ‘Indian Legal Reports’ of British India and in 
commentaries written on the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in order to discuss the 
historical period and practice of religious offences in British India.
28
 
Macaulay was aware that there were bound to be deficiencies in the 
interpretation and application of the Code, and therefore proposed some careful 
revisions, which were effected between 1837 and 1858.  However, after his death, his 
basic principle could be said to have remained as the cornerstone of reforms of the 
law in British India and the early post-colonial era.
29
  For example, the law to control 
religious offences was amended and reformed in the 1920s to punish the person who 
‘with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any 
class…by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, insults or 
attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class…
30
  This law 
(section 295-A) was an addition to the earlier clauses of Chapter XV of IPC, and was 
especially included to protect the Muslim community from offensive publications 
written against the Prophet Muhammad.  However, a change to the philosophy and 
intention of Macaulay’s law came after 1980 in Pakistan, when further amendments 
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were made to protect the sanctity of the Prophet.  The law, originally intended to 
avoid religious conflicts in India, was very different from the blasphemy laws then 
existing in England and used in British history to protect Christianity.  Indeed that 
first British India law of 1860 as it has evolved in Pakistan has only been referred to 
as the ‘Blasphemy law’ for at the most the last thirty years.  The outcome, therefore, 
of these recent changes has been to restrict and arguably to diminish the 1860 Penal 
Code. 
Setting out the variations between English law, the British India 1860 law, 
and its outworking over the years proved all the more necessary in order to 
understand the later picture, the application and amendments of the law in the last 
thirty years, which are usually discussed in modern sources with at best a very 
limited assessment and incomplete or irrelevant historical evaluation.  For example, 
Linda S. Walbridge gives adequate information about the historical existence of 
Christianity with her main focus on how Bishop John Joseph came to commit suicide 
in protest in order to encourage reform of the blasphemy law in Pakistan in 1998.  
However, she not only gives insufficient information but also gives an incorrect 
background for the legislation of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ in the British 
subcontinent.  For example, she notes that ‘section 295-A was added in 1980’ to the 
Pakistan blasphemy law to punish offensive speech and writing, adding her 
unsubstantiated assumption that the law ‘may have been an attempt to prevent intra-
Islamic violence since Sunnis and Shia’s have different opinions…’
31
 This is a 
totally inadequate conclusion as the historical setting of section-295-A, applied by 
the British in 1927 an addition to Chapter XV to protect Muslims from offensive 
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publications and speech.  Regarding the concern of Walbridge that section 295-A 
could be used for Sunni-Shia conflicts, it must be noted that section 295-A 
successfully protected Christian community before the law was amended in 1980s.  
However, it cannot be denied and will be argued that application of this law was 
significantly limited in Pakistan.
32
  Major sectarianism did not start in 1980s but 
began with the birth of Pakistan, as exemplified by the Ahmadi-Muslim conflicts in 
1950s and 1970s, which gradually affected Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ and later came to affect all religious communities, making Christians, in 
the same way as Ahmadis and now Shias, more vulnerable to accusation today in 
Pakistan as discussed in the second part of the thesis. 
Significantly, reviewing the early judicial dealing regarding some cases in 
West Pakistan deemed religious makes clear that contrary to Walbridge’s 
assumption, Chapter XV did indeed bring justice to protect different classes. 
Contrary to the later application of the law, which discourages communities from 
discussing religious matters freely, some historical cases took the prosecution of 
religious matters very seriously, discussing and judging without any disorder or 
violence.  In one of the cases, for example, Christian beliefs which had been insulted 
by a Muslim were discussed and protected
33
 and, even more important for this 
research that religious rights of religions were protected provided the issue of 
intention was clear, in two other cases, two books were judged inoffensive, despite 
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containing matter which might be offensive to Muslims, because they were judged as 
not written maliciously to offend Muslims.
34
 
Pakistani lawyers and writers, who have reviewed the historical background 
of the law in British India, are important to mention.  Ismail Qureshi, a Muslim 
writer and a senior advocate of the Lahore High Court, is one of the important 
sources mentioned in this research.  From an Islamic perspective, he argues that 
blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad is punishable with death in Islam as 
discussed in detail in Namoos-e-Rasalat or Qanoon-e-Toheen-e-Rasalat, (The 
honour of the Prophethood of Muhammad and the law of blasphemy) an Urdu book 
published in 1994.  This book states that Pakistan changed its law to protect the 
sanctity of the Prophet which was not protected in British India.
35
  Qureshi wrote 
another book Muhammad the Messenger of God and the Law of Blasphemy in Islam 
and West published in 2008 in English especially to address the readers in the West 
and also for those interested in Islamic laws.  In his book the research ‘was done with 
historical details and judicial aspects of law of blasphemy in Islam and other 
religions: Christianity and Judaism.’
36
  Furthermore he discussed in this book how 
punishments for blasphemy as prescribed in the Bible were implemented in the past 
in European countries and America. Qureshi commented, while discussing the 
Salman Rushdie case which was not tried under British and European Blasphemy 
law, that Europe is conservative in maintaining its own orthodox laws while 
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Pakistan’s Government ‘proposed to make amendments in the just equitable law of 
blasphemy in an attempt to show the country as a secular, modern state.’
37
 
Qureshi provides adequate detail about European Blasphemy laws but gives 
little of the historical implementation of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ in 1860 (amended in 1920s in British India and then in Pakistan in 1980s). 
He does not detail, for example, that religious conflicts, generally occurring between 
Muslims and Hindus, came under the law especially regarding the protection of 
religious worship, places of worship, religious assemblies and freedom of religious 
discussions.  Qureshi put much focus on the events which occurred in 1920s and 
1930s and argues that the main reason for religious violence over the offensive 
writings in this period which brought extra-judicial judgment such as killing of two 
Hindu blasphemers, Rajpal and Ram, by young Muslim men was the absence of a 
proper law to protect Muslim feelings in British India.
38
  This is demonstrably not the 
case, as will be discussed in detail in the first half of the thesis, and briefly clarified 
here.  The issue is to what extent the British were successful or unsuccessful in 
bringing religious tolerance, to what extent all religious communities and their 
religious objects were protected, including Muslims, and how the British dealt with 
offensive publications which assaulted the Prophet Muhammad. 
Qureshi does insist that Muslims should refrain from taking the law into their 
own hands as ‘an adequate remedy is available against the offender through due 
process of law.’
39
  According to Qureshi, an accusation of blasphemy should be 
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judged only by the ‘intention’ which is the most important element introduced by the 
Islamic law.  He can be regarded as the first who tried to amend the blasphemy law, 
especially to revise the death sentence carried out according to Islam, and to add 
mention of ‘intention’ in section 295-C as the basis of prosecuting anyone accused of 
defiling the Prophet.  However, his proposal was withdrawn by the ruling 
Government of Nawaz Sharif in 1991.
40
  He also argues that Pakistani non-Muslims 
should not be afraid as the law of blasphemy is not aimed against them.  He further 
notes that ‘no non-Muslim has been convicted under this law so far due to strict 
observation of the law of evidence.’
41
  The blasphemy law itself and its proper use 
may not be harmful to any religious community and indeed all communities can be 
accused under this law.  However, he does not discuss or give any example of this 
law providing proper legal or social safety to religious minorities.  There are 
numerous examples to illustrate how in various cases non-Muslims in the last thirty 
years have been accused on mere suspicion and were punished by the local 
community without any trial and formal accusations in Pakistan. 
While Qureshi does not include the contemporary implications of the law of 
blasphemy in Pakistan, other sources have provided much information about the 
contemporary application of the law.  Among these sources, some will be carefully 
discussed to show how political leaders and lawyers have not only condemned the 
misuse of the law and declared that it violated religious rights but also indicated why 
the law of blasphemy results in extra-judicial consequences in contemporary 
Pakistan.  Therefore, they have all made suggestions to reduce the misuse of the law, 
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although each of them faces threats when they defend and deal with minorities’ cases 
in Pakistan.  Asma Jahangir, a Muslim writer, human rights activist and lawyer, who 
served as the first woman president of the Supreme Court Bar Association of 
Pakistan, has defended not only Muslims but also religious minorities.  Various 
blasphemy cases are discussed in her book From Protection to Exploitation: The 
Laws Against Blasphemy in Pakistan, discussed later in the thesis.  She notes that the 
blasphemy laws of Pakistan have ‘controlled and silenced the liberal lobbies,’ 
dissuading them from discussing religious matters or the need to bring about changes 
to the post-1980s laws.
42
  She further argues that the law has affected society as a 
whole and minorities in particular, but that, ‘the core issue is that while laws based 
on religion are easy to enact, they are virtually impossible to repeal.’
43
  Therefore the 
gap between liberals and conservatives remains and the communities continue to 
suffer.  She has often been strongly opposed for fighting for minorities’ rights, 
religious freedom and security, as discussed in Chapter Five.
44
 
It is essential to point out at the outset that the career of politicians of any 
religious background in Pakistan can be ended by threats of violence if they discuss 
the post-1980s laws with the intention of reforming them to reduce their misuse.  
Sherry Rehman, a Pakistani Muslim journalist and politician, is one of the examples 
to be mentioned later in this research.
45
  Rehman, in her political career (2002-2007 
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and 2008-2011) as a member of parliament, was regarded as a democrat and liberal 
Muslim who had taken bold steps and decisions on contentious issues of Pakistan 
such as passing key legislation to protect religious communities and human rights.
46
  
One especially bold step was tabling a Blasphemy Bill of 2010 to bring further 
changes in Chapter XV of the Religious Offences law to reduce its misuse and to 
protect the minorities of Pakistan; this action is discussed in the third part of the 
thesis.
47
  Though Jahangir and Rehman have clearly said that the law of blasphemy 
has threatened the justice system, human rights and politics of Pakistan, they also put 
much emphasis on the contemporary application and misuse of the law, and made 
little attempt to anchor their views in the past. 
As well as these major figures who will be discussed where appropriate in the 
thesis, there are a host of minor modern sources which it may be helpful to mention 
here: Mathews George Chunakara and Naeem Shakir,
48
 some publications by the 
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 reports and articles by Amnesty International,
54
 
and reports published by the Jinnah Institute.
55
  All of these people have tackled the 
issue, but have limited their approach to contemporary applications.  Although some 
of these authors attempt to review the historical application, they rely on just one of 
the incidents of Rajpal’s prosecution for writing Rangila Rasul which led the British 
to amend Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ in the 1920s.  This 
research, in contrast, has included other cases prosecuted for offensive publication 
such as the Trip to Hell, Risala-i-Vartman, Vichitra Jiwan and A Trip to Islam, which 
give another insight into the historical aspects of the issue, noting especially the 
amendments brought in Chapter XV of Religious Offences, still under the British, to 
protect anti-Muslim publications and subsequently other communities.  In particular, 
this argument has been developed by researching and discussing cases mentioned 





  Even the controversial action of banning Angare (embers) in the 1930s, 
demanded by the Muslims of Lukhnow, has been discussed to show the early misuse 
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The Research Approach and Time Scope 
The thesis briefly discusses the period 1837-1860, especially the origins of and 
amendments to the legislation in Chapter XV of the Religious Offences law.  It is not 
my intention to comment much on the issue of caste practices and culture in the 
Indian context, although it is important to note that caste practices were initially 
included but later deleted. Though caste practices were omitted, their legacy 
remained in major ethnic and social practices which can still be seen in contemporary 
accusations in Pakistan. 
1860-1920 is a significant period in terms of seeing the application of the 
law, especially the extent to which it brought the tolerance which British law 
enforcers claimed.  Some cases discussed in this period will show the main 
objectives of the law.  However, some cases also reveal that people in some ways 
misunderstood the context of the law and brought accusations to use the law to settle 
their personal scores, but such intentions were by and large negated by judges who 
saw through the personal animosity.  Apart from this it is also important to show that 
the British policy of encouraging freedom of discussion under section 298, though 
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revealing its own religious interests and advantages, gave freedom to all religious 
communities to cherish and speak of their views. 
1920-1947 is one of the important eras to show how the British were 
threatened by critical events occurring in Hindu-Muslim communalism both 
illustrated and incited by offensive publications.  This is the period when two 
communities were trying to legitimize their arguments on the one hand to protect 
their rights and on the other to defend their beliefs.  It is demonstrated how the 
British as mediators dealt with the issue of offensive speech and publication and 
brought in amendments to Chapter XV.  The 1920s and 1930s also show some 
examples of extra-judicial judgements and murders of those who insulted the Prophet 
Muhammad, the legacy of which remains later in Pakistan.  One of the important 
revisions of this period shows how the British government struggled to maintain their 
power threatened by the freedom movement which brought a controversial 
application of the law.  Finally the application of the law shifted to new political 
powers: India and Pakistan from 1947. 
The major reason for examining Chapter XV in the post-colonial period 
(1947-1979) is to see how it played an important role in protecting all communities 
in India and Pakistan (East and West Pakistan).  Initially on independence, all the 
countries promised to protect all communities, and adopted the British era law in its 
entirety with necessary changes of nomenclature.  However, it was a struggle to 
maintain Pakistan and India as secular states, which increasingly affected the original 
objectives of the legislation of ‘Religious Offences.’  Amid such conflicts, India 
gradually revised the original application of religious offences by the promulgation 
of the Conversion Act, and Pakistan took a significantly direction in Islamizing its 
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constitution which affected its ability to deal equitably with all religious 
communities.  In post-1947 Pakistan, animosity between Hindu and Muslim dropped 
although there were up to 20% Hindus in East Pakistan, but tensions rose in West 
Pakistan between Ahmadis and Muslims which affects religious offences. 
Post-1980s is the era which shows how the entire application of the 
legislation on religious offences was changed.  Since the law of blasphemy has been 
applied it has annulled the earlier British Religious Offences legislation.  The 
blasphemy law appears to be applied in contexts which may seem beyond the 
religious reach even of Islam.  The major aim of this research is to study what is 
commonly called the law of blasphemy, and actual accusations: that is, the historical 
and legal frame of the blasphemy law in Pakistan and the application of the law.  It is 
necessary to see whether all religious groups are equal and safe before the state law 
and how they are protected under the law of blasphemy.  If they are not, and the 
hypothesis is that they are not, the thesis will examine just who suffers under this law 
and how judicial, political and religious communities struggle to deal with religious 
prosecutions. 
Thus the main argument of this thesis is to describe, discuss and analyse 
historical claims to toleration and protection of communities from religious 
motivated offences and violence, seeing how they gradually shifted from one 
political authority to another with different understanding and application of 
religious offences.  Such shifts show how religion became a political slogan for 
authorities and how it changed the pattern of everyday living within and between 
communities which is current in Pakistan today.  All of the concerns regarding the 
law of blasphemy, especially its historically gradual evolution at the hands of 
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different governing officials and protesters, require exploration and discussion on a 
broad front. 
 
Approaches and Methodology of the Research 
The thesis has achieved its goal through field research including archives, library, 
personal interviews and the collection of various legal reports and case studies.  
Firstly, the primary source material on the British promulgation of the Indian Penal 
Code of 1860 and its objectives were viewed and used from the Bodleian Law 
Library of Oxford University, Edinburgh University Law Library, National Library 
of Scotland, and the British Library, London which specifically contains sources, 
documents, archives, and banned books belonging to British India. 
Secondly, the post-colonial application of the religious offences in India and Pakistan 
falls into different categories: 
1) To discuss the experience of East and West Pakistan’s dealing with religious 
offences, some commentaries on Pakistan Penal Code, the historical Munir 
Report: Report of the Court Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act 11 of 1954 
to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, and other cases studies 
have been used from Lahore High Court library. 
2) Various reports and books published by Christian and Muslim organizations 
especially Human Rights Commission and National Council of Justice and 
Peace, written on the contemporary implication of the law were collected 
during my field research in Pakistan. 
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3) Some modern sources (Ahmad, Nasr, Mailk, Musk, Jalal, Lau, Zaman 
available at the University of Edinburgh) have also been utilised to discuss 
the period of Islamising Pakistan. Contemporary scholarship on religious 
freedom of speech and blasphemy has been used from the Main Library of 
Edinburgh University and New College Library. 
4) Pakistani newspapers: Dawn, The News, The Daily Times and Nawa-e-Wakt 
have also been utilized. 
5) Online sources such as the Encyclopaedia of Islam and Quran (Brill Online) 
and information about the contemporary issues from the Jinnah Institute 
(www.jinnah-institute.org) and the Ahmadi website 
(www.thepersecution.org) have been used. 
6) Various articles from journals such as Almushir, South Asian History, Journal 
of Islamic Law and Culture, Indian Church History Review, American Centre 
for Law and Justice, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Rutgers Journal of Law 
& Religion, Law & Contemporary Problems, International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Asian Survey, The Journal of Social Studies, Connecticut 
Journal of International Law, and The Christian Century have been used. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis on Chapter XV of Offences Relating to Religion, presented in six 
chapters, has been divided in three historical parts covering the different periods.  
The first part discusses the law’s origin, early amendments, development and 
application of Chapter XV in the era when the country was under British rule.  The 
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second part notes the adaptation and application of Chapter XV after 1947 in the 
Independent Subcontinent (India and Pakistan).  The third part of the thesis discusses 
the amendments to and changes in the legislation on Offences Relating to Religion 
made from the 1980s and their implications for contemporary Pakistan. 
 
The Division of Chapters 
The first part of the thesis explores how the British dealt with the multi-religious 
background and religious conflicts of the Indian subcontinent.  The first chapter 
discusses why this law, Chapter XV, was able to take root and was promulgated in 
the subcontinent with its essential objective of bringing tolerance and protection from 
religiously motivated insult and violence.  The chapter shows various legal 
interpretations and case studies to explain the context of the legal procedure of 
religious prosecution under this law.  The second chapter discusses the continuing 
religious issues particularly affecting the mode of prosecution expressed in 
religiously offensive ‘speech and publications’ which became a religious, political 
and social threat to the colonial power.  The chapter investigates how such religious 
conflict led the British to modify the law and shows how they attempted to use 
religious offences for their colonial advantages.  The tendency to top-down control 
rather than support of the vulnerable implicit in these modifications and actual 
prosecutions remained after independence in the subcontinent in general and 
Pakistan in particular: but it began under the British. 
 The third chapter give a short review of Pakistan’s and India’s initially 
independent status, adopting religious offences laws and freedom of expression with 
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the major aim of protecting all religious communities.  However, both countries had 
difficulty in maintaining full secularism with consequent religious neutrality.  The 
Conversion Act of 1950 affected religious offences in India, and the Islamic political 
and religious policies of Pakistan not only affected the relationship between the East 
and West wings of Pakistan but also affected the early application of religious 
offences intended to protect all religious communities.  Having set out the common 
heritage in 1947, the chapter explains in some detail the evolution of India, and of 
West and East Pakistan. 
The fourth chapter specifically examines religious offences and their 
application from 1947 to 1976 in Pakistan.  It discusses the gradual procedure of 
Islamising the constitution of Pakistan in which the goal of maintaining a common 
national identity among all religious communities was lost.  It focuses on the limited 
application of Chapter XV of the Religious Offences law, pointing out that on the 
one hand the Pakistan judicial system successfully protected some Christians and 
Muslims accused under religious offences laws but on the other hand how the 
application of these same religious offences laws became controversial as they were 
used to restrict rather than protect the very vulnerable Ahmadis.  The process by 
which Ahmadi-Muslim conflicts became political protests which later played an 
important part in changing the constitution of Pakistan will be laid out.  In describing 
this change, the chapter reconsiders the core question of just what priorities the 
Muslim Ulama, Islamic religious parties and leader and government strategies were 
seeking to fulfil which led to the radical alteration in the religious offences law. 
The fifth chapter aims to explore the Islamic revolution of Islamic law from 
1977 to 1986 and the introduction of the blasphemy laws in the constitution of 
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Pakistan.  It mainly focuses on the presidency of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1987), when both 
the intentions of the blasphemy law and its penalties were significantly altered in 
Pakistan.  The chapter particularly discusses the category of blasphemy against the 
Prophet Muhammad, (Sabb al-Nabi or Qanoon-e-Toheen-e-Rasalat, section 295C) 
which prescribes a mandatory death sentence and fine for the accused, whether 
Muslim or non-Muslim, even when the offence in speech or publication was 
unintentional.  And the lesser charge of blasphemy against the Quran, usually 
attached to defiling or damaging a copy of the Quran (Qanoon-e-Toheen-e-Quran, 
section 295B), prescribes life imprisonment.  The implications of the blasphemy law 
will be discussed with some of the experiences of those who suffered, imprisoned or 
prosecuted under it.  The chapter examines how such changes in the religious 
offences have brought a different application of the law and how what can be seen as 
the procedural failure of Pakistan’s legal system, given the absence of an 
independent judiciary, leads religious communities, particularly minorities, to suffer 
grievously under the law of blasphemy. 
The sixth chapter shows the struggle and protest over the protection of 
religious communities and people alleged to have committed blasphemy, which has 
become a question of life and death in Pakistan.  The issue of blasphemy has been 
much disputed among political officials and religious groups after Zia-ul-Haq’s death 
but it remains a critical issue which has a deep impact on the community of Pakistan.  
The chapter discusses various political authorities, Muslims and non-Muslims, 
lawyers and religious groups, who have been appealing to make possible changes in 
the law but nothing has been done to protect the communities.  One of the continuing 
struggles is how on the one hand some are concerned with the critical application of 
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the law which they wish to review and revise, and on the other are people who wish 
to protect the sanctity of the Prophet and of Islam.  Officials, caught between the two 
and recognising the political and the brute strength of the latter group, do not try to 
change the law, either from fear that they, as others who have tried, will be killed, or 
because they are anxious not to be seen to oppose tenets of their own faith. 
The conclusion indicates just how religious and political interests have 
historically changed the direction of Pakistan and the application of the legislation on 
religious offences.  The politically powerful class now seems powerless to bring any 
further changes if it also wishes to protect its own political interest and power, and 
can be pressured by the mob, incited some time ago to lead historical protest and is 
now capable of bringing extra-judicial declarations, violence and lynching.  Amid 
such conflict, and with little capacity to control the law and its misuse, all full 
citizens of Pakistan will continue to suffer, as Pakistan faces religious anarchy and 





The Legislation on Religious Offences of the Indian Penal Code 
The Offences Relating to Religion, Chapter XV is one of the criminal codes of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh which was intended to prevent and control religiously 
motivated violence and in this has arguably been successful for much of its 
existence.  It pre-dates the creation of these countries (1860-1947), coming from the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 when the sub-continent was under military rule by 
the British during the Colonial Period.
59
  It was the period when the British regarded 
punishing crimes and maintaining law and order as the responsibility of the state, as 
proposed by Macaulay
60
 who believed that no country ever stood in such need of a 
law as India.
61
  Dealing with religious offences under the Penal Code was one of the 
significant strategies of the British law enforcers who claimed that ‘there is perhaps 
no country in which the government has so much to apprehend from religious 
excitement among the people.’
62
 
To keep religious harmony and tolerance, Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating 
to Religion’ of the Indian Penal Code was able to take root in the Indian subcontinent 
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and become a significant piece of legislation.  Chapter XV has been constantly 
tested, amended and criticised at different instances by lawmakers as well as 
enforcers for much of the period and with varying intensity.  For example, it was 
criticised before and after the initial application of this law and the new amendments 
to it during the Colonial Period between 1837 and 1858.  One of the major areas of 
discussion of Part 1 is how judicial and political forces came together to bring about 
significant changes and amendments to the law.  Before discussing this, however, we 
must review what kind of religious issues appeared to be the problem that the 
promulgation of Chapter XV was designed to alleviate, and what was the distinctive 
understanding and objective of British law enforcers to protect all religious 
communities of the Indian subcontinent. 
Overall, with regard to the ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ for India, it seems 
the Legislature, in enacting Chapter XV of IPC, intended to ensure religious freedom 
and ‘to punish, in a country populated by persons of widely different religions, 
deliberate acts or offences perpetrated by persons of religious persuasion.’
63
 
However, the potential for clashes among religious traditions meant the role of the 
foreign government was not an easy task.  The British Government observed with 
concern religious tensions and contradictions among various religions in the 
subcontinent.  Addressing religious issues was not new for the British Empire as 
‘Christianity is part and parcel of the law of the land [England].’
64
  Various religious 
offences known as blasphemy were included in the law to protect Christianity.  For 
instance, according to the (English) Christian Blasphemy Act 1679, it was a crime 
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for any Christian to deny publicly that Christianity is true or deny publicly the 
scriptures to be of Divine authority.
65
  For the British, offences relating to writing 
and publication were statutes restricting objectionable material about religion which 
had long been part of English Common Law.  Blasphemous writing as a category 
was developed by judges there between 1676 and 1922 to prevent anti-Christian 
writing and speech in Britain.
66
 
A review of this legislation suggests that the sections of the Chapter XV of 
‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of the Indian Penal Code follow the intention of 
English law.  For example, most of the religious statutes of English law were aimed 
at preventing disturbances in worship and church, disturbing the congregation, 
assaulting Christian ministers, breaking church windows or laying violent hands on a 
consecrated place, and that can also be seen in the Indian legislation on ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion’.
67
  These issues will be mentioned in the discussion of the 
various sections of Chapter XV later in this chapter.  The Legislature, in enacting 
Chapter XV, apparently had it in view that most of these English statutes deal with 
the offences against the Established Church, and offences against religious peace.  
They further note that: ‘for obvious reason the Indian religious offences in the Penal 
Code has no provision regarding offences against Christianity or against the Church 
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and the few sections in this chapter are directed against certain acts which are most 
likely to excite people to commit a riot or other breach of peace.’
68
 
Given that religious offence may be regarded as a serious crime within one 
religion, the practicalities become more complex and critical when multi-faith 
communities are encountered.  Before passing the religious offences section of the 
Indian code, law enforcers viewed the different kinds of insults that could happen in 
the religious communities of the subcontinent.  Consideration of minority and 
majority status as well as the supposed superiority and inferiority of different 
religions and different classes and castes could be one reason to insult another 
religion, especially if the discussion went into religious matters and claims of its sole 
truth and assertion that others were untrue or false.  This point is made in the review 
report by Macaulay: 
The question whether insults offered to a religion ought to be visited with punishment, 
does not appear to us at all to depend on the question whether that religion be true, or 
false. The religion may be false but the pain which such insults give to the professors of 
that religion is real. It is often, as the most superficial observation may convince us, as 
real a pain, and as acute a pain as is caused by almost any offence against the person, 
against property, or against character. Nor is there any compensating good whatsoever 
to be set off against this pain. Discussion, indeed, tends to elicit truth. But insults have 
no such tendency. They can be employed just as easily against the purest faith as against 
the most monstrous superstition. It is easier to argue against falsehood than against 
truth. But it is as easy to pull down or defile the temples of truth as those of falsehood. It 
is as easy to molest with ribaldry and clamour men assembled for purposes of pious and 
rational worship, as men engaged in the most absurd ceremonies. Such insults, when 
directed against erroneous opinions, seldom have any other effect than to fix those 
opinions deeper, and to give a character of peculiar ferocity to theological dissension. 
Instead of eliciting truth they only inflame fanaticism.
69 
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It was debated that religious encounter is sensitive and significantly it was 
suggested that the consequences of an insult could turn into violence, which may 
have led to the classifying of religious offences intended to respect the religious 
susceptibilities of persons of different religious beliefs.  For example, it was 
discussed in the early report on the law that British Christians are numerically a very 
small minority of the Indian population possessing the high Government posts and 
‘under their rule are placed millions of Mahomedans, of different sects...strongly 
attached to the fundamental articles... [and] creeds, and millions of Hindus strongly 
attached to doctrines and rites...’
70
 Contradictions accrued where religious 
communities followed different doctrines and beliefs as well as different practices of 
rituals. Following different beliefs derives from the holding of distinct 
understanding, as where a religion such as Christianity proclaims that Jesus is the 
only way of salvation and invites others to embrace it.  However, contest also arises 
not only through holding different beliefs but also through sharing some apparently 
similar beliefs differently understood.  For example, in Islam, anyone who believes 
in God, the Prophets of God, Gospel, final judgment and angels is counted a believer.  
However, conflict may exist when Muslims realize that Christians regard Christ as 
the son of God which Muslims see as the sin of polytheism (shirk), associating 
partners with God or giving his characteristics to others beside him.  Not only do 
conflicts of beliefs bring critical discussion but conflict is also significantly linked 
with religious conversion, the religious duty of the two main monotheistic religions 
in South Asia, Islam and Christianity, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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This research evidences the fact that religious rituals and practices remained 
critical sources of accusation and it was to control such issues that the British applied 
Chapter XV of religious offences.  For example, some riots occurred and intensified 
Hindu-Muslim relations when it was observed that practising different rituals such as 
slaughtering a cow and playing music of religious communities were contested and 
critical issues, especially where it is a sacred act of Muslims to sacrifice a cow, 
which is intolerable to Hindus who worship the cow.  Likewise music and singing 
disturbs Muslim worship but is a sacred practice of Hindus and Christians who use 
these elements during their worship.  Such issues led some of both communities to 
disgrace and damage the others’ places of worship, some accusations of which will 
be set out below. 
Likewise, places of worship were also vulnerable to damage where it was 
observed that building a certain mosque or temple had violated the sacredness of a 
certain religion.  For example, one of the riots which occurred in Banaras on the 
issue of defiling the place of worship when it was observed that a mosque was built 
by Aurangzeb in sight of the old Hindu temple.  In this conflict about fifty mosques 
were destroyed and hundreds of persons lost their lives in Banaras in 1809.
71
  The 
intensity of such practices was present before the application of Chapter XV which 
was intended to deal with the practice of different cases of the religious communities 
as the authors noted: 
...No offence in the whole Code is so likely to lead to tumult, to sanguinary outrage, and even 
to armed insurrection. The slaughter of a cow in a sacred place at Banaras in 1809 caused 
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violent tumult, attended with considerable loss of life. The population of a mosque at 
Bangalore was attended with consequences still more lamentable and alarming. We have 
therefore empowered the Courts in cases of this description, to pass a very severe sentence on 
the offender.
72 
Though various religious rituals, practices and controversies were already 
present before the enforcement of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ in 
British India, later performances of such rituals can be clearly linked to political and 
religious animosity among religious communities, which will be discussed later in 
the chapter.  Therefore based on these principles and discussions, the law enforcers 
declared that ‘such a state of things is pregnant with dangers which can only be 
averted by a firm adherence to the true principles of toleration.’
73
  According to 
Macaulay, controlling conflict among religious communities was the principal aim of 
Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ which declared: 
The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be 
desirable that all Governments should act, but from which the British Government in 
India cannot depart without risking the dissolutions of society. It is this, that every man 
should be suffered to profess his own religion, and that no man should be suffered to 
insult the religion of another.
74
 
It can be said that an early concern of the enforcers of the law was to bring 
religious tolerance to all communities and to punish acts such as insulting another 
religion that could endanger public tranquillity, which was a major concern of the 
law.  Generally this principle required every person to be liable to punishment 
without distinction of nation, rank, caste and faith provided the offence had been 
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committed in British India.
75
  Despite declaring the general objective of Chapter XV 
fairly swiftly, editing and criticism continued to be concerned with whether the 
structure and the categories listed under the Chapter XV would be flexible enough to 
cover all possible conditions of religious crimes and laws in the Indian subcontinent.  
There was a long delay (1837-1860) in passing it into law as the British Indian 
Government was concerned over uniformity and diversity in all issues relevant in an 
Indian context.
76
  The criticisms and amendments of the Chapter during this pre-
promulgation period will now be discussed. 
 
1.1. The Primary Amendments in Chapter XV in British India 
Some caste practices were considered to include religious crimes which could be 
taken under the law.  The original title of Chapter XV of IPC was ‘Offences Relating 
to Religion and Caste’ which included eight sections and punishments.
77
  In framing 
the caste practices Macaulay claimed that though the Hindu caste system was rooted 
and practised in India, where actions which would otherwise be considered criminal 
were based on caste traditions and practices, they were not an offence in any part of 
India.  The Hindu caste system is a wide subject beyond the present brief, but it is 
relevant to review some caste customs to which the British objected or which they 
saw as discriminatory which were initially included but then omitted from Chapter 
XV. 
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Macaulay added section 283 in Chapter XV, punishing caste practices such as 
dhurna, a method of obtaining justice such as the payment of a debt, by sitting and 
fasting before the Charan door of the person from whom reparation is sought, or even 
killing a child or adult.  Another caste practice, traga, was included which means 
self-immolation and the self-shedding of blood to enforce demands, practised by the 
Bard and castes.  There had long prevailed in India the practice of hiring a person of 
a particular religious caste to threaten to injure himself unless redress is given. Any 
person who practises this would have committed a religious crime under section 
283.
78
  J. Awdry, one of the British critics of the law, suggested that section 283 
related to these practices, is ‘...likely to suggest modes of annoyance to persons of 
adverse sects against each other.’
79
  M. Lewin observed that the punishment of such 
caste practices as dhurna or traga ‘should not be made to depend on the name of the 
Deity being invoked, or should any absurd alarm or belief be held to excuse an act in 
itself wrong.’
80
  Both critics advised omitting section 283 from the chapter as they 
were adequately dealt with elsewhere in the chapter.
81
 
The use of food to create conflict was included in sections 284 and 285, the 
former making it a religious offence to intentionally cause anyone to lose caste by 
eating food polluted by those of a lower caste
82
 and the latter making it an offence 
intentionally to cause food belonging to any person to be in a state in which that 
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 The full version of section 284 is ‘whoever with the intention of causing any person to lose cast, 
commits any assault which causes that person to lose cast, or induces that person to do ignorantly 
anything whereby that person incurs loss of cast, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to six months, or fine which may extend to two thousand 
rupees, or both.’ Macaulay, The Indian Penal Code, 49-50. 
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person cannot use it as food.
83
  Macaulay made clear that this was especially crucial 
for the high caste Brahmins, if lower castes intentionally mixed beef in food, causing 
the former to lose caste.  He argued that intentionally depriving a Hindu of his caste 
by assault or by deception was not an offence in any part of India, and proposed to 
make this ‘an offence, but not to deal with it severely.’
84
  It was argued by the 
reviewing committee that caste and what constitutes the loss of it should be clearly 
defined and fully explained in the legislation on Religious Offences.  J. F. Thomas 
suggested that losing caste could be dealt with in the religious sphere.  For example, 
Brahmins had a remedy in civil action to recover the amount necessary to procure the 
indemnification for temporary loss if someone intentionally added meat to their food.  
Apart from these suggestions it was also observed that the section would only uphold 
the Brahmins’ privilege of caste, high castes being able to misuse such a law by 
accusing lower castes without a genuine religious offence being committed.
85
  
Eventually, all sections relating to caste, including the Chapter title, were omitted, it 
being limited to four sections on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ and passed into 
Law in 1860 throughout India. 
Even though all caste sections were deleted from the chapter, there were 
however some cases where lower castes were accused of offending high castes which 
were brought under the legislation on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ in British 
India, an issue which will be seen later in the chapter.  It is also important to note that 
this is a legacy that has remained for religious ethnic groups who, for example, 
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converted to Christianity but remained lower class and un-touchable: in some cases 
they are still being accused of committing a religious offence which can be seen in a 
few such cases taken as religious offences under Chapter XV.  It is now necessary to 
consider just which offences could be prosecuted as religious offences in Chapter 
XV of IPC in British India. 
 
1.2. Chapter XV of 1860 
In the final edited Chapter XV of 1860, injuring or defiling a place of worship with 
intention (section 295), disturbing a religious assembly (section 296), trespassing on 
a place of worship and graveyard (section 297), uttering words or making gestures 
with intent to wound religious feelings (section 298) were among the offences so 
defined.  For British law enforcers, the edited Chapter XV covered all possible 
conditions and contested actions relating to religion which, when promulgated, 
would be enough to maintain the major objective of bringing tolerance among all 
religious communities in the Indian subcontinent.  It was certainly a hard aim to put 
into practice, as indicated by long and frequent juridical discourses which both 
criticised and insisted on the difficulty of deciding how the legislation on Religious 
Offences was to be applied in specific conditions and cases.  Despite the problems, 
there was no major change in the edited Chapter XV from 1860 till 1927, although 
during this period various ‘rules and regulations’ were declared to clarify the context 
of the law, such as what kind of ‘intention’ could be accepted to prosecute certain 
religious offences, discussed below, after the different sections of Chapter XV were 




1.3. Section 295 to Protect the Places and Objects of Worship 
This section makes punishable acts of destruction, damage or defilement committed 
by anyone, even if the person is a worshiper of the sacred place which he or she has 
defiled.  Originally the punishment for defiling places was seven years imprisonment 
which was later reduced to two years.
86
  This section is similar to the English law 
which protects Church property and its surroundings from damage or theft of the 
property belonging to the church.
87
  According to Russell the law related to: 
Affrays in a church or churchyard have always been esteemed very heinous offences, as 
being very great indignities to the Divine Majesty, to whose worship and service such 
places are immediately dedicated; and upon this consideration all irreverent behaviour 
in these places has been esteemed criminal by the makers of our laws. Several statutes 
have been passed for the purpose of preventing disturbances in places of worship 
belonging to the Established Church...
88 
The objective of the English Blasphemy Law was to protect Christian sacred places 
and churches, but the religious offences in the British Indian subcontinent, especially 
section 295, had a broader application used to protect sacred places or objects such as 




Section 295 of IPC requires two things for a prosecution.  Firstly, there must 
have been some destruction, damage or defilement to a place or worship or object 
held sacred, including inanimate objects such as idols in Hindu temples or in 
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churches or the like, and animate objects such as cows or bulls.
90
  Secondly, such 
destruction must have been done with the intention to insult and with the knowledge 
that a person is likely to consider such destruction as an insult to religion in that 
place.
91
  Both points will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
1.3.1. The Accusation of Defiling a Place or Object of Worship  
Continuing the discussion of the first requirement of section 295, mentioned above, it 
is necessary to explore what kind of destruction, damage or defilement counted for 
an accusation to be taken seriously.  The words ‘destroy’ and ‘damage’ mainly 
indicate material objects and acts which are designed to cause a particular result.  It 
was held by Muthuswami Airye that the word ‘defile’ has a broader meaning that 
does not only mean to make a sacred place unclean or dirty but to render a place or 
an object ceremonially or ritually impure.
92
  For the accusation under section 295 the 
place or object must be sacred.  Here the meaning of the sacredness of ‘place’ and 
sacredness of ‘object’ is different and cannot be merged. 
 
1.3.2. The Meaning of a Sacred Place of Worship  
Considering the sacredness of place, common examples of such sacred places are 
mosques, churches or temples but in addition to these other designated places may be 
considered sacred.  A case lacking proof of ‘sacred place’ cannot be brought under 
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this section.  If people consider any other place sacred, the place must have been 
consecrated for worship or for some sacred ritual.  For example, Hindus, apart from 
having properly built temples, consecrate some places by placing a stone painted 
with ochre to mark the spot and also regard the water of the Rivers Ganga and 
Narbada as sacred.  There are many other local places that can be considered sacred 
but in all such cases the prosecutor must have proof that the ‘defiled’ place was 
actually held sacred.  Considering this issue, Hari Singh Gour notes one of the cases 
under section 295 when after having a quarrel with a relative in 1898 the accused 
threw cooked food (fish, fowl and rice) into a well.  He was convicted under section 
295 of IPC for desecrating the sacredness of the well but that case was annulled on 
appeal as no evidence was found that the well was a sacred place or object.
93
 
In the case of Islamic sacred places, apart from mosques, certain Muslims fly 
a green flag from places such as tombs called dargahs or burial grounds which they 
regard as objects of veneration.  Such places could be as sacred as a mosque, clearly 
a place of worship, if a declaration of waqf has been made in Shari’a law, which 
blocks off a property and allows the revenue from that particular area to be used for 
the cause of Allah or worship.
94
  For example, one of the cases which occurred in the 
colonial era was made by the few Muslims of Kujra North India in 1941 regarding a 
hut used for prayers without the permission from the landlord.  It was declared that 
the use of any place like that hut for public call to prayers, called azan, could not be 
converted into a place of worship or object as contemplated by section 295.  It was 
also held that the owner of that hut had a right to allow either Muslims or Hindus to 
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use the hut as a place of worship but if the owner had not dedicated such place for 
worship, it could not be said that the place had been consecrated for the public 
worship.  Therefore no one can be convicted for insulting the sacred place when 
there is no evidence to show that such place was an accepted place of worship.
95
 
The reason for the accusation as described in the above cases shows the 
misreading or misuse of the context where ‘dishonouring places of worship’ has been 
raised.  Notably most of the cases like this were said not to show a genuine religious 
offence even though courts had clearly discussed the context and dismissed the case.  
It can also be seen that courts review the background of the cases: Hindu-Muslim 
tension based on religious differences, for example, was one of the major causes of 
bringing accusation such as where the hut had been used as a place of worship.  The 
Court significantly examined and dismissed the case in which Hindus of that 
community had become apprehensive that the hut might be converted into a mosque 
and secondly, the more serious historical issue where the Hindu community of Kujra 
was concerned that the slaughter of the cow might have violated the Hindu belief.  It 
is for this reason that special care was taken to clarify the term sacred object in each 
case within the meaning of section 295 of IPC. 
 
1.3.3. The Meaning of a Sacred Object 
There are different explanations of the meaning of the word ‘object.’ According to 
the Calcutta High Court, the term ‘sacred object’ means ‘something with an object of 
worship, such as an idol or a picture, something that is capable of destruction in the 
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sense in which that word is ordinarily used, or of damage or defilement.’
96
  For 
instance, custom ordains that an untouchable whose touch, in the opinion of Hindu 
belief, is impure should not enter the enclosure surrounding the shrine of any Hindu 
god: any untouchable with the knowledge of this belief who deliberately enters 
temples and defiles sacred objects commits an offence and can be prosecuted under 
section 295.
97
  One example is a Hindu temple practice in which persons especially 
appointed for the purpose and observing set rules touch the idol or pour coconut 
water on it (abishkam).  Anyone who performs the ‘abishkam’ deliberately with the 
object of openly ridiculing the established rule can be convicted under section 295.
98
 
Apart from including the rituals as an object, it was debated whether animals 
such as bulls or cows, sacred animals according to Hindu faith, constitute ‘objects’ 
under section 295 of IPC.  The High Court of Allahabad and the High Court of 
Calcutta held that the word ‘object’ in the section 295 includes inanimate objects 
such as sacred places and rituals but does not include animate objects like cows and 
bulls.  The argument was discussed in a case in which Imam Ali and Amiruddin were 
convicted by the magistrate of Shahjahanpur under section 295. They were 
prosecuted for killing a cow on 30
th
 August 1887, at Tilhar municipality, Muazampur 
Street on the side of the public highway.  The Magistrate found that they knew well 
that the killing of the cow was considered an insult by Hindus who consider it a 
sacred object, and he fined them Rs 25 each.  The case was appealed and the sole 
question was whether the word ‘object’ could be extended to animate objects such as 
                                                 
96
 Lal, The Indian Penal Code, 1324; Nelson, The Indian Penal Code, 1363. 
97
 Atma Ram v. Emperor, (1924) 25 Cr. L. J. 155 in Lall, The Indian Penal Code, 1325; M. H. 
Nizami, Supplement to Complementary on the Pakistan Penal Code (Karachi: Law Book House, 
1954), 214. 
98
 Gokulavanam, A Guide to the Indian Penal Code, 151; Lal, The Indian Penal Code, 1325. 
47 
 




The Chief Court of Punjab held the meaning and usage of the word ‘object’ 
of section 295 was not limited to inanimate objects, and was wide enough to include 
animate objects like cows or bulls.
100
  But like the sacred place, the object has to be 
sacred and should be worshiped or capable of so being, the decision being made 
carefully by the courts, and a distinction made between objects that, on one hand, can 
be sacred and on the other, ones which are merely venerated while not being sacred.  
For instance, a tomb of a Muslim saint is an object of veneration but it is not a sacred 
object unless it shows evidence of consecration and is so used by Muslim 
worshippers.
101
  J. Brandt observed: 
There is a distinction, not arbitrary, between objects which are objects of respect and 
even veneration and objects which are held sacred; as an example of the former, I may 
refer to a sepulchre...as distinguished from a place of worship to the deity, or where an 
idol; or altar is kept; and such distinction appears to have been kept in view by the 
Legislature, for while section 295 deals with the latter class of objects and places...
102
 
The mere defilement or destruction of a sacred place or object which was clarified by 
courts is not an offence under the section 295.  In order to sustain a conviction, there 
must be an intention of thereby insulting which is the most important ingredient of 
this section.  Notably, all religious communities are entitled to be punished according 
to the nature and intention of the offence.  Intention includes the mental capacity and 
knowledge to insult through such an act and, separately or at the same time, through 
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words uttered, gestures assumed, threats given or the determination expressed.
103
 
Legal action cannot be taken to punish an accused unless and until the status of 
intention is clear. 
 
1.3.4. The Meaning of ‘Intention’ of Section 295 
Before any conviction can be secured under section 295, the ‘intention of insulting’ a 
religious place or object must be clear.
104
  For the act must be intended to cause, or 
knowingly be likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to any person by injuring any 
property, whether it belongs to that person or not.
105
  For example, a case brought 
under section 295 was rejected on the grounds that the appellant was not aware that 
removing some materials from a small old disused fallen-down building would hurt 
the feelings of Muslims.
106
  Likewise, the Sheo Shankar appeal was allowed, in 
which the high-caste accused had destroyed a sacred thread worn by a Sudra, a lower 
caste of Hindus.  The accused was judged not to have insulted Hindu religion 
because in the court’s view Ahria and Sudra castes are not entitled to wear it, 
wearing it is not a part of their religion and as such destroying a thread worn by them 
in assertion of a mere claim to a rank could not amount to an insult to their religion.  
However, the Court stated that if a Muslim, Christian or atheist tore off the sacred 
thread worn by a Hindu who was entitled to wear it, this would be likely to be 
considered as a disrespectful insult and thus an offence against the Hindu religion 
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dealt with by section 295 of IPC.  The Court observed that the matter was not truly a 
religious matter for the plaintiff but rather an injury to his dignity and status as a high 
caste Hindu.  Therefore a conviction under section 295 of IPC was dismissed.
107
 
In the first instance, certain acts cannot be prosecuted where the intention of 
insulting the sacred place or object is not involved.  Secondly certain acts may offend 
another religious community but cannot be regarded as a religious offence because of 
the other’s having religious legal rights.  For example, there are many cases where 
Muslims slaughtering cows, sheep and goats were looked down on by Hindus who 
insisted that any cow slaughter was intolerable to them and caused riots, yet Muslims 
insisted upon their right to sacrifice cows.
108
  It is significant to note that the claim of 
protecting or sacrificing the cow was one of the critical issues which became a 
political icon for Hindus in their conflicts with Muslims. Muslims fought 
successfully to have their religious freedom ritually to sacrifice a cow.
109
  Yet while 
the legal right to sacrifice existed, this was voided when Muslims deliberately and 
intentionally offended Hindus by actions surrounding the slaughter, the moral 
obligation not intentionally to insult applying.  For such acts, specific rules and 
regulations of sacrificing were added to the Code of Criminal Procedure: cows 
should be slaughtered in the slaughter house, any procession or parades of sacrificial 
and decorated animals indicating impending slaughtered was prohibited, and any 
exhibiting of the flesh was prohibited, unless covered.  All these rules were declared 
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to control outrageous intention which ‘hurt the feelings of others [Hindus].’
110
  In 
such regulations any Muslim who killed a cow in the presence of other Muslims, not 
in the slaughter house, only to use its meat and skin, cannot be accused of religious 
offence under section 295, although had it been done intentionally in front of Hindus, 




After discussing all clauses of section 295 of IPC, it is clear that no case can 
be proceeded with unless the basic ingredients such as the sacredness of the place of 
worship and the intention of doing the act as a religious insult are proven.  It is also 
worth noting that new rules and regulations were brought in to clarify the notion of 
intention.  Hindu-Muslim tension based on the cow issue remained in British India, 
although it seems the colonial courts were by and large successful in excluding 
personal animosity behind accusations under section of 295, although the exclusion 
of personal motives cannot be certain. 
 After protecting the sacred places and objectives, Chapter XV of ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion’ advanced in another direction to prevent voluntarily causing 
disturbance to any assemblies lawfully engaged in religious worship under section 
296.  The aim of the following discussion is to view the context of religious 
assembly and worship of any religious class which was generally protected from 
external interruption and disturbance.  What kind of intention of disturbance could be 
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prosecuted and the extent to which interference in religious assembly was allowed is 
the focus of the next section. 
 
1.4. Section 296 of IPC to Protect Religious Assemblies 
Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the 
performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, or with both.
112 
According to Gour, section 296 corresponds with the English law under Mary I, the 
Queen of England (1516 –1558) in the statute (I Mary, sess.2. c. sec. 2) against 
disturbance during the time of Church Service.
113
  Under that statute, the church in 
the reign of Mary Tudor in early reformed England saw the restoration of Catholic 
worship and assembly.
114
  In order to be punished under that statute, the disturbance 
of the assembly had to be shown to have been caused intentionally and presumably 
by dissenting Protestants.
115
  Later the Toleration Act of 1689 of England permitted 
Roman Catholics and Dissenters under certain conditions to worship according to 
their own agreed forms, any following a different form being ‘not lawfully engaged 
in worship,’ and thus not protected.
116
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This condition in English law such as voluntarily disturbing a lawful 
assembly of worship is included in section 296 of IPC, the only difference being that 
section 296 in the subcontinent applies to disturbance caused to religious assemblies 
among the diverse religious communities of British India.  In the Indian context the 
issue of disturbing religious assemblies is not only based on external interruption or 
changes to the assembly’s worship or tradition but also on giving religious freedom 
to discuss religious matters in religious gatherings and assemblies as discussed in 
section 296 of IPC. 
 
1.4.1. Main Ingredients of Section 296 
To constitute an offence under section 296 (i) there must be a voluntary and 
intentional disturbance to an assembly engaged in religious worship or religious 
ceremonies; and (ii) the assembly must be lawfully engaged in such worship or 
ceremony, that is, it must be doing what it has a right to do as discussed in the 
following points. 
 
1.4.2. Voluntarily Causing Disturbance in the Religious Worship or 
Religious Ceremonies under Section 296 
The general objective of this section is to secure freedom from molestation when 
people get together for their religious ceremonies.  The original section 296, 
submitted in 1837 before its promulgation, was limited to describe the disturbance 
intentionally done in the ‘place of worship’ which was later replaced by ‘whoever 
53 
 
voluntarily disturbs the ceremony of worship.’
117
  However, the final edited version 
of section 296 referred to whoever voluntarily disturbs religious ceremonies which 
may or may not take place in a place of worship.
118
  So what is this offence that has 
been done ‘voluntarily’ within the meaning of section 296?  According to section 39 
of IPC, an act can be done voluntarily when the person ‘causes it by means whereby 
he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he 
knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.’
119
  Describing wilful 
disturbance, the English Criminal Law Commissioners said: 
We have included within the predicament of wilful offenders not only such as directly intend 
to inflict a particular injury, but also all such as wilfully and knowingly incur the hazard of 
causing it...the proper suggestion of guilt in such cases is...that a man is presumed to intend 
the natural or probable consequences of his own act, gives to words which denote intention, 
the meaning here annexed to “voluntarily.”
120
 
In a ‘voluntary disturbance’ case it was still not clear whether it includes interrupting 
a service of religious worship or ceremony or interrupting certain acts to harm or 
harass people.  Missionaries had objected to section 296 and raised two concerns 
regarding the meaning of ‘voluntarily causing disturbance,’ particularly where their 
intention was not to hurt but to share religious matters and to proselyte others.  
Firstly, it was argued that places of worship are not the only places where people 
gather for religious worship as other people, mostly Hindus, use places such as 
melas, festivals and places like Juganath and Ganga Sagar for religious observance.  
It was discussed whether missionaries committed an offence when they: 
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Quietly commence the reading of an inoffensive tract, and when curiosity or some other 
motive has gathered around him a small number of persons, may proceed to proclaim the 
message of the Gospel of God our Saviour, and thereby become liable to what hitherto he 
was not, an accusation of wilfully causing disturbance to an assembly lawfully engaged in 
the performance of religious worship.
121 
That observation generally meant that missionaries could not be convicted for sitting 
and sharing calmly the Christian faith unless they insulted or threatened to insult the 
religious assembly of any religious group.  This concern was not only based on 
interfering in other religious assemblies but also being interfered with or interrupted 
by Hindus and Muslims during church worship without any aggression and threat to 
them, as discussed by law enforcers: 
Supposing him to speak with all the calmness and moderation ascribed to the 
missionary, would not the whole assembly be moved with indignation? Would not the 
mere fact of his raising his voice in such an assembly on such an occasion and to such 
purpose be justly felt as an aggression, an insult? And would it not be thought that 




The committee of law enforcers, bearing in mind the meaning of ‘voluntarily,’ 
decided that ‘the section did not apply to persons who engage in friendly discussion 
together, and that a disturbance caused by the interference of third persons in such 
discussions is not a disturbance voluntarily caused by the missionary or his 
hearers.’
123
  Secondly, it was proposed that while it should not be a crime to enter 
with moderation and calmness, a conviction was possible only if those entering did 
so to insult or threaten to insult or even assault non-Christians engaged in religious 
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ceremony.  The law commissioners declared that ‘nobody can be convicted... who 
has not been guilty of aggression...’
124
 
Therefore according to the arguments given above, the section on voluntarily 
causing disturbance was not intended to exclude people from taking part in religious 
worship, but rather to prosecute where someone has actually intended to disturb or 
interrupt with aggression or to harm.  The offence under section 296 cannot be 
dismissed where this intention is due to religious animosity and hostility, or other 
cause
125
 for it would be a religious crime under section 296 of IPC if an accused 
voluntarily and knowingly actually caused a disturbance.
126
  It should also be clear 
what ‘disturbed’ constitutes in section 296 of IPC.  The word ‘disturbance’ here 
means molest, let, vex or trouble, or in any other unlawful way to disquiet a religious 
assembly.
127
  It means the peace of the assembly should not be interrupted, whether 
by sound, noise, or any other diversion that can disturb the assembly as illustrated in 
one of the cases.  In 1885, a mosque in Muhalla Madanpura, Banaras was used by 
Hanafis
128
 according to whose tenets the word amin (amen) is spoken in a low tone 
of voice.
129
  The accused, Ramazan, Muhammad Husain, and Abdul Rehman, who 
formerly belonged to Hanafis but had lately become Wahabi, were using that 
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mosque, and in the course of prayer they called the word amin in a loud tone as 
required by the tenets of their new sect.  They were not held liable under section 296 
as there was no voluntary disturbance of any assembly.
130
  The main ground for the 
prosecution was of a different sect saying the word amin loudly.
131
 
The full Bench ordered the case to be re-tried to investigate whether there 
was a lawful assembly and whether it was, in fact, disturbed act or behaviour by the 
accused.  The Court was bound by section 57 of Act 1 of 1872 (Evidence Act) to 
take judicial account of ‘Islamic Law.’  It was held by J. Mahmood that Islamic law 
should be used in all questions regarding any religious usage or institution.  The act 
of the accused took place during the interval when prayers were not going on and at 
that time the assembly was not engaged in the performance of religious worship and 
was not actually disturbed voluntarily within the meaning of section 296.
132
  It was 
also held that there is no indication in the Islamic law schools that pronouncing the 
word amin can be a cause of injury to the prayers of any other person.  Regarding the 
question of the new Islamic Wahabi sect it was held that all Muslims are entitled to 
enter a mosque and perform their worship or prayer and say the word amin and when 
this word is pronounced loudly in the honest exercise of conscience it is not an 
offence and cannot be prosecuted under section 296.  However, if any Muslim goes 
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into the mosque not for religious purposes but to create a disturbance and to interfere 
with the devotion, he is criminally accountable under section 296.
133
 
In reviewing this case it could be argued that breaking traditional practice by, 
for example, saying amin in the worship loudly could in certain circumstances be 
regarded as religious offence, but this case concerned personal advantages as well as 
religious conflict.  According to the statement of Ramazan, the accused in this case, 
there was a dispute between him and Abdullah, who was in charge of the mosque, 
regarding the Mosque accounts.  The Court held that saying of amin aloud had been 
made the pretext for the prosecution with the object of stopping the accused from 
requesting the prosecutor to ask Abdullah to render accounts of the disbursement of 
the income of the property belonging to the mosque.  It was held that this case was 
not liable under the section 296 as no one voluntarily disturbed the assembly.
134
  It 
can be seen that section 296 in this case was used as a tool to settle a personal score. 
It can be argued that the majority of the worshipers may bring an accusation to 
deprive the minority, the accusers in this case, of the right of worship or to make 
them silent, a point which had been brought up earlier in the pre-promulgation 
discussions cited above. 
It has also been seen that particular social and political circumstances of 
British India impacted on society in ways related to the religious issue of disturbing 
religious assembly.  For example, in the cases of Kolimi Mahabub v. Sri 
Sidheswaraswami, permission was given to the Muslim community between 1904 
to1905 to build a new mosque in the village, on a particular site.  Tensions started 
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only in 1939 when Muslims objected to Hindu processions that had long been 
accustomed to passing by with music.  Hindu residents of the village sued for their 
rights to pass in procession to the accompaniment of music, which they achieved 




Considering the contemporary political circumstances of the case it cannot be 
denied that the subcontinent was struggling for independence from the British 
Empire.  The growth of Muslim separatism from the late 19th century and the rise of 
communal violence from the 1920s were major contributory factors to independence.  
However, it was only from the late 1930s that independence was felt to be possible 
by partition, creating two sovereign nations of India and Pakistan.
136
  It has been 
argued that religion was one of the powerful tools that was a driver for 
independence.
137
  Considering this background it can be argued that the case of 
Kolimi Mahabub v. Sri Sidheswaraswami straddles two different periods.  Probably 
it was not an issue when the mosque was built between 1904 and 1905 when the 
Muslim community was not disturbed by Hindus as they customarily passed by with 
the music.  However, it became an issue between 1938 and1945, when the question 
of gaining independence of the subcontinent from Britain arose and the question of a 
separate state for Muslims was at its peak.  However contemporary social and 
political issues did not support the conviction under the case, as has been discussed 
above.  It was held that playing music before a mosque was not an offence and could 
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not be taken under section 296 which demands a substantial and not fanciful 
disturbance of religious worship.
138
 
Apart from the voluntarily causing disturbance in religious assembly in 
section 296, it is also necessary to review whether the assembly is lawfully engaged 
in religious worship or not.  Like the meaning of voluntarily disturbance, religious 
worship of any class can only be interrupted if it was lawfully constituted. 
 
1.4.3. Lawful Engagement of Assembly for the Performance of 
Religious Worship 
To come within the protection afforded by section 296 of IPC the assembly must be 
essentially a religious assembly rather than any unlikely gathering,
139
 an assembly of 
three being adequate although if it is not a religious assembly, even if carrying out its 
proceedings under such a rubric, it would not be protected under this section,
140
 an 
assembly being a meeting where people are together for a common and formal 
purpose of worship.  For example, it is a practice among Hindus to meet at each 
other’s house to hear Bhajans, religious songs and Kathas, religious stories, but this 
would not be considered religious worship or a religious ceremony.  Macaulay had 
proposed that this section should apply to disturbance ‘in a place of worship’ and the 
missionaries who objected to the section were answered by the Indian Law 
Commissioners that it was restricted to a place of worship where persons of other 
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religions have no right to enter and where they would be trespassers.
141
  However, it 
was also added that, just as the missionaries would resent the intention of Hindus and 
Muslims impugning their faith, so too would the latter be offended by the intention 
of the missionaries. 
It is also necessary that the assembly is lawfully gathered for worship 
according to their faith or religion.  The word ‘lawfully’ applies when the assembly 
meets together in a proper place to do what is proper.  It was declared that no 
particular religious sect or class has a right to appropriate a public highway for 
worship even temporarily as it causes obstruction, inconvenience or annoyance to the 
public.  However, considering religious gathering outside worship places, all 
religious communities are entitled to have religious processions through public 
streets but they should not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets but equally 
the public should not interfere by disturbing the religious procession that is being 
held in the streets.
142
  In the case of ‘Vijairaghave Chariar v. Emperor,’ Justice 
Bhashyam Ayyangar (13 M. L. J. 171) was inclined to the view that within the 
meaning of this section, no assembly can be lawfully engaged in the performance of 
religious worship or religious ceremony on a highway unless it is established, or can 
be reasonably so presumed, that the dedication of the highway included such use.  
For example, a procession during the Islamic Muharram can be lawfully done on a 
highway and such assembly cannot be convicted under section 296.
143
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The British legislation on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ moves from 
protecting religious assemblies for worship to other areas of protecting religious 
funeral ceremonies from disturbance and preventing trespass in places of worship.  It 
is significant to note that the practice of section 297 does not refer to religious 
feelings in particular but is based on the emotions of the bereaved and respect for the 
dead in British India as discussed later. 
 
1.5. Section 297 of IPC: Protecting Funeral Rights and the Human 
Corpse 
Whoever, with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or of insulting the 
religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are likely 
to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted thereby, 
commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any place of sepulchre, or any place 
set apart for the performance of funeral rites or as a depository for the remains of the 
dead, or offers any indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance to any person 
assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, or with both.
144 
Section 297 of IPC extends the principle laid down in section 295 concerning sacred 
places, following English Common Law, which declares it is a crime to remove, 
without lawful authority, a corpse from a grave in a burying ground belonging to a 
congregation of Protestant Dissenters.
145
  Places reserved for the cremation or burial 
of the dead are universally to be regarded with veneration as sacred to the memory of 
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the dead and that is certainly the case for followers of different religious 
communities. 
Section 297 initially only applied to a sepulchre, but its scope was extended 
in accordance with the recommendation of the British Law Commissioners who 
thought the word ‘sepulchre,’ the proper meaning of which is burial or interment, 
was not sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the Indian context.  It was declared 
that section 297 punishes a person who commits trespass in any place of worship, 
any place of burial, any place set apart for the performance of funeral rites or a 
depository for the remains of the dead, offends any dignity of any human corpse, or 
causes disturbance to any person assembled for the performance of funeral 
ceremonies.
146
  Degrees of criminality under section 297 depend upon ‘intention’ or 
knowledge. 
 
1.5.1.  Intention as Essence of the Offence under Section 297 
Intention is again the substance of the offence under section 297.  The act must relate 
to the religion or hurting the feelings of any person by the commission of an act. 
Mere suspicion of malicious intention is insufficient to prosecute the case.
147
 
Therefore the essence of section 297 is an ‘intention’ to offend feelings, or insult 
religion which can be prosecuted ‘when with that intention either (i) trespass on a 
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place of sepulchre, (ii) indignity of corpse, or (iii) disturbance to persons assembled 
for funeral ceremonies, is committed...’
148
 
Any person who destroys or disturbs a place of religious worship or a 
sepulchre with the intention of wounding the feelings of any another person, or with 
the knowledge that the feelings of a person are likely to be wounded, is liable.
149
  For 
example, in one such case in 1896, the accused, Subhan, entered a burial place and 
ploughed up a grave with the permission of the owner, but here the perpetrators were 
held liable under section 297 of IPC as the act was done intentionally to hurt the 
feelings of others and the knowledge of potential injury was sufficient.  In the Court, 
considering these elements of section 297, J. Knox, delivering the judgement, said 
that ‘the act of petitioners was an act of injury of sepulchre, and it was an act which 
they must have known would have been likely to wound the feelings of others.’
150
  
Though ‘intention’ in section 297 is significant, the offence occurs when the action 
also involves ‘trespass’ in a place of sepulchre, an indignity to a corpse, or 
disturbance to people assembled for a funeral ceremony. 
 
1.5.2. Trespass and Prosecution 
The term trespass as defined in section 297 of IPC means any violent or injurious act 
committed in such a place and with such a knowledge or intention as stated in the 
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  In various cases the trespass is committed within the sepulchre or sacred 
place and dishonours the dead body or remaining part of it in the grave. 
Firstly, ‘trespass of sepulchre’ can be seen in the case where, in 1915, Umar 
Din, the accused, dug up and levelled certain graves existing on a plot of land, called 
Khasra No. 383 which is described in the Revenue Records as graveyard and waqf 
property in Lahore.  It had been sold to him by the owners of an adjoining shrine of 
Shah Abdul Maali in Lahore and the case was successfully prosecuted under section 
297.  Notably, ‘a cemetery or graveyard is consecrated ground and cannot be sold or 
partitioned... but when a place is found not to be a maqbra (a burial ground) but only 
one or two bodies are buried there, the actual spot is where the bodies lie buried is 
consecrated.’
152
  It was held that the act of destroying or disturbing a place of 
sepulchre hurts the religious feelings of the persons whose relatives were buried in 
the graves no matter whether the land on which the sepulchre is does or does not 
belong to the person guilty of the alleged act.
153
 
Secondly, ‘trespass of assaulting sacred place or place of worship’ with the 
knowledge and intention that the feelings of persons would be wounded falls under 
section 297.
154
  According to Allahabad Court (Queen v. Subhan 1896 I. L. R. 
Allahabad 395) and Calcutta Court (Jhulan Sain v. Emperor 40 c.548) the question 
of the true meaning of the work ‘trespass’ as used in section 297 was directly 
involved, and the view expressed by the judges was that this word in this section has 
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not the same meaning as in the expression ‘criminal trespass’ which is defined in 
section 441 of IPC.
155
  In section 297 it must be taken to have been used in its 
original meaning, covering any injury or offence done coupled with entry upon 
property which is sacred for religious worship.
156
 
Thirdly, ‘trespassing in the burial ground, dead body or its remaining parts’ is 
another kind of religious offence under section 297.  Considering this aspect of 
section 297, a burial ground of any religious community can also be protected for a 
certain religious community, even if it is not clearly in use.
157
  Any act of trespass 
with the specified intention or knowledge by which the feelings of the relations of 
the dead are wounded would come under section 297.
158
  For example, in a case in 
1911, Ram Prasad entered a grove in Sindhauli and dug up certain graves and 
exposed the bones of the persons, residents of the village of Sindhauli who were 
buried there.  He was convicted under section 297 because the accused, as well as the 
joint owner of the land, had entered the land with intention or knowledge that what 
he was about to do was offensive to his fellow-residents.
159
 
Apart from trespassing on a corpse or burial ground, anyone can also be 
prosecuted if they disturb a group gathered for a funeral, though the word 
disturbance is only relevant where there is actual interference or hindrance to the 
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performance of the funeral ceremonies.
160
  Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion,’ after protecting sepulchre and burial places and ceremonies in section 297, 
moves to the last section, 298, which protects against outraging words and acts of 
wounding any religious class.  Under section 298, the nature of wounding the 
religious feelings of another religious class has changed somewhat from the earlier 
clauses, which reveals the wide scope of the section including freedom of religious 
discussion in British India.  It is important to note that section 298 also demonstrates 
political interests and the religious advantages given to monotheistic religions to 
discuss their religious views freely.  Therefore it is needed to consider to what extent 
religious freedom was given to religious communities under section 298 and who 
could be accused under it. 
 
1.6. Section 298 of IPC to Protect Against Acts Wounding Another 
Religion 
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, 
utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person, or makes any gesture 
in the sight of that person, or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with fine, or with both.
161
 
Section 298 of IPC is the last section that punishes the doing of certain acts with the 
deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person.  This section 
follows English law which sought to protect only Christian faith and doctrine.  At 
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one time to write against Christianity was an offence in English Common Law.  
From the 16th century to the mid-19th century, blasphemy against Christianity 
(mainly applying to the Church of England) was held an offence against common 
law: ‘to speak or otherwise publish any matter blaspheming God, e.g., by denying 
His existence or providence, or contumeliously reproaching Jesus Christ, or vilifying 
or bringing into disbelief or contempt or ridicule, Christianity in general, or any 
doctrine of the Christian religion, or the Bible.’
162
 
The English blasphemy law supports the Established Protestant Church and 
therefore punishes all irreverence, which could include or be aimed at the state.  In 
British Indian territory, the legislature was much exercised about what policy to 
sanction, but at last decided in favour of religious neutrality and freedom of religious 
discussions.  The difference between section 298 of IPC and English Blasphemy Law 
is that the former treats all religions alike and pays no attention to irreverent 
comment of any religion as long as it is not uttered to cause offence to the other’s 
religious feelings with the intentions of insult.  Section 298 was much discussed and 
criticised before its promulgation, particularly to clarify the legal status of religious 
discussion and proselytization which was much discussed in the lead-up to the 1860 
promulgation and is still of considerable interest in light of present practice in the 
north-western section of formerly British India. 
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1.6.1. Religious Freedom of Discussion under Section 298 
Generally, section 298 relates to spoken words and religious discussion uttered in the 
presence of a person with the intention of wounding his religious feelings.  It was felt 
difficult to discern the context and intention particularly where section 298 makes it 
an offence for anyone who utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that 
person with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings.  Reviewing 
potential accusations of offensive religious conversation among religious 
communities under section 298, Norton observed that ‘it was impossible to say to 
what absurdities the criminality of uttering any word or making any gesture in 
hearing or sight of a person with the intention of wounding his religious feelings may 
be carried out.’  J. F. Thomas further observed that under such conditions there is ‘a 
dangerous novelty liable to extensive abuse.... and there can be no limit to criminal 
prosecution or to variety of sentences...’
163
 
The missionaries of Protestant churches and other church bodies, mostly 
serving in Calcutta and its surrounding areas, had objected to section 298 relating to 
the persons who deliberately intend to wound the religious feelings of any person, 
but the committee thought there was no reason to worry that the magistrates would 
so interpret the meaning of the section as to interfere unduly with missionary 
efforts.
164
  It was suggested that ‘provisions should be made in order that they should 
work no harm to those who merely desire by useful and friendly discussion to 
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proselytise others to what they consider a purer and sounder faith.’
165
  The 
missionaries considered section 298 as calculated to: 
Operate injuriously to themselves and disastrously on the spread of Divine Truth—Deliberate 
and wilful intention will surely be as strenuously, and honestly too, disclaimed by the zealous 
missionary, as it will be attributed to him by those who deem their religious feelings 
wounded or insulted, when their understandings are simply reasoned with. If it be 
establishable at all, it can only be by inference. But inference may be variously drawn from 
the very same overt acts, according to the light in which they are beheld by the 
adjudicators—so, ‘any word or sound,’ will include all discussion or announcement 
whatever: ‘any gesture,’ all ordinary animation in the advocate of truths the most interesting. 
Assuredly, if tried by these rules, there is not a discourse or expostulation of Prophet or 
Evangelist in the New or the Old Testament, nay, not of our Divine Saviour himself, which 
not be thought to wound, and keenly to wound, the feelings of a zealous Jew, Mussulman 
[Muslim], or Idolater, and which, if so, must not be held forbidden, under the new Code, to 
be either recited or imitated in the discourses of the Missionaries.
166 
Notwithstanding this explanation, complaints against section 298 were numerous not 
only from the missionaries, but also from lawyers and judges.  For example, Giberne, 
a Judge of the Bombay High Court said ‘this clause might, I think, be excluded, for it 
almost amounts to the prohibition of preaching the Gospel.’
167
  In his speech Bernard 
Peacock, the Vice President, on the third reading of the Indian Penal Code in the 
Legislative Council of India, observed that under section 298 the British had gone 
beyond the proper bounds of legislation which would affect the missionary 
performing his duty.  Peacock clarified that there was no objection to a person who 
argues about religious matters with the intention of convincing.  He drew attention to 
section 298 because it appeared to him that there was a great misunderstanding about 
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  In commenting upon these criticisms, the law commissioners noted 
that: 
We understand these instances to be mentioned as indicative of the strictness with which the 
definition is to be constructed, so as not to make a person criminally liable for words, &c., 
wounding the religious feelings of another, unless a deliberate intention so to wound his 
feelings be unequivocally manifested, as it would be by mere railing and abuse, and by 
offensive attack upon his religion, under the pretext of discussion, without any argument 
which an impartial arbiter could possibly believe to have been addressed to him in good faith 
merely for the purpose of convincing him of the truth. It is here to be observed, that it is not 
the impression of the offended party that is to be admitted to decide whether the words 
uttered deserve to be considered as insulting, and whether they were uttered with the 
deliberate intention of insulting; these are points to be determined upon cool and calm 
consideration of the circumstances by the judge.
169
 
After the discussion of section 298 and its objectives, in framing section 298 and 
passing into the law in Chapter XV of IPC, the Law Commissioners, Macaulay and 
others, described the main ‘object’ of the section by declaring that: 
We wish to allow all fair latitude to religious discussion, and at the same time to prevent the 
professors of any religion from offering, under the pretext of such discussion, intentional 
insults to what is held sacred by others. We do not conceive that any person can be justified 
in wounding with deliberate intention the religious feelings of his neighbours by word, 
gesture, or exhibition. A warm expression dropped in the heat of controversy, or an argument 
urged by a person not for the purpose of insulting and annoying the professors of a different 
creed, but in good faith for the purpose of vindicating his own, will not fall under the 
definition contained in this clause.
170
 
It was declared that religious discussion among religious communities was not a 
crime under section 298.  From the commissioners’ observation, it appears the 
grounds for distinguishing such offences under section 298 were to preserve the 
general policy to bring religious harmony, peace and the protection of all religious 
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communities in the free exercise of their particular form of religion.
171
  It is 
important to note that not only missionaries but all religious communities could take 
an advantage of the freedom of religious discussion and be argued out of their 
cherished views on almost any religious subject in British India. 
Though all religious communities were given freedom of discussion, on the 
question of what constituted an offence under section 298 it was declared that it is 
necessary for everyone to refrain from insults.  If in the discussion any religious 
arguments or words are used which do wound the religious feelings of any person, 
they do not constitute an offence, because they would not be uttered with the 
deliberate intention of wounding the religious feeling of any person.  Section 298 is 
probably the one law in this cluster under which there is at least room to explain the 
reasons behind the act of the accused if convicted for religious discussion.  However, 
it was concluded that an insulting intention is necessary to constitute the offence and 
that had not been sufficiently noted by the critics of section 298.  It was declared that 
it could be considered offensive where ‘...insulting or contumelious language is used 
and where it may be fairly presumed that the intent of the offender is not grave 
discussion but a mischievous design to wound the feelings...’
172
  Therefore the 
essence of this offence under section 298 consists in the ‘deliberate intention’ of 
wounding the religious feelings of another, which becomes a significant ingredient in 
making an accusation. 
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1.6.2. The Meaning of Deliberate Intention of Wounding Religious 
Feelings under Section 298 
‘Deliberate intention’ was to be inferred from the words spoken, the place in which 
they were spoken, the people to whom they were addressed and other surrounding 
circumstances.  In the first place, there can be no offence without deliberate intention 
of religious discussion as defined in section 298.  These words have been explained 
by the Law Commissioners who observed: 
The intention to wound must be deliberate, that is, not conceived on the sudden in the 
course of discussion, but premeditated; it must appear, not only that the party, being 
engaged in a discussion with another on the subject of the religion professed by the 
other, in the course of the argument consciously used words likely to wound his 
religious feelings, but that he entered into the discussion with the deliberate purpose of 
so offending him. In other places in the Code a party is held to be guilty if [it] causes a 
certain effect the causing of which is an offence, intending to cause that effect, or 
knowing that his act was likely to cause it. Here there is a marked difference. Although 
the party uttering offensive words might be conscious at the moment of uttering them 
that they were likely to wound the feelings of his auditors, yet if it were apparent that he 
uttered them on the spur of the occasion, in good faith, simply to further his argument—
that he did not take advantage of the occasion to utter them in pursuance of a deliberate 
purpose to offend—he would not, we think, be liable to conviction [under section 298]. 
If however a party were to force himself upon the attention of another, addressing to 
him, an involuntary hearer, an insulting invective against his religion, he would, we 
conceive, fall under the definition, for the reasonable inference from his conduct would 
be that he had a deliberate intention of wounding the religious feeling his hearer.
173
 
The commissioners conceded, in the view of the High Court of North-West Province, 
that there would be difficulty drawing the line and that different religious people 
would be apt to take very different views of what ought to be considered as 
evidencing a deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings.  But they added: 
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When a man in a course of an argument uses insulting words to another it is impossible 
to suppose that he does so without the intention of insulting him—it is not to be 
believed that he uses them in good faith simply for the purpose of convincing or 
persuading the person with whom he is arguing. In such a case the intention is to be 
inferred from the character of the words. Again when words not positively insulting in 
themselves are used in a manner clearly evidencing a deliberate intention to insult the 
religious feelings of another, the case will fall within the clause. But it will not be an 
offence when any person arguing with another on the subject of his religion says what is 
likely to wound his religious feelings, in good faith, simply for the purpose of 
convincing the person with whom he is arguing of what he believes to be the truth.
174
 
Intentions can be inferred from ‘words’ that can lead to religious discussions 
intended to convict or convert.  The Law Commissioners agreed to declare that 
discourse addressed to anyone with the intention of converting the person, however it 
may wound religious feelings, should not be considered a religious crime.
175
  Though 
the British government proclaimed neutrality in all religious matters, it later played a 
significant and pre-eminent role in the religious history of the sub-continent.
176
  
During colonialism, giving knowledge of the faith of Christianity to Indian religious 
communities was British ‘policy, not only as Christians, but as statesmen.’
177
  With 
regard to the intention of this section the Indian Law Commissioners observed:  
In England an attempt to convert any one from the religion of the country by the most 
gentle and dispassionate address, is by law is an offence; to attempt the same thing by 
contemptuous or vituperative language is an offence which would be severely punished 
in practice. But the reason is that conversion is not recognized as a legitimate object. 
The law assumes the truth of Christianity. But it is manifest that the law and the 
legislature of this country cannot assume the truth of any religion. And, as free 
discussion, or, in other words, attempts to conversion, is the best criterion of the truth of 
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anything the truth or falsehood of which is not already assumed by law to be beyond 
controversy, it seems to follow that a bona fide attempt to convert ought not in this 
country to be treated as a crime, even though the intention to convert be an intention to 
do so by wounding the religious feelings of the persons addressed. We apprehend it is 
almost impossible to convert a sincere or ardent votary of any faith without wounding 
his religious feelings in the early stages of the process. And if that be so, and if it is 
admitted that attempts at conversion from one faith to another ought not to be punished 
in British India, then the wounding of religious feelings ought not to be punished when 
the wound is inflicted with that legitimate object.
178
 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that British policy was to maintain freedom of 
religious discussion.  Secondly, section 298 allowed all religious communities, 
particularly but not only English or any foreign Christian missionaries, to discuss 
their faith which could lead anyone to convert.  All shared enthusiastically in the 
advantages provided by British imperial power which protected missionary work in 
the subcontinent.
179
  There is no record of cases brought concerning injury to feelings 
when non-Christians were invited by missionaries to embrace Christianity.  Probably 
this resulted from the clarification of section 298 noted by Peacock that ‘it was a 
mistake to suppose that the intention of the missionary was to wound the feelings of 
the person whom he intended to convert.’
180
  Therefore with such intention: 
No missionary can come within the provisions of Section 298...he must use and utter 
words with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of some person, 
which, if he is at all keeping within the limits of his office cannot be the case, as his 
intention is not to insult, but to convince.
181
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Statements such as these reveal that the British protected the missionary from 
accusation, although it cannot be said that missionaries did not face criticism.  They 
might not be judged by the law under section 298 but indeed were judged by local 
religious communities and individuals.
182
  Local judgments on the issue of 
conversion or religious discussion were not taken to the courts even though that 
could have provided legal aid to Indian religious communities.  It is interesting to see 
above that when a missionary discussed religious matters to convince and convert, 
s/he could not be convicted unless an intention to insult has been found.  Before 
discussing the difference between ‘insult’ and ‘convince’ it is important to note that 
the scope of section 298 was not limited to missionary work alone, for discussing and 
arguing religious faith applied to all religious communities and religious sects such 
as Ahmadi-Muslim who could proselytise in British India.  Notably, it was noticed 
that religious conflicts occurred between Ahmadis and Muslims especially on 
Ahmad’s claim of calling himself the Prophet, nabi.  This led to several fatwas, or 
decrees declared in religious matters and discussions by Ulama and clerics, against 
him regarding him as a heretic, unfaithful, and a liar.
183
  The outcome of these 
discussions did not come to a head, as Ahmadis were not declared non-Muslims in 
British India.  One of the main reasons was the British willingness to allow all 
religious communities to discuss and propagate their beliefs.
184
  Therefore the notion 
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of ‘convincing’ for religious views applies to all religious communities who might 
enthusiastically try to convince anyone, and if an accused claimed any intentional 
wounding was done to ‘save life’ they may be safe from prosecution.  The problems 
this could raise were troubling, as J. F. Thomas noted in the Law Report: 
One Judge may, in his charity, assume, that there could be no ‘deliberate intention’ of 
wounding the feelings, and so absolve all offenders—another may adopt the maxim, 
that the act itself indicates such intention. And if the Criminal Courts are to be [at] all 
times open to the zealots of differing sects, on every trifling occasion, the result must be 
to foster bigotry, and to keep the religious animosity of sects at its height, as well as to 
interfere with individual security and peace.
185
 
Though the possible consequences of discussing religious matters were reviewed, the 
question arises of the exact meaning of ‘insult’ in religious discussion which could 
be prosecuted under section 298.  One of the reasons given in the pre-1860 revision 
of section 298 was that abusive language must not be used for religious discussion.  
Thomas gave the example that under section 298, monotheistic followers, Christians 
and Muslims, ‘would be subject to penalty for the undisguised and natural expression 
of their views of the evil and folly of idolatry’ in British India.
186
  It can be said that 
while arguing about idolatry in a respectful manner may seem legal, it can be 
insulting where any Hindu deity or idols representing gods are disgraced through 
hate or prejudice.  For example, anyone who intentionally breaks a particular idol by 
claiming that it was part of his campaign against idol worship insults or disgraces 
Hindu idols as a class.  However the question remains unclear how converts dealt 
with the previous idols they worship. 
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Abusive and aggressive action can also be considered offensive as well as 
insulting.  Missionaries argued that section 296, interfering in religious assembly and 
section 298, wounding religious feelings in religious discussion, should not be 
considered insult particularly when done with moderation and calmness as discussed 
above.  That discussion mainly shows the British assumption that particular care of 
language and manner of discussing religious arguments was enough to control 
controversies.  Religious communities may have implied certain moderation or 
absence of intention to wound on various occasions in British India.  However, the 
same application and rules for religious discussion reveal a very different application 
post-1947.  Before seeing this application it is important to review that no case was 
registered under section 298 during British India concerning insult during conversion 
or religious discussions, cases remaining limited to certain issues as discussed in the 
following point. 
 
1.6.3. Prosecutions and Cases under Section 298 
Given the careful pre-promulgation discussions about this section, the question arises 
which issues were included in section 298 of the 1860 Indian Penal Code.  All 
religions were safe from prosecution under section 298 although specific “acts of an 
accused” could be prosecuted if they have been done deliberately to injure the 
religious feelings.  For example, in 1893, the accused, Rehman was held liable under 
section 298 because after sacrificing a cow on Bakr Eid, he carried the flesh around 
the village in an uncovered condition,
187
 despite Hindu fellow villagers having 
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previously endeavoured to persuade the zamindar, the landlord, to prevent the 
slaughter of cows.
188
  It was held by the High Court of Allahabad that that there was 
no doubt that Rehman exposed the cow’s meat with deliberate intention to wound the 
religious feelings of Hindus.
189
  Action judged offensive but not through deliberate 
insult was not a crime under section 298.  For example, a case in which Muslims had 
driven cows for slaughter in the Eidgah through a street containing Hindu shops, the 
Court held that driving cows through a public street did not constitute ‘placing an 
object’ in sight of the Hindu shopkeepers; deliberately placing beef in front of 
Hindus is an offence but simply driving animals to slaughter is not.
190
 
The issue of cows remained a critical issue that was commonly prosecuted 
under section 298 amid increased Hindu-Muslim tensions, discussed in the following 
chapter.  However, section 298 was used within religions as well as between Hindu 
castes where the insult was deemed social rather than religious.  For example, an 
accused gave birth to an illegitimate child, whereupon she went to the house of a 
person whom she alleged to be the child’s father, and threw upon him a cloth which 
she had been wearing at the time of her confinement.  She was prosecuted under 
section 298 by the complainant who alleged the act deprived him of his caste.  It was 
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held that section 298 did not include acts related to injuries to caste as distinct from 





The historical view of Chapter XV (sections 295 to 298) of the ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ of 1860 shows that the legal foundations of the law date back to English 
Christian blasphemy law and the colonial period when British rule brought new 
political institutions and a new system of law to India.  Through Chapter XV of 
‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ originally applied in 1860, the British protected 
sacred places of worship under section 295, religious assemblies lawfully gathered 
for worship under section 296, funeral and burial rights under section 297 and 
against offensive acts of wounding the religious feelings of any religious class under 
section 298.  This historical review also reveals how the law was re-shaped for its 
procedure and application and was discussed by many lawyers and British enforcers 
with various objectives and implications.  This review of sections 295-298 also 
reveals that in various cases much criticism and clarification as well as some rules 
and regulations were included, although no significant changes or additions to 
Chapter XV were made from 1860 till 1927. 
One of the important objectives of Chapter XV under sections 296 and 298 
was to declare freedom of religious discussion and conversion.  Such discussions 
may have been enabled by the British but freedom of speech and writing became 
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another issue as well as a threat in the early twentieth century when religious 
discussions went beyond criticism and close to or arguably over the line of insult in 
various religious publications. This period brought new changes to Chapter XV 





The Issue of Offensive Writing and Publication and Amendments to Religious 
Offences Laws in British India 
In India, the British aimed to maintain religious harmony among the diverse religious 
communities of India, otherwise threatened by religious, political and patriotic 
controversial writings and publications.  They increasingly faced the issue of 
offensive writing from the end of the nineteenth century as threats to harmony by 
religious controversies, especially amid political tension, led to further steps to 
control publications that created religious agitation, especially tensions between 
Hindus and Muslims.  For example, literature on the sanctity of the cow and eating 
the meat of the cow (the most commonly prosecuted crime under Offences Relating 
to Religion) increasingly affected Hindu-Muslim relations, as Hindu cow societies 
had increased launched campaigns with songs, tracts and posters which were limited 




The increased religious-linked tensions resulting from and feeding these 
social and religious changes led to several amendments to the 1860 Indian Penal 
Code such as section 124-A
193
 and section 153-A
194
 under Act IV of 1898.  These 
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were added and applied by the British authorities to contentious publications, 
permitting magistrates and authorities to prosecute publishers and publications which 
disseminated seditious matter under section 124-A as well as publications which 
attempted to promote feelings of hatred between different classes under section 153-
A, political and patriotic poetry, songs and books being banned under sections 124-A 
and 153-A. 
With tension increasing during the early twentieth century related in large 
part to jockeying for position between Hindus and Muslims as the end of foreign rule 
became increasingly likely, by 1929 the situation had changed dramatically when 
religious communal violence including verbal and written controversies on religious 
beliefs became a widespread issue.  Throughout the 1920s the Government dealt with 
religious offences amid 122 riots from 1923 through 1928, which the government of 
India classified as serious communal disorders, exacerbated by various controversial 
publications, with the loss of approximately 450 lives and major injuries to 5,000 
people.
195
  Part of the background to the riots was the effect of the Hindu Reform 
movement, which as it evolved and organised itself into ‘one religion’ rather than a 
plethora of local activities and attitudes, confronted the Muslim community which 
had long been more or less (with the exception of Ahmadi and Shi’a) one group.  
The main such Hindu group, the Arya Samaj, led by Dayanand Saraswati in 
the late nineteenth century in Punjab and western UP, reformed various issues such 
as child marriage, widow remarriage, idolatry and caste ‘within a framework of the 
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assertion of Hindu supremacy over other religions.’
196
  Thursby suggested that 
religious tension was a result of the Arya and Muslim counter-publications in the 
Punjab province which fed, and fed on, inter-religious tension.  Beyond these 
publications the Arya Samajit Swami Shraddhanand and the Sufi Muslim Khwaja 
Hasan Nizami were well-known for their proselytising work in the 1920s.  Each was 
an effective publicist and each was criticised for offending the other religious 
community.  From this and other causes, Hindu-Muslim tension increased critically, 
leading to violence, fuelled by controversial publications including sexual aspersion 
and character assassination of the sacred figures of the others’ religion: the Arya, for 
example, attacked Islam through the personal life of Prophet Muhammad, worsening 
Hindu-Muslim relations.
197
 Under such intense circumstances the British government 
had to take legal action by adding 295-A to the law of ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion.’  In order to discuss this issue, it is necessary to discuss the historical 
setting of this new clause. 
 
2.1. Offensive Publications and the Historical Setting of Amending 
Chapter XV in 1920s 
Section 295-A was added in consequence of the abortive prosecution of Mahesh 
Rajpal who had published an Urdu pamphlet called Rangila Rasul, ‘The Amorous 
Prophet,’ in May 1924 in which he described the alleged sexual incontinence of the 
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  Barrier notes that before the pamphlet had been banned, 
after much religious criticism had been received, 1,000 copies were in circulation.
199
  
Rajpal was prosecuted and convicted under section 153-A of IPC for creating 
feelings of hatred between Hindus and Muslims.  The Sessions Judge on Appeal held 
that the pamphlet read as a whole ‘was intentionally offensive, scurrilous, and 
wounding to the religious feelings of the Muhammadan community...’
200
  The 
Lahore High Court overturned Rajpal’s conviction on appeal, on the basis that the 
publication did not constitute an offence within the meaning of section 153-A and an 
attack on the Prophet could not expose the accused to the penalty for an offence 
directed against class hostility.
201
  The object of the section was given in the 
statement of Objects and Reasons as follows: 
The prevalence of malicious writing intended to insult the religion, or outrage the 
religious feelings of various classes of His Majesty’s subjects has made it necessary to 
examine the existing provisions of the law with a view to seeing whether they require to 
be strengthened. Chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with offences 
relating to the religion, provides no penalty in respect of writing... Such writing can 
usually be dealt under sec. 153A of the Indian Penal Code, as it is seldom that they do 
not represent an attempt to promote feeling of enmity or hatred between different 
classes. It must be recognised, however, that this is only an indirect way of dealing with 
acts which may properly be made punishable themselves, apart from the question 
whether they have the further effect of promoting feeling of enmity or hatred between 
classes. Accordingly it is proposed to insert a new section in chapter XV of the Indian 
Penal Code, with the object of making it a specific offence intentionally to insult or 
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attempt to insult the religion, or outrage or attempt to outrage the religious feelings, of 
any class of His Majesty’s subjects.
202 
The Lahore High Court proposed to add a new section to deal with the issue of 
offensive writing.  However, in the case of Rangila Rasul, Justice Dalip Singh of 
Lahore High Court argued that section 153-A was intended to prevent attack on a 
community but not to stop polemics against religious leaders; therefore, Rajpal’s 
conviction was illegal.  After the protracted trial of Rajpal, his conviction was set 




  This judgment brought chaos when 
around ten thousand Muslims attended an open protest, sending telegrams and 
petitions to the Delhi and Lahore secretariats, and petitioning for a special law to 
protect the Prophet Muhammad, a significant pointer to later hopes and expectations 
in the region.
204
  Though security was provided in Lahore to prevent violent riots 
against Hindus and Sikhs, the critical reaction against the Rangila Rasul judgment 
produced unpleasant repercussions in daily life across the North-West Frontier 
Province.  Approximately 450 Hindus, for example, were persecuted in 1927 and 
were forced to migrate to Peshawar (now in Pakistan), only returning to their homes 
in the following year.
205
 
The Punjab’s British Governor, William Hailey, prohibited public meetings 
to maintain public peace among the many offended Muslims who were agitating for 
the government to remedy the defect in the Law and increase the punishment for 
those who offend any religious class through malicious writing.
206
  Discussing the 
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situation following the release of Rajpal, Hailey noted that there was a ‘very serious 
danger of disorder, for an attack on the Prophet was a concrete offence against Islam 
that stung them to the quick, and they could not bear the thought that Hindus could 
repeat it with impunity.’
207
  To calm the riot, he also promised that the British 
(particularly Punjab and Indian) Government would make plans to prevent 
circulations of the book, Rangila Rasul which had so offended the Muslim 
community. To Hailey the only way to calm the Muslim community was the 
successful prosecution of publications similar to Rangila Rasul, and indeed Rangila 




Historically, the decade of 1920 was the most critical period in the history of 
religious tension between religious communities in British India which brought 
various other offensive publications written on the life of the Prophet Muhammad.  
For example, in 1927 the court in Agra discussed Vichitra Jiwan, another book 
against the Prophet Muhammad offended the Muslim community and affected 
Hindu-Muslim relations.  Therefore all copies were forfeited under Section 153-A of 
IPC.
209
  Though all publications written about the Prophet Muhammad in 1920s were 
judged offensive, Rangila Rasul was the focus of attention at the judicial, communal 
and political level, producing widespread religious controversy and debate over how 
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to control malicious religious writing.  It was assumed that banning books that 
wounded the feelings of Muslims would calm the community, although banning or 
forfeiting offensive religious books was not the only way. 
Therefore the British were still looking for the successful prosecution of 
publications similar to Rangila Rasul in the Punjab Province before making any 
change in the law.  In the hope that he would secure an opposite ruling from the 
Lahore High Court to that initially given in Rangila Rasul, Justice F. W. Skemp was 
appointed to a special bench to hear arguments against another offensive essay 
written on the Prophet Muhammad in the monthly journal, Risala-i-Vartman, written 
by Devi Sharan Sharma, published in Amritsar, Punjab, especially the article Sair-i-
Dozakh, A Trip to Hell.
210
  It was declared that the article Sair-i-Dozakh could not be 
regarded as merely an attempt at ‘Hindu missionary work’ as was claimed, as liberty 
to make religious criticism did not include a licence to resort to vile and abusive 
language.  Judge Skemp declared that ‘the article deals with the Prophet Muhammad 
not as an individual but as the founder of Islam, and attempts to emphasize the 
futility of the Prophet’s claims as the “intercessor” for his followers.’
211
  The Judge 
also rejected the defence accepted earlier by Justice Dalip Singh dealing with the 
case of Rajpal’s writing Rangila Rasul, that an offence against the founder of a 
religion cannot be regarded a crime against the religion itself.
212
 
Therefore, the Judge passed judgements against the editor and publisher of 
Risala-i-Vartman on 6
th
 August 1927 for writing the article with the deliberate 
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intention of promoting hatred and enmity between Muslims and Hindus.
213
  The 
publication of Sair-i-Dozakh affected Hindu-Muslim relations not only in Amritsar 
Punjab but also in Khebar Afridi, namely among the Khukhihal and Zakkakhell, 
whose Jirga decided on a Hindu boycott in July 1927 till judgement was passed 
against the author of Risala-i-Vartman. During this period, about 400 to 500 Hindus 
were expelled from their houses and forced to move to Peshawar from Khebar, most 
leaving in fear though some with the sympathy of their neighbours.
214
  Thus religious 
tension did not stay within the legal and judicial system but also affected the social 
life of Hindus and Muslims who had nothing to do with controversial writings. 
Under the circumstances, the secretary of state pushed for amendments and 
argued that the law on religious publications should be clarified, because as it was 
publishers had nothing to fear from the law.
215
  Hailey added that unless the 
government faced the problem, the Indians would find their own solutions.
216
  The 
British therefore started imposing legal restrictions on religious publications and 
made plans to amend the law after reviewing cases such as Risala-i-Vartman and 
Rangila Rasul in Punjab.  Hailey, in his letter to the Home Department, 
recommended a draft to add a section encompassing attacks on the founder or 
principal personages of a religion and preventing a broad range of provocative 
writing, but considered that it would be problematic to undertake any attempt to draft 
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a law which would be both specific and wide-ranging in its reference.
217
  Another 
suggestion was given by Sivaswamy Aiyer to prevent ‘attacks of a blasphemous 
character against any religion or religious founder, or any reputed incarnation 
thereof, or any prophets, saints or spiritual leaders revered by any class or 
persons.’
218
  This suggested provision saw all sacred personages protected from 
malicious attacks.  One of the suggestions was also given by a Muslim, Ali, who 




The Home Department of British India reviewed all suggestions put forward 
for this new section in the proposed bill.  The debate on the ‘Religious Insult Bill’ 
produced a significant opportunity for the members of the Legislative Assembly to 
offer their own interpretation regarding the amendments.  On the one hand the Bill 
was criticised by Hindu members who ‘termed the bill an undue concession to 
Muslims, who were said to remain the favourite wife of the British Government.’
220
  
On the other hand, Muslim members of the Assembly feared that the Bill did not go 
far enough to stop attacks on the Prophet and predicted that the amendment would 
not be effective.
221
  Critics of the government continued to be suspicious that this 
legislation could reduce the freedom of the press and criticism of religion.  However, 
after much discussion, a new section 295-A was passed and introduced by the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act (XXV of 1927) in August 1927.  Though in the new 
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version no name of any sacred person within religions was mentioned, it has been 
argued that section 295-A was specially designed to protect Prophet Muhammad and 
subsequently other historical sacred figures of religious communities from 
publications written with malicious intention.
222
  Before discussing to what extent 
malicious writings were actually prevented after its enforcement, it is important to 
note what it contains and how the section dealt with religious publications. 
 
2.2.  Section 295-A of IPC 
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of 
any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that 
class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine or with both.
223
 
In the bill as originally framed this section was first introduced in the following 
words: 
Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, 
or otherwise, intentionally outrages or attempts to outrage the feelings, of any class of 
His Majesty’s subjects, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both.
224
 
The Select Committee to which the Bill was referred had disapproved of this 
provision, and examined all aspects and suggested modifications both in words used 
in the section and in procedures.  It redrafted the section by qualifying the word 
‘intention’ with ‘deliberate and malicious,’ and changed ‘religious feelings’ to 
‘religious beliefs.’  The committee also limited the offence to verbal and written 
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attacks by ‘visible representation’ rather than the earlier vague clause ‘by signs.’
225
  
It was assumed that people might misuse the law as they were still allowed to publish 
religious books.  It is important to note that not all religious writings fall under 
section 295-A but just those with deliberate and malicious intention to offend.  
Before discussing the application of this section after its inception, it is significant to 
look at the main ingredients of and procedures concerning section 295-A in British 
India. 
 
2.2.1. The Main Ingredients and Procedures of Section 295-A 
Anyone proposing to start proceedings under section 295-A had to obtain the 
necessary sanction from the relevant government before proceeding.  It was 
essentially a civil case, which made malicious acts insulting any religion, or 
outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens, punishable as offences 
relating to religion, whether or not they amount to attempts to promote feelings of 
enmity or hatred between religious communities.
226
  To constitute an offence under 
section 295-A, it is essential that the act is done in words, either spoken or written, or 
visible representation.  The reference to ‘words’ might cover an attempt to write a 
book or to voice a religious opinion or that the accused had maliciously insulted or 
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2.2.2. Deliberate and Malicious Intention of Section 295-A 
Section 295-A does not limit all publication or speech and published matter, for the 
‘religious belief of class of persons will not amount to an offence.’
228
  Section 295-A 
requires that the act of insulting should have been done with both deliberate and 
malicious intention.
229
  According to the Law Commissioners in the second Report 
the intention to wound religious feelings must be deliberate which did not conceive 




Secondly for prosecution under section 295-A, the intention behind the act 
must also be malicious.  The term malicious has not been defined in the Penal Code 
but has been borrowed from the English Law as generally applied in legal 
phraseology.  According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, malice in the common 
sense means ill-will against a person; but in a legal sense, it means an intentionally 
done wrongful act without cause or excuse.
231
  Malice in its legal import does not 
mean merely ill-will but the wilful doing of an illegal act or the intention to do an act 
which is wrongful and to the detriment of another.  Where any person wilfully does 
an act injurious to another without lawful excuse he or she does it maliciously.
232
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It is therefore important to be certain the action has been done deliberately 
and maliciously to outrage the religious feelings and to insult the religion or religious 
beliefs of any such class before proceeding to prosecute under section 295-A. 
 
2.2.3. The Intention to Outrage and Insult in Section 295-A 
This section does not apply if the accused has used neither words nor visible 
representations to outrage any religious beliefs.  Outrage means to treat with gross 
violence and indignity.
233
  Notably, the words ‘outraging religious feelings’ were 
intended to bring those culprits to book, as discussed in Rajpal’s case, whose attack 
was on the Prophet Muhammad held sacred by Muslims.  In Sheo Sharma, another 
text insulting the Prophet Muhammad, it was held in 1927 that the newly added 
section 295-A has no retrospective effect, but if a new edition of an offensive book is 
published after enactment of the section, the author of the book can be convicted 
under this section if his connection with the publisher is established.
234
  Considering 
any further publication or writing on religious issues, it was declared ‘if the language 
is of a nature calculated to produce or to promote feelings of enmity or hatred the 
writer must be presumed to intend what his action was likely to produce.’
235
  For 
example, it is possible that someone attempts to publish a book or pamphlet on a 
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religious matter only in reply to the opposite side or party.  Under section 295-A, 
however, the prosecution must prove that the insult was for the sake of gratuitous 
insult and with an intention which derives from malice and malice alone.  For Gour it 
would be a good defence if the accused says: ‘I had no malicious intention toward a 
class, but I did intend to wound and shock the feelings of an individual so that 
attention might, however rudely, be called to the reform which I had in view.’
236
  The 
case under section 295-A, ‘is not so much the matter of discourse as the manner of 
it.’
237
  It can be difficult for the Court to defend the charge under section 295-A if 
anyone pleads that ‘he was writing a book in reply to the one written by one 
professing another religion who has attacked his own religion.’
238
  If anyone chooses 
to write such a book or pamphlet, he or she must take particular care with the 
language and manner of writing.  Regarding the case of Rajpal that has been 
discussed above, the Select Committee in 1927, who dealt with the issue of writing 
an offensive book in their report, stated that the essence of the offence is that: 
The insult to religion or the outrage to religious feelings must be the sole, or primary, or 
at least the deliberate and conscious intention. We have accordingly decided to adopt 
the phraseology of sec. 298 which requires deliberate intention in order to constitute the 
offence with which it deals.
239
 
Section 295-A became law in 1927, but up to that time acts constituting the offence 
under it also fell within 298, which still forms part of the code and runs as follows: 
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, 
utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person, or makes any gesture 
in the sight of that person, or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be 
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punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with fine, or with both.
240
 
The two sections still stand together in the Code but the question arises of the relative 
scope of each section.  The expression used in section 298 is ‘wounding religious 
feelings’ while the expression used in 295-A is ‘outraging the religious feelings.’  
The word ‘outrage’ is stronger and more serious than the word ‘wound.’
241
  The 
select committee in their report stated: 
We think that to penalise even an intentional outrage or attempted outrage upon the 
religious feelings of any class would be casting the net too wide for the cases with 
particular reference to which the Bill has been introduced. At the same time, we realise 
that the reference to the outraging of religious feelings was inserted to provide for the 
case of an insult to the founder of a religion or person held sacred by the followers of a 
particular religion where such an outrage does not amount to an insult of the religion. It 
has in one instance been held that an insult to the founder of a religion is not necessarily 
an insult to the religion although it may outrage the feelings of the followers of that 
religion. We have therefore provided that the new section shall only apply in cases 
where a religion is insulted with the deliberate intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of its followers.
242
 
The intention of causing outrage to religious beliefs ‘must be malicious as well as 
deliberate, and must be directed to the class of persons and not merely to an 
individual.’
243
  Under section 298 religious feelings can be deliberately wounded by 
an accused seeking to draw attention to certain convictions in need of reform.  It also 
means that people are free to discuss religious issues but their intention should be 
based on convincing others in theological discussion or conversation.  Under section 
295-A, however, the prosecution must prove that the insult derived from deliberate 
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and malicious insult.  If this is proved, the offence is non-bailable and the Court of 
Session or President Magistrate who tries the case may declare any publication to be 




After reviewing the historical facts it is clear that Chapter XV of ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion’ of 1860 and its procedure was revised in order to meet the 
changing nature of the legislation on religious offences, religious writing and speech 
in the 1920s.  It can also be seen that such change in the addition to section 295-A 
was intended to safeguard and to prevent cases like Rajpal’s that might endanger 
public peace by stirring up the feelings of people or provoking the community to 
protest their hurt religious feelings.  Considering such intensity of religious 
expression in ‘publication and speech,’ the British Government, by changing the 
procedure of the prosecution under the clause 295-A, also declared that critical 
religious cases such as those discussed above would be tried at the sessions or at the 
presidency Magistrates.
245
  The question now arises whether all British endeavours 
regarding the addition in the law in 1927 actually calmed the situation and helped to 
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2.3. The Application of Section 295-A after 1927 
Barrier has observed that throughout the 1920s, religious communities’ anger over 
what they variously felt were offensive publications was a problem for the British 
Government in India with some extreme reactions and consequences such as in the 
case of the publisher, Rajpal.
246
  Though he had been acquitted by the High Court, 




 April 1929, 
Illam Din, a young Muslim man, aged 19-20 years, of Lahore stabbed Rajpal in his 
book shop.
248
  Illam Din was convicted and given the death penalty for the murder.  
In the appeal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), his defending lawyer and later 
founder of Pakistan, pleaded that provocation due to the youth of the accused was a 
mitigating circumstance, added to which Jinnah held the trial-court evidence was 
insufficient, the youth’s reverence for the Prophet clear and his anger against those 
who maligned him reasonable, and the prosecution story doubtful.  He also noted that 
the death sentence is harsh for a young person and the punishment should be 
converted to life imprisonment.
249
  The British Judges, however, dismissed the 




Ismail Qureshi, a Muslim lawyer in Pakistan, notes a subsequent case with a 
similar outcome in which Nathu Ram, a Hindu, was prosecuted for writing a ‘History 
                                                 
246
 The point has been discussed in detail by Barrier in Ibid.,  66-107. 
247
 Khuda Bakhsh and Abdul Aziz, two Muslims attempted to kill Rajpal in 1927 but he survived. 
Qureshi, Namoos-e-Rasalat, 399-400. 
248
 Illam Din v. Emperor AIR 1930 Lahore, 157. 
249
 Ibid; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, “Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a Lawyer, Pakistan,” 
Journal of History & Culture XXVIII:1 (2007): 12. 
250
 Illam Din v. Emperor AIR 1930 Lahore, 157. 
98 
 
of Islam’ in which he reviled both Islam and the Prophet in 1933 in Karachi, Sindh 
Province, later part of Pakistan.  He was imprisoned for a year with fine but was 
bailed against his offence following his appeal to the judicial commissioners in 
Karachi in 1934.  Nathu Ram was murdered by Abdul Qayum, a young Muslim, 
when he came to court for the hearing in 1934.  Like Illam Din, Abdul Qayum also 
received the death sentence for murdering the offender and later became known as 




Historically, both cases are crucial examples, showing how Illam Din and 
Abdul Qayum both judged the accused and took the law in their own hands, 
becoming popular figures in subsequent history.  However, Illam Din is the most 
quoted and known in the region of Punjab, the province in which religious incitement 
remained critical.  As Asma Jahangir, a Muslim lawyer, has recently commented, 
Illam Din became a role model among many Muslims of the subcontinent, especially 
in contemporary Pakistan, where believers are urged by Muslim clerics to follow 
Illam Din Shaheed, the martyr, by killing those who insult the Holy Prophet.
252
  
Some such as Qureshi argue that the fateful instances following occurrences of 
offensive publications in 1920s and 1930s such as the murder of Rajpal and Ram by 
Muslims occurred because ‘there was no law to redress their grievance with regard to 
slanderous attacks on the holy Prophet with the malicious intention to outrage their 
religious feelings,’
253
 a view negated in the Introduction to this thesis.  The historical 
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setting and assessment of cases such as Vichitra Jiwan, A Trip to Islam and Trip to 
Hell and the promulgation of section 295-A discussed above give a different insight 
into the historical period.  However, while the historical record shows various cases 
brought to defend the Prophet Muhammad, there were no recorded cases of anyone 
having been killed extra-judicially for insulting the Prophet after Rajpal and Ram 
during British rule. 
Though the British significantly and critically dealt with religious offences 
and circumstances throughout the 1920s as outlined above, Barrier notes that the 
1930s brought a flood of controversial publications on religious, political and 
patriotic issues that shook the British Government: half the printed matter banned 
between 1933 and 1935 dealt with religious controversy.
254
  For example, in Punjab, 
98 of the 135 newspapers had been involved in religious controversies.
255
  Religious 
tensions did not only occur between religious communities, particularly Hindu and 
Muslim, but also within religious sects or groups.  For example, the most hated 
discussions and publications among Punjabi Muslims, later banned by the British, 
were by or on the Ahmadiya sect in which the founder was criticised for claiming 
and calling himself a Prophet.
256
  Apart from the religious controversies, the realities 
of Indian politics in that period cannot be denied, particularly communal religious 
protest, so-called terrorist attacks and challenges by freedom movements against 
colonial control.  Barrier notes that the government’s ‘focus was diverted from the 
Hindu-Muslim violence to another cloud that was graying the political skies—a 
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resurgence of challenge by the Congress and revolutionists.’
257
  Most of the 
published matter was deeply inspired by the freedom movement, religious 
publications playing an important role in encouraging the fight for freedom.
258
  Such 
publications were considered a serious threat to and within these religious 
communities as well as to the British Empire and policies.  Some cases involving the 
banning of offensive publications in the 1930s aroused controversy over the 
application of section 295-A of IPC, as clearly shown in the case of Angare (embers 
or red hot coals). 
 
2.4. The Controversial Application of Section 295-A to Ban Angare 
Angare, a collection of short fiction stories in Urdu, was written by Sajjad Zaheer, 
Rashid Jahan, Ahmad Ali and Mahmuduzzafar and published by Sajjad Zaheer, 
printed by Muhammad Jawad at the Nizami Press, Victoria Street in Lukhnow in 
December 1932, but banned on 15 March 1933 by the British government ‘on the 
ground that the said book contains matter the publication of which is punishable 
under section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code.’
259
  The reason given for banning the 
publication of Angare was for insulting the Prophet Muhammad and outraging the 
Muslim community within the meaning of section 295-A.
260
  However, Angare also 
included comments on social and religious traditions and practices as well as issues 
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related to colonial governance and criticism of Urdu literature, none of which fell 
under section 295-A.  Before analysing various aspects of the stories it is necessary 
to discuss which stories in Angare dishonour the Prophet Muhammad, and how, for 
not all were considered offensive to the local Muslim clerics and community of 
Lukhnow. 
Not all authors of Angare were criticised, just Sajjad Zaheer (1905-1973) and 
Rashid Jahan (1905-1952) were alleged to have insulted Islam in their stories.  First 
it will be helpful to give a brief description of the stories which offended the 
religious feelings of Muslims.  Zaheer’s first story Nind Nahien Ati (Sleep doesn’t 
come) concerns a person who is unable to sleep, his mind wandering over various 
thoughts and objects such as sex and religion.  Zaheer again writes about religion and 
sex in the second story Jannat ki Basarat (vision of paradise).  According to this 
story: 
[A] Pious Maulana Daud, whether out of fear of God or of importance, prefers to pray 
from his Koran rather than to sleep with his young wife. On the holiest night of 
Ramadan, while prostrated over the Quran, he dreams that he is about to engage in 
intercourse with a houri [a woman]. He is then abruptly awakened by his wife’s 
laughter from the erotic dream...
261
 
The literal meaning of these stories may be offensive but before reviewing the 
intention behind them and people’s reaction it is important to review the stories by 
Rashid Jahan, a lady physician who was particularly criticised and was called a 
radical ‘Angare-Wali’ (woman of angare): ‘Muslims have threatened to chop off her 
nose.’
262
  Her first story, Delhi Ki Sair (Sightseeing Trip to Delhi) is a story about a 
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Muslim woman, Malika Begum, whose husband, in a mood of generosity, offers to 
take her out to see the city of Delhi.  On the Delhi platform he meets with his friend 
and goes off with him leaving his veiled wife behind, on a hot day, to keep an eye on 
the luggage.  She sits and observes things while waiting for her husband.  On her 
husband’s return, already having lunch with his friend, he offers to buy puris for his 
wife without realising her feelings.  She says ‘no thank you…I think you better [take] 
me home.  I have seen enough of Delhi.’
263
 
In another story, which is actually a play, entitled Parde ke Peeche (Behind 
the Veil), Muhammadi Begum, a Muslim married woman, gives birth to a baby girl 
every year because her western-educated husband insists on having a son.  
Muhammadi’s sister-in-law comes to visit her and realises Muhammadi’s health 
problem.  She requested a lady doctor to come and help, and she warns her about the 
danger of continuing such pregnancies.  The play ends with the arrival of the long- 
awaited son who mistreats his sisters, pointing out the situation as self-perpetuating, 




The reaction of the contemporary local Muslim community of Lukhnow, 
where the accusation was brought and initial criticism shows that Angare was 
criticised by conservative Muslims as described in the Urdu newspaper The 
Medinah, published in Bijnor on 13 February 1933: 
We are grateful to exalted God that he has allowed us to live in a remote township to 
perform the duties of journalism, a town which is safe from the piety-destroying and 
faith-removing elements of civilization... We could not find in them [the stories of 
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Angare] anything intellectually modern except immorality, evil character and 
wickedness. To mock at the creator of the world, to ridicule religious beliefs and to 
make indecent jokes are the main characteristics of this bundle of filth. There is no 
regard for the greatness and majesty of God nor [sic] any respect for the sanctity and 
honour of the prophets, nor any respect of the human dignity. Instead one finds a bold 
and shameless display of every kind of foul language.
265 
Angare was also regarded as a religious offence by local clerics, as Ahmad Ali notes: 
‘Mullahs from the pulpit and priests from the minarets carried invectives against the 
book and the authors; semi-political and all-India organizations passed resolutions 
condemning it.’
266
  Not only condemnation, but also a demand for prosecution as 
mentioned in an article in the Hindustan Times on 21 February 1933, writing that the 
Central Standing Committee of the All Indian conference, Lukhnow: 
Strongly condemns the heart rending and filthy pamphlet called Angare... which has 
wounded the feelings of the entire Muslim community by ridiculing God and his 
Prophet and which is extremely objectionable from the standpoints both of religion and 
morality. The committee further strongly urges upon the attention of the UP 
Government that the book to be at once proscribed.
267
 
Local Muslim clerics issued fatwa (decree) against the publications of Angare and its 
authors.  Funds were collected for their prosecution, and the punishments suggested 
included ‘stoning to death’ and ‘hanging by the neck.’
268
  It is important to note that 
initially demands for death sentences for publishers were declared by local clerics 
without understanding whether such sentences could be practiced or not for religious 
offences.  The intensity of the issue can be seen in one of the statements of the 
authors of Angare, Ahmad Ali, who said that ‘we were reminded of the Rajpal and 
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the Rangila Rasool case.’
269
  Such statement shows they realised the possibility that 
they too might face death like Rajpal who was killed for publishing a book which 
insulted the Prophet.  Howeve, Rajpal’s case was considered offensive by Muslims, 
the judiciary and religious communities alike.  The question arises whether the case 
of Angare legally falls under section 295-A for outraging the feelings of Muslims 
and Islam or not. 
According to the legal procedure, the case of Angare was liable under section 
295-A for ‘trial and revision’ to declare the nature of literature and most importantly 
the intention of the authors, whether outrageous as well as malicious, to wound the 
feelings of Muslims within the meaning of the section.  Though Angare was banned, 
the authors issued their statement of defence which reveals the glimpse of their 
intention as expressed in words that they ‘have chosen the particular field of Islam, 
not because they bear any ‘special’ malice, but because being born into that 
particular society, they felt themselves better qualified to speak for that alone...’
270
 
The intention of the writers was not seen as offensive by the entire Muslim 
community of British India, for not all reacted in the same way; some Urdu papers 
writing against the prosecution of Angare.  For example, in Sarguzashat in February 
1933, though accepting that some themes in Angare were offensive, the reaction to 
the issue was criticised and the accusers of Angare were asked ‘…to set a correct 
example of Islam; because Islam is a light which is an enemy of darkness...’ Payam, 
published on 5
th
 March 1933 in Aligarh, wrote that: 
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...Condemnation, proscription and legal action are no answer to blasphemy and atheism. 
How ironic that the very people who claim the right of free speech from the 
Government are not willing to concede the same right to their countrymen. The result of 
this is that fire keeps kindling unnoticed and burst into flames when it gets a chance... 
Such anger and rage can silence criticism for some time but the question still remains. 
The progress of the human mind cannot depart from the path of research...
271
 
The statements and thoughts published in the Hindustan Times against the authors, 
and the statements mentioned above in Sarguzashat and Payam, show the different 
understandings of Muslims who did not consider that the accusation of the authors of 
Angare was reasonable nor their work truly offensive.  Others wished to take serious 
legal steps and actions to punish them.  The British authorities could have pointed to 
some support for publication from others within the Muslim community if they had 
wanted.  Calm discussion of Islam or any other religion, indeed religious discussion 
in general between and within religious communities, was still legal under section 
298 of ‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ as discussed in the first chapter.  However, 
the prosecution of Angare suggests that the British authorities and the Islamic 
religious clerics formed an alliance to ban the book under section 295-A.  This not 
only raises questions about the decision, but also why and how Muslim clerics had 
such influence over the Muslim community and why the British authorities followed 
the clerics’ led to ban the book. 
Firstly, the short stories in Angare were in Urdu and its stories were written in 
a literary form that challenged established norms of Urdu language and literature. 
The language used could be prosecuted under section 295-A to enforce revision but 
only to clarify an ‘intention’ that was outrageous as well as malicious, the defining 
criteria used for publications offensive to a religious community.  Why were these 
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changed forms of the Urdu language considered offensive?  Historically, the Urdu 
language gained wide recognition and status because its script and style had become 
identified with Islam, indeed it became a symbol of Islamic ideology linked, 
therefore, with the language of the Quran.
272
  Geeta Patel makes clear in her 
historical appraisal of the Urdu language that since the eighteenth century, forms of 
Urdu prose had formal guidelines for judging the correctness and aesthetic status of 
the language.  By the mid-nineteenth century, the area of form and its failures, islah, 
had moved into a different realm organised around the ‘intent of writing to reform 
the populace at large and Muslim communities in particular.’
273
  Such a religious 
mandate was then used to assess literary works against that fixed yard-stick in the 
nineteenth century which was preserved and intensified in the twentieth, entering a 
period which became ‘synonymous with punishments and exiles.’
274
  Discussing all 
legal issues of the writing and publishing of Urdu literature is beyond this research 
but it is important to discuss what was found offensive in the literature of Angare in a 
legal and religious perspective. 
In the British era, one of the offensive styles of writing in the case of Angare 
came from Western literature’s impact on the Urdu language and literature.  Here it 
is important to note that English had long been imposed as a language of study and 
by the 1830s was declared the official language with the major aim to ‘form…a class 
of persons Indians in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and 
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  The previously important languages such as Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, 
Persian, Arabic and many others were marginalised.
276
  Introducing a western slant 
in Urdu literature through Angare was simply offensive, for the authors intended to 
break established norms of the language and introduce a more liberal style with a 
direct impact on the social problems of the Indian society, as Mahmud notes: 
Angare came as an act of defiance against all traditional norms. It deliberately jettisoned 
much of the traditional language of Urdu literature and introduced new style. Drawing 
inspiration from the writing of James Joyce, Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence, and in 
some cases Marxist writings, the young writers experimented with new techniques in 
writing which aimed at a more direct impact in its stark and unvarnished portrayal of 
human existence.
277 
This assessment of the western style of writing as offensive was often based on the 
assumption that linguistic modernity and change would cause the decline of 
established Urdu writing and its often religious gate-keepers.  It is also significant to 
note that the response of the authors to religion in the Angare text was regarded and 
formulated as the ‘new secularism’ which generally implies the notion of rejection of 
or insult to religion.
278
  Though the authors, in publishing Angare, ‘dreamt of 
winning for Urdu language’
279
 were undermined by the critics’ view that it was ‘not 
a great piece of literature’
280
 their intention of publishing modern Urdu literature did 
not stop them.  After the ban on the publication of Angare, the writers issued their 
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statement of defence and plans for future publications from Delhi, drafted by 
Mahmuduzzafar and published in The Leader Allahabad in April 1933: 
...the book [angare] at once raised a storm in Muslim circles. It was said to be... [an] 
attack on Islam and everything decent in the society....The authors of this book do not 
wish to make any apology for it. They leave it to float or sink of itself. They are not 
afraid of the consequences of having launched it.  They only wish to defend ‘the right of 
launching’ it and all other vessels like it... They stand for the free criticism and free 
expression in all matters of the highest importance to the human race in general and the 
Indian people in particular… Our practical proposal is the formation immediately of a 
League of Progressive Authors, which should bring forth similar collections from time 
to time, both in English and the various vernaculars of our country...
281 
It was a call for claiming the ‘right of free expression’ and, despite the court case, 
this style became a significant marker of progressive writing in the history of Urdu 
literature, the Progressive Writing Movement, launched in 1936, citing the writers of 
Angare as leading figures in the history of Urdu Literature.
282
  One of the future 
objectives of the progressive association was ‘to secure literature and other arts from 
the conservative classes in whose hands they have been degenerating so long.’
283
 
Apart from the issue of Urdu Literature as a religious sentinel, the second 
probable major reason for banning Angare was ‘the moral language and themes’ of 
its authors.  Ahmad Ali, one of the authors of Angare, insisted the text and indeed the 
genre were influenced by social conditions of India.
284
  In the stories of Zaheer and 
Rashid Jahan, the writers attempted to raise some traditional, social and religious 
themes and issues they saw in middle class conservative Muslim families, culture 
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and behaviour in a male-dominated society.  Among many perceived causes for 
grievance among those who claimed that religion was insulted was the portrayal of 
sex and sexuality, described in Zaheer’s story Janat Ki Basarat, the vision of 
Paradise, a story which portrays a sanctimonious cleric fondling a copy of the Quran 
in his sleep as he dreams of nubile houris in heaven.  However, the intention of 
Zaheer as expressed in the statement of defence was rather different: 
Sajjad Zaheer was concerned with a criticism and satire of the current Muslim 
conceptions, life and practices. His attack is directly primarily against the intolerable 
theological burden that is imposed from childhood upon the average Muslim in this 
country—a burden that leads to a contortion and a cramping, an internal torture of the 
inquisitive or speculative mind and the vital vigorous body, both man and woman.’
285 
Zaheer’s stories may have expressed a few such themes.  However, it was the stories 
of Rashid Jahan, the female doctor, which were regarded as particularly offensive 
and threatening.  Generally in her stories Jahan presented women’s experiences of 
social isolation and concealment under the veil, as well as mistreatment by the 
husband even if he is western-educated.  Historically, in the late nineteenth century 
some prominent Islamic male scholars also dealt with the issue of woman’s 
oppression in education, her legal marriage status, the issue of parda, veil, as well as 
her lower status than a man which was described as common social practice in 
British India.
286
  The question arises why such conditions and issues, acceptable to 
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discuss in the nineteenth century, were regarded as offensive in the stories written by 
Jahan in Angare.  Malik argues that Angare was an internal critique of patriarchal 
practices within the Muslim society and social life.
287
  One of the commonly 
accepted ideas was the supremacy of man, who in Jahan’s stories had clear authority 
to suppress women at home.  Such supremacy goes beyond what the new social 
awareness and modernity, implied in the stories, was willing to accept in silence, and 
shocked the readers of that time, particularly Urdu speaking Muslims: Angare’s 
treatment of sexuality and mistreatment by husbands, women’s health and 
pregnancies was offensive for traditionalists, a view which later spread across some 
other parts of India.
288
  By raising such issues, Jahan tried to suggest birth control 
methods, an unacceptable issue for many conservative families who were key 
advocates for the family in the nineteenth century as well as in Indian Urdu 
literature.
289
  Probably the most offensive aspect of Jahan’s stories was to take such 
issues ‘out of house’ particularly in the play ‘Behind the Veil,’ where she broke the 
rules by ‘open[ing] up a peephole into the sacred space of the house hold, the space 
that was hidden from the gaze of the outside, a bedroom in the women’s quarter, the 
zanana,’
290
 a place of women.
291
  Rashid, mediating as a doctor between the zanana 
and the rest of Indian society, plays a similar role in her writing which exposes the 
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poor medical conditions and isolation of a woman who has never been out of the 
zanana, never met the doctor or lawyer as such transactions are parda nashin, 
conducted through male mediators.
292
  Paulos notes that Rashid was qualified to raise 
family issues through her medical profession and knowledge and write on the subject 
for the people relying on old beliefs and methods. He insists that: 
Rashid Jahan thus covers the spectrum of her experiences and her socio-political beliefs 
in her writings. She intended her short stories to be educational and followed the 
progressive line in her choice of subject matter. As a woman, a Muslim and a doctor, 
she utilized those areas to provide her material and to direct her attention back to 
correcting and readjusting the values and inequities that she saw there... [as]... a most 
influential person of her class. The complete immersion in radical politics, medicine and 
literature side by side is clear evidence of the goals that she set for herself...
293
 
Rashid’s offence was also to have had the courage to break tradition and start a 
career as a woman.  Coppola and Zubai notes that Rashid Jahan ‘became a symbol of 
emancipated woman; in conservative homes an example of all the worst that can 




             All thoughts about this aspect of the Angare publication, discussed above, 
can be summed up in the conclusion that breaking traditional rules in such a male-
dominated society was simply a religious offence, a blasphemy, which offended 
some Muslims of Aligarh and Lukhnow.  The secular tension challenged the self-
image of those orthodox Muslims who idealised ashraf, noble ethics, values and 
language coming from the Middle East Islamic world, values which they considered 
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threatened by the new reformation and western values.
295
  The nature of the set rules 
and orthodoxy as the power to protect tradition clashed with other views from the 
wider community which may have had doubts about certain practices and beliefs.
296
  
Malik suggests that the Ulama became the gatekeepers of a particular Islamic 
scholarly tradition which they saw as being the guardian of the Muslim identity and 
presence of Islam in British India, a tradition which they felt was threatened by the 
modern writers of Angare.
297
  Not all Muslims of British India accepted their views. 
Such social and traditional reasons, however, would not have been strong 
enough to ban the publication under section 295-A, had it been treated on its merits 
alone, especially given that the stories of the first volume of Angare were not written 
‘intentionally’ to insult the Prophet Muhammad within the meaning of that section. 
And if there was any offensive theme in a few stories, there was room under section 
295-A to demand corrections, islah, certain changes in words and lines in the text in 
contention: this was not done in the case of Angare.  After reviewing and analysing 
reasons for accusation from the literature and moral language of Angare, it is now 
important to discuss the political manoeuvrings which underlay the banning of the 
book which also was considered offensive by the British government. 
The publication of the stories in Angare also showed negative aspects of 
British colonial rule.  Mahmood notes that a few stories of Angare, those written by 
Sajjad Zaheer and Ahmed Ali, were intended to critique social and religious practices 
based on ignorance.  However, they were also written in protest against what they 
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felt was a disgraceful acquiescence in foreign rule and inequalities in British Indian 
society.
298
  The contemporary political circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s were a 
serious threat to British colonial rule.  Throughout the 1920s, as discussed above, the 
British confronted critical social disorder and threats to Hindu-Muslim relations 
based on religious issues and publications.  However later in the 1930s, the situation 
dramatically changed when the British ‘government feared a confrontation with anti-
British forces more strongly than a continuation of Hindu-Muslim violence.’
299
  Most 
of the publications in 1930s were inspired by the freedom movement which played 
an important role to encourage people to fight for freedom from colonial rule.
300
  By 
the 1930s the colonial authorities were interacting with the religious leaders, Ulama 
and clerics, as the representatives of the Muslims of British India.
301
  Angare was 
published in the era of this freedom movement and was inspired by it, and this was a 
key reason for banning it, religion being a useful hook to use.  Under such 
circumstances, the British were able to suppress dissent within the communities over 
which they exercised colonial rule, particularly the educated liberal voices that were 
starting to organise anti-colonial and nationalist political organisation.
302
  It is clear 
how religious issues were handled by the authorities especially where policy-makers 
could use policies for their own political advantages, and where: 
...Obedience of the people to the decisions of the power command becomes habitual... 
In some cases the method may include isolation from all sources of support... These 
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individuals are the silent groups. The voice of the professional…may have something to 
say about policy, but usually goes unheeded.
303 
This brief reference to some political reasons behind the ban on Angare make it 
reasonable to suggest that the written matter in Angare was treated as a religious 
insult punishable under section 295-A of IPC, because the government could use this 
law both to placate some Muslim leaders and quell dissent against their own rule.  
However, banning the book did not stop the authors from publishing on colonial 
matters as they later became more concerned to write on colonial power.  One of the 
aims of the ‘Association of Angare’ was ‘to produce and translate literature of a 
progressive nature, to fight for cultural reaction, and in this way to further the cause 






The revision of the religious offences law from the 1920s to 1947 was a response to 
some important incidents which left deep marks that remained into the post-colonial 
period.  Bringing the first amendments was a significant step by the British 
government.  The application of the addition to Chapter XV not only shows that the 
demands of Muslims to amend the law were accepted but that after revision resulting 
from some cases it was declared that the issue of offensive writing was indeed and 
perhaps primarily a malicious intention to wound Muslims.  It can be assumed that a 
really malicious insult would cause a government to protect people and beliefs 
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through the rule of law.  However, the case of Angare presented a totally different 
picture, showing how socio-political influences and anxieties can affect the law-
makers with the power to use religion to strengthen its position.  This is yet one more 
legacy from the colonial era which has continued until the present.  The fight for 
freedom from colonial rule continued until the British left South Asia in 1947.  In an 
independent political arena, it was important to establish and enable social, economic 
and political dynamics in the component states of the newly divided subcontinent- 
India, Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh.  However, as the next chapter will 
show, concern about the destabilising effect of religious hatred as expressed in the 






The Legacy of British Law in Independent India and Pakistan 
The British Indian subcontinent was one of the most religiously diverse regions in 
South Asia.  Religion played a significant role in the independence movement and 
was one of the powerful tools both driving for independence in the British colonial 
era and directing the post-independence division of South Asia into Hindu and 
Muslim countries
305
 on the basis that Hindus and Muslims, from two different 
religions, could not live together.
306
  Before handing over power to the Indian 
subcontinent, it was declared by the British Government that ‘India is hopelessly… 
split by racial and religious division which we cannot bridge and which became more 
and more acute as any real transfer of power by us draws near.’
307
  That division led 
to two nations in which Christians as a minority in each sought protection under the 
Muslim and Hindu majority nations of Pakistan and India.  The focus of this chapter 
is how two and then three countries dealt with the ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
legislation and fulfilled the law’s spirit to protect religious communities. 
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Though British rule ended in the subcontinent in 1947, it left its legacy such 
as law and order that is still in practice.  After 1947 (the partition of India and 
Pakistan), the title of the Indian Penal Code remained for independent India but was 
changed to that of the Pakistan Penal Code for that country.  Similarly, after 1971 the 
Pakistan Penal Code came to be known simply as the ‘Penal Code’ in independent 
Bangladesh.  Thus except for changes in the title, the Penal Code of 1860 remained 
largely unchanged with only minor modifications in a divided South Asia.  The new 
countries, just as the British in writing and applying the law, claimed that under it 
every person would be liable to punishment without distinction of rank and faith 
provided the offence with which anyone is charged had been committed in India and 
Pakistan. 
The application of the law, Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of 
1860 was expected to play a key role in encouraging and bringing toleration in 
religious issues to all religious communities, badly scarred by Partition.  The main 
objective of this law, as discussed in the first part of the thesis, was and still is to 
protect religious communities from having their place of worship intentionally 
injured or defiled (section 295), their religious communities outraged through 
offensive writing and speech (Section 295-A), their religious assembly disturbed 
(section 296), their place of worship trespassed upon (section 297) and their religious 
feelings wounded by words (section 298). 
It has been shown in Part One how the law regarding ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ was applied, criticized and amended in British India.  Major criticism 
occurred on the issue of offensive writing and speech, particularly in the 1920s that 
brought amendments in Chapter XV as already discussed.  Part Two will examine 
118 
 
how the aim of the ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ law, to preserve religious 
tolerance and avoid intolerance, fared over the years in the two and then three 
countries.  Of particular interest will be the fact that the legislation concerning 
offensive writing and speech under section 295-A and section 295, defiling a sacred 
place and object, have been used more than any of the other legislation concerning 
religious crimes described in Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ law, 
sections 296, 297 and 298 rarely being prosecuted in India and Pakistan. 
Apart from protecting religious communities under the legislation on 
‘Religious Offences,’ India and Pakistan each decided to declare it a fundamental 
right to provide religious freedom to religious communities in 1948.  The 
Constitution of India declared India a secular state, and in Section 25 (1) provides 
that all citizens are ‘equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to 
profess, practise and propagate religion.’
308
  According to Section 19, all Indian 
citizens have the right to freedom of speech and expression and are subject to 
reasonable restrictions for preserving inter alia public order, decency or morality.
309
  
Likewise, Pakistan adopted fundamental rights that give the same religious freedom 
to all religious communities.
310
  Under these provisions both countries claimed and 
reiterated their democratic values and secularism.  Secularism may denote a notion of 
a separation of religion and state, or it may guarantee freedom of religion to all 
religious communities, and equality of citizens for equal opportunities without any 
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discrimination on religion grounds, or it may be used to denote opposition to religion 
and its influence.  It has a multi-dimensional meaning in the South Asian context.  
India is a secular state: Pakistan was initially.  Nandy discuss secularism as a western 
concept which, he asserts, plays an important part in religious intolerance and 
violence among different religious classes in India.
311
  For Madan, it is used when 
religion persists as a powerful element in personal identity, claiming religion as a 
‘constitutive of society.’
312
  In Pakistan’s general socio-cultural context, secularism 
has been used to mean Islamic democracy and has been regarded as reflecting the 
‘insignificance of religious thinking.’
313
  In short it can be said that in the post-
colonial period in India and Pakistan, religious interests arose which gradually 
limited the full freedom of religious expression, whether in writing and speaking, 
evangelism, or other religious practices.  Before discussing the evolution and even 
transformation brought about by this growing erosion of the secular principle, it is 
necessary to consider how religious communities and political power initially 
regarded religious issues and how Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ 
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3.1. The Application of Chapter XV of Religious Offences in India post-
1947 
It has been argued that such laws for the protection of religion reveal the secular 
democratic values on which India bases its secularism. There is no state religion in 
India but all religious communities such as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians 
are protected by the law particularly as constituted in Chapter XV of the 1860 
‘Offences Relating to Religion.’  In the main, Indian Courts and the judicial system 
applied Chapter XV without any major contradictions or critical consequences, 
passing adequate judgements to maintain religious harmony from 1947 until the 
1970s.  Significantly in terms of providing religious protection, the Courts and the 
judicial system were prepared to be very circumspect in considering religious issues 
and to ‘pay due regard to the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of 
persons with different beliefs irrespective of the consideration whether or not they 




In India the most common religious offence has been writing and speaking 
outrageously and maliciously on a religious matter, which is prosecuted under 
section 295-A of IPC, all the ingredients and objectives of which were discussed in 
the second chapter.  The most important legal aspect of this section is to note the 
critical circumstances in which prosecutions had occurred under the British when 
offensive books and pamphlets, particularly about the life of the Prophet 
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Muhammad, were published in the 1920s in British India, which as we saw led to 
major changes in the legal history of ‘Offences Relating to Religion.’  It is interesting 
to note both continuation and change in post-colonial publications, particularly those 
targeting the sacred personages of Muslims or other religions, and indeed such 
publications continued in independent India.  Such events brought one change or 
amendment in section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code, increasing the punishment 
from two years to three years in 1961,
315
 although it seems the circumstances 
surrounding the various cases reported under section 295-A in India post-1947 were 
not as critical as in British India. 
The Indian Courts followed and declared the same objective of section 295-A 
while passing judgment on cases brought for offensive writing and speech whether 
the case fell under section 295-A, deciding whether an act was done with malicious 
intention to hurt the feelings of the other religious community, or not.
316
  For 
example, in the cases of Baba Khalil Ahamad v. State, six books were considered 
offensive which had received protests from a number of persons in the Muslim 
community whose religious feelings had been injured.  In November 1952, a handbill 
was published in Benares describing Yazid, son of Muawiya, as one entitled to be 
admitted to heaven, whereas in other pamphlets Muawiya was praised and 
represented as a leader of Hanafi Muslims.  The applicant was a Sunni who 
                                                 
315
 Amended by Act 41 of 1961, K. D. Ghour, The Indian Penal Code, 418; Another change was made 
in the procedure of section 298.  An offence under section 298 originally was non-cognizable in British 
India, which means that a police officer shall not arrest an accused without warrant, but now it is 
‘cognizable’ which gives power to a police officer for arresting anyone without a warrant, although this 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh only. 
316
 Various religious cases have been recorded in ILR (Indian Law Reports), AIR (All India Reports) 
and Cr. LJ (Criminal Law Journals) which mostly have been successfully constituted in India within 
the meaning of the Law of Religious Offences particularly section 295-A for protecting malicious 
writing and speech. Shiv Ram Das v. The Punjab State, AIR 1955 28; 1955 Cri. L. J. 337. 1957 CRS 
860, AIT 1960 Madras 258, AIR 1971 Bombay, 1971 CrLJ 1773, 1980 CrLJ 448, 1983 1446, 1985 
CrLJ 797, 1995 SEC 214, 1995 CrLJ 1316. 
122 
 
considered it his duty to dispel doubts and misunderstandings about the position of 
Yazid and Muawiya in Islamic history.  With this object, the defendant wrote six 
books in reply to one written by someone professing another religion who had 
attacked his religious views.  The court decided when anyone chooses to write such 
books, particular care in the language and manner of writing is necessary.  In the 
court’s opinion, the six books contained matter and language offensive and 
considered punishable under Section 295-A of IPC.  The State Government was, 
therefore, justified in passing the order for their forfeiture.
317
 
Yet protection for hurt feelings related to religion was not uncontested, for 
controlling such speech in India was felt to violate the constitution which declares 
freedom of religious expression under Article 25 and 26 of the Indian constitution.
318
  
However, it has been argued that ‘Chapter XV which deals with the offences relating 
to religion is not affected by the operation of Article 25 of the constitution...’
319
  For 
example, in 1969 in the case of Sant Das Maheswari, the contradiction between the 
limited freedom of writing and expression under section 295-A and Religious 
Freedom of Expression under Article 25 and 26 was raised.  It was held that section 
295-A does not prohibit or make punishable anything which is mere profession, 
practice or propagation of a religion within the meaning of Article 25 but what is 
made punishable is a deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
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feelings of any class.
320
  The Madras court laid down the following law while 
discussing Section 295-A: 
The right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the 
Constitution will no doubt enable a citizen to criticise the religion and the religious beliefs of 
a class of persons. Article 25 of the Constitution confers a right on all persons to freedom of 
conscience and a right freely to profess, practice, propagate religion subject to certain 
conditions and a person is entitled to express and propagate his views so long as he does not 
affect the public order, morality and health or offend any of the provisions of the Constitution 
or laws of the land.
321 
The statement makes clear that though religious communities have religious 
freedom, the expression of that freedom cannot affect the public peace.  It is similar 
to the comment of Naguib Mahfouz that ‘we need to differentiate between speech 
and disrespect for religious symbols.  Every man has a right to stretch his arms, for 
example, but not to the extent that he hits the face of the [next] person...’
322
 
Though the application of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
remained largely unedited in the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the application of the 
Conversion Acts has challenged the freedom of expression as briefly indicated 
below, a detailed review of the Indian Conversion Act being inappropriate here other 
than noting its application, importance and meaning particularly with the reference to 
the social and historical context of legislation on ‘Religious Offences’ as affected by 
the Anti-conversion Acts. 
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3.1.1. The Impact of Conversion Acts on Chapter XV of Religious 
Offences 
Conversion is a broad term referring to a highly variable and potentially syncretistic 
process in which social identities and cultural styles, frequently but not exclusively 
linked to religion, are transformed.
323
  It is clear that people may convert for religious 
reasons as well as social ones.  However, the material interests involved were 
frequently associated with a certain social and ethnic identity, and especially in those 
cases, people who had not converted as well as people of the faith to which a person 
converted might not accept the validity of the conversion. In that case the convert 
was marginalised in a way which could not be protected under the law.  Under 
colonial governance, all religious communities could use freedom of religious 
discussion to enable conversion, though the government itself did not encourage 
conversion to Christianity in the mid-19th century.  This was a period when their 
control was uncertain, and religious change could tip the balance.  Thus while the 
convert’s social position had to be negotiated within their family of origin as well as 
in the church of their reception, their legal position was not helped by British law.
324
 
Though the application of Chapter XV rarely caused great turmoil in India, 
the role and meaning of the original law, to encourage religious discussion and 
toleration without religious antagonism in the context of a genuine exchange of ideas 
not excluding the possibility of conversion, has been radically affected by anti-
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Conversion Acts in some Indian states.  The Conversion Acts promulgated in the 
1950s and 1960s in India have arguably also affected the fundamental human rights 
for religious freedom of conscience, which is shown in various case studies, and will 
be reviewed later in this chapter.  In order to maintain religious freedom, the Indian 
Parliament initially rejected the ‘Indian Converts Bill’ in 1955 after members of the 
legislature such as A. M. Thomas and Prime Minister J. Nehru warned of the 
potential for harassment of a large number of people.
325
  However, the desire to 
regulate conversion gained the support of state government officials by 1956 and 
since 1968 offenders can be legally prosecuted in some states of India.
326
  It is 
necessary to comment on the place of the Conversion Act in the legal history of India 
as it affected the application of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of the Indian Penal 
Code and Human Rights from the 1970s. 
Generally the Conversion Acts deal with religious conversion particularly 
from Hinduism to another religion.  Anti-conversion laws do not prescribe harsh 
punishments such as death sentence or life imprisonment but imprisonment for a 
maximum of one or two years.  It has been argued that such laws are mainly applied 
to preserve the Hindu caste system by preventing castes such as Dalits, untouchables, 
from converting from Hinduism,
327
 lest conversion from Hinduism eventually 
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decreased the Hindu population.
328
  Mass conversion had already been criticised by 
Hindus in the first half of the twentieth century, such as the several thousand lower 
caste people who converted to Christianity in the 1920s and 1930s in Orissa and the 
eastern region of Chhattisgarh.  The Arya Samaj (Aryan Society), which had earlier 
been active in protecting Hindu practices including the cow-slaughter issue later, 
started protesting conversions in this period, as well as arranging reconversion 
ceremonies to protect Hindus.
329
  Gandhi was also one of those who opposed mission 
work, especially that leading to the conversion of Hindus, in the 1930s and 1940s.
330
 
While conversion may be for religious reasons, frequently conversion to 
Christianity was associated with a certain social and ethnic identity, although it was 
not the only way to acquire a new identity, some lower-caste Indians integrating 
themselves into the colonial system by joining the army or by serving as indentured 
labourers in British colonies.  All the same, many consciously saw the social reform 
movements within Christianity as an opportunity for upward mobility, educational 
and political advancement.
331
  Thus missionaries’ attitude towards the lower castes, 
even to colonialism which they by no means blindly supported, enabled many 
converts to search for a new means of protest and liberation from their lower status 
and caste. 
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From 1947, in independent India, the Conversion Acts were recommended to 
be enforced in Madhya Pradesh by the ‘Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry 
Committee’ which objected to conversion to Christianity by enticement with 
promises of employment, education, or social and health services.
332
  Voluntary 
converts cannot be prosecuted under the Conversion Acts, but after 1950, any person 
could be punished for attempting to convert another from one religious faith to 
another by the use of force, inducement, allurement, or any fraudulent means or 
aiding any person in such conversion.
333
 
Historically, the ‘intention to convert’ is also linked with the British 
‘Offences Relating to Religion’ especially section 296, which as we have seen 
allowed ‘voluntary’ religious discussions in religious assemblies, and section 298 
which declared religious discussions which might lead to conversion legal for all 
communities.  Likewise neither an ‘intention’ to convert nor converting was a crime 
liable to prosecution under section 298. 
After independence, new political powers, particularly the Hindu Nationalist 
Party, strongly opposed conversion from Hindu traditions.
334
  Arguments in favour of 
the application of conversion acts are often contested as being contradictory.  First, 
preventing conversion contradicts the fundamental right to freedom of conscience 
enshrined in the Indian Constitution’s assurance of the freedom of conscience and 
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the right freely to profess ‘practice and propagate religion.’
335
  According to P. V. 
Reddi, in viewing fundamental rights, ‘it is well-settled that the freedom of 




Secondly, though illegal means of conversion can be prosecuted, voluntary 
conversion should not be so treated.  The distinction is in practice largely irrelevant, 
given that courts have sentenced priests for converting people even after converts 
provided statements that they converted voluntarily,
337
 assuming that converts, 
especially if low-caste, lacked independent judgment and their conversion was thus 
illegitimate.
338
  The outcome of such legal changes could be disastrous, such as when 
state governments required those wanting to convert to notify their ‘clear intentions’ 
to convert to government officials in advance in eastern Madhya Pradesh and 
Chhattisgarh in 2006.  The result in Chhattisgarh was that conversion to Christianity 
brought violence and isolation and made Christians more vulnerable to accusation at 
the hands of local communities.
339
  The Conversion Acts have been misused by 
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religious communities, particularly when the law has been taken into hands of local 
communities to punish converts and to harass minorities in India.
340
 
Such applications of Anti Conversion Acts affected the security of religious 
communities in India today.  Religious communities were not as vulnerable to 
accusation or punishments until the increasingly firm application of Anti Conversion 
Acts with no effective redress when local communities took the law in their hands to 
punish a person accused of conversion.  The major problem is that the ‘intention’ to 
allow religious discussions and conversion, explained in section 296 and 298, can 
still be used to discuss religious matters freely but can nevertheless breach the peace 
of religious communities, which Chapter XV sought to avoid.  Having glanced at 
India it is now important to see how Pakistan protected religious communities and 
how Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ was applied to religious issues. 
 
3.2. The Application of Chapter XV of Offences Relating to Religion in 
East Pakistan post-1947 
Like India, Pakistan inherited ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ contained in Pakistan’s 
Penal Code.  The Legislature, in adopting this law, aimed to maintain religious 
tolerance among religious communities in Pakistan, which was based on the notion 
that all Muslims in British India formed a nation, and should have their own state 
where their political rights can be protected.
341
  Though Pakistan had been an Islamic 
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country of South Asia since its inception in 1947, it claimed and intended to make 
the country secular, with religion a personal matter and all citizens of the then East 




The vision of Pakistan (East and West) expressed by the early founders of 
Pakistan was that there should be equality between Muslims and minorities, such as 
Christians and Hindus, Pakistan’s founder and first leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, 
dreaming of a progressive Pakistan based on the rule of law.
343
  In his Presidential 
address to the first constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 September 1947, Jinnah 
said: ‘the first duty of the Government is to maintain law and order, so that life, 
property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the state.’
344
  
Addressing the Pakistani religious communities he said: ‘We are starting with this 
fundamental principle that we all are citizens and equal citizens of the one state.  You 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with business of 
the state.’
345
  In his speeches, equal citizenship beyond religion, caste or creed was 
expressed.  Ayesha Jalal comments that ‘neither the speech, nor the legacy of which 
it is a part, has mattered very much in filling the deep crevices that constitute the 
contested narratives of Pakistani history.’
346
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It has been a crucial continuing concern and question ever since 1947 in 
Pakistan whether Jinnah used religion to create a Muslim state or a modern 
democratic country.  Bose and Jalal note an important historical fact that though 
religion and culture have been important elements in the identity of Indian Muslims 
there was no agreement on religion as political ideology.  However, the local and 
regional politically-motivated Muslim League, which was initially not sufficiently 
established to develop its framework, eventually rustled up the semblance of mass 
support which could be won by a precise political program to claim a separate 
Muslim part of India. In this context, from 1947 ‘…the partition of India is 
celebrated as the ultimate victory of Islam in the subcontinent.’
347
  Therefore 
throughout the history of Pakistan, the question of Islamising Pakistan remained 
critical and unclear.  The main reason for discussing the initial foundation and 
potential sources of conflict in such detail is to show how Pakistan’s initial steps to 
change its constitution not only threatened the unity of the whole but also gradually 
brought major changes in religious, legal and constitutional history in post-1971 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan officials did not change Chapter XV of 1860 after independence 
other than trivial amendments relating to ‘citizens of Pakistan:’ in section 295-A of 
Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), for example, the words ‘His Majesty’s subjects’ were 
deleted and replaced with ‘the citizens of Pakistan.’
348
  Initially, both East and West 
wings of Pakistan practised the law without any major change.  However, a gradual 
change occurred concerning arguments between East and West Pakistan over the 
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secular or religious nature of the state.  It was not only an issue of religious ideology 
for the country but also an issue of ‘ethnic pluralism and its lack of recognition that 
has always posed the most serious threat and challenge to Pakistan’s heavily 
centralized system.’
349
  Such issues led Pakistan to continuing ethnic and religious 
strategies, experienced as oppressive by minorities, differentiating religious classes 
and sects and their norms and beliefs in East and West wings of Pakistan. 
West Pakistan had a dominant ruling class based on Punjabi political 
leadership that believed in a strong central government, with the Urdu language as a 
symbol of unity and Islamic ideology for both wings of Pakistan.
350
  These values 
were not acceptable to East Pakistan and could not unite Pakistan.  The reasons for 
the Punjabi insistence over what appeared to East Pakistan Bengalis as oppression 
are complex.  Historically, though the supremacy of the English language over local 
languages was introduced in the 1830s in British India, according to Bose and Jalal, 
the Bengali and Urdu languages continued to be important at the lower level of the 
administrative and judicial system in eastern and northern India.  They further note 
that it was in Punjab where British officials used English and adopted Urdu as the 
language of government.
351
  This legacy remained in Punjab, West Pakistan where 
Urdu became the national language and English was acceptable for educational 
purposes: accepting Bengali language became a serious issue. 
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Apart from the politics of language, it has been argued that distinct social and 
ethnic statuses are evaluated differently in these two Muslim communities, East and 
West Pakistan.  One is ashraf, meaning noble born, mostly from Arab, Persia and the 
Mughals as well as converts from the high castes of Hindus: ajlaf, also known as 
atraf, denotes those people who are lower than noble, belonging to occupational 
groups and crafts such as fishing, trading and weaving.
352
  There is also a third group 
arzul, the lowest class of all and a class of Hindu defined untouchables, all which are 
part of the Islamic structures of South Asia.
353
  The Urdu language alone simply 
became the ‘preeminent symbol of Muslim Identity’ and of ashraf, the Urdu-
speaking atraf in the West being in effect bundled together with all other non-ashraf 
in both parts using local languages such as Mandal, Sarkar and Bengalias people of 
lesser socio-religious status.
354
  One of the slogans of Eastern students clearly 
showed the conflict: ‘[we] refuse to believe that any language under heaven can be 
Islamic or Christian or heathen.’
355
  Accepting the Bengali language for the Bengal 
province of East Pakistan became for Punjabis a dilemma of choosing between 
‘religious’ and secular language as well as a status matter for Punjabis.
356
  The ashraf 
intelligentsia held to the historical prejudice against Bengali Muslims, their language, 
culture and occupations, considering Bengali as poor and uncultured.
357
  It seemed 
that adopting a language other than Urdu became almost a religious offence for elite 
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West Pakistanis, who saw themselves as the protector of a united Pakistan through 
Islamic ashraf norms. 
Apart from this basic cultural issue, East Pakistan also had another reason to 
object to the supremacy and constitution designed by West Pakistan.  The 
background of the religious communities of the then East Pakistan, its social, and 
economic as well as judicial level and circumstances, also lies behind the refusal to 
accept the first efforts of West Pakistan toward making the constitution accord with 
the general principles of an Islamic state, including the exclusion of non-Muslims as 
head of the state.
358
  The first demand made by East Pakistan was to revive the early 
promise that the country would not be theocratic.  Due to the facts of economic life 
in East Pakistan, Bengali Hindus were never excluded from the main stream of social 
and political life, for they were the backbone of the Bengali economy.
359
  The basis 
for the East Pakistan argument also relied on the generally good relationship between 
Hindus and Muslims that encouraged the Muslims of Bengal to give equal rights to 
the Hindu minority.  Hasan Zaheer notes that there was no Islamic extremism in East 
Pakistan to divide and detract the people from the real issues. He further comments 
that: 
By and large, the Muslim middle classes had a love-hate feeling towards the corresponding 
Hindu classes; there was a deep cultural affinity between them. Having achieved state power 
to redress the economic and other imbalances, the Muslims had no difficulty in co-operating 
with the Hindu minority in the political, social, and cultural fields.
360 
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There was another very important factor that ‘East Pakistan had a Hindu minority 
which was twenty-five per cent of its population, and this kind of parochialism 
injected rigidity into national politics which did not help the integration of the two 
wings.’
361
  Rehman Sobhan observes that at partition in 1947 there ‘was not a single 
large scale industrial enterprise in East Bengal controlled by Bengali Muslims.’
362
  In 
short it can be said that for East Pakistan to have oppressed Hindus in those early 
decades would have been economic suicide.  It can also be seen that compared with 
West Pakistan, the minorities of East Pakistan, especially Hindus, were strong 
enough to lend effective support to that government’s refusal to change the common 
constitution to one which did not support minorities in the mainstream of political 
and social life.  Historically, the issue of being a minority had a significant impact on 
Muslims of India, for they claimed during the independence movement that their 
rights were threatened by the Hindu majority.
363
  In the post colonial era it was 
claimed that minority issues in Pakistan would be resolved by Muslims but on the 
question of giving equal rights to minorities, West Pakistan was suspicious of the 
Hindu minority and wished to minimize their influence in the political life of 
Pakistan as a whole.
364
  This was not a good sign for minorities. 
Apart from economic and political controversies between East and West 
Pakistan, the judicial and legal system remained both effective and independent 
particularly in protecting religious minorities under the law, Chapter XV of 
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‘Offences Relating to Religion.’  For example, the Hindus of Bengal were effectively 
protected in one case, Okil Ali v. Behari Lal, when the Muslim defendants, Okil Ali 
and others, were sentenced under section 295 for hurting the feelings of the Hindu 
community of Akilpur, Dacca, (Dhaka after 1982) and the capital of the then East 
Pakistan, in 1962.
365
  The prosecution case was that the Hindus of Akilpur had a 
place of worship known as ‘Krishnatala’ in the same village where they offered puja 
worship each year.  The area of the place was fenced off and there was a Kadam tree 
in it with an altar around the tree.  On 16
th
 November 1959, the defendants Okil Ali 
and others came along variously armed and cut down the Kadam tree, destroying the 
altar. As a result, the feelings of the Hindus of that village had been wounded.  The 
court of Dacca reviewed the religious issue, including the social circumstances as 
well as (remaining true to the original law) the intention behind the incident.  The 
defence case was that the disputed land belonged to the petitioner, Okil Ali, by 
purchase from Ahmad Ullah which formerly belonged to Jahur Ali.  Having failed to 
purchase it from Ahmad Ullah, the complainant had filed the case falsely. 
It was declared by Advocate A. W. Chowdhury that section 295 of PPC 1860 
did not require investigation into possession or ownership of the land.  It was also 
observed that in the settlement agreement the disputed land was not recorded as a 
place of worship and that there was uncertainty with regard to the land itself.  The 
advocate also cited the decision that was taken in Bechan Jha v. Emperor (1941) in 
British India that unconsecrated places cannot be considered mosques and thus 
cannot be the basis of cases under section 295.  It was accepted that the place in the 
case of Okil Ali in Dacca of East Pakistan was not consecrated.  However, it was 
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also, and importantly for our purposes, accepted that the ‘Krishnatala’ was known to 
all religious communities of that region, including the petitioners, as sacred and 
attacking it was an act which they must have known would have been likely to 
wound the feelings of Hindus.  The Advocate handed down a lesser sentence of 
rigorous imprisonment for two months to Okil Ali and others for hurting the feelings 
of the Hindu community, though not for blasphemy, for which the sentence would be 
rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs.200.
366
  It is significant to note 
that even though the charge of religious offence was not fully proved by the court the 
judgement was still made for hurting the religious feelings of the Hindu minority of 
Dhaka of East Pakistan under the 1860 law.
367
 
Considering the early years of Pakistan’s history, it can be seen that the 
religious, social and constitutional development of East Pakistan was different from 
West Pakistan.  Keeping the idea of secularism, East Pakistan did not accept the 
constitutional changes to make Pakistan an Islamic country, a conflict which 
escalated into the war of 1971 which was fought particularly to prevent Bengalis 
from demanding the maintenance of a secular state.  East Pakistan separated after the 
war, becoming Bangladesh, another Muslim-majority country in South Asia. After 
the partition of Pakistan into its East and West wings, Bangladesh later had the 
religious and political freedom to make an independent constitution.  It is therefore 
necessary briefly to consider how the application of the law of Chapter XV of 
‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ intended to protect religious communities, has fared 
in Bangladesh. 
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3.3. Chapter XV in Bangladesh 
Initially the constitution of Bangladesh, adopted in 1972, incorporated fundamental 
principles of state policy, socialism, democracy and secularism.
368
 Article 9 of the 
constitution stated: 
The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language 
and culture attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined 
struggle in the war of independence shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism.
369 
The political history of Bangladesh post-partition is replete with questions, 
arguments and clashes between the religious and secular ideologies and political 
parties.  The separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh shows that Bangladesh is 
associated with secularism, most clearly revealed in the Sheikh Mujib period, 
whereas Pakistan is usually equated with Islamic ideology.  Like India and Pakistan, 
Bangladesh generally accepted and declared the fundamental freedom of religion in 
the law which was another step to securing Bangladesh as a secular country.  The 
1860 British Law became known as the Bangladesh Penal Code, including the 
legislation on ‘Offences Relating to Religion.’   
Initially the government of Bangladesh decide to ban Islamic parties in 1971, 
preferring those based on nationalism and liberalism.  Through the exercise of 
political power, the Jaamaat-e-Islami
370
 party had constantly discouraged the secular 
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system of law and encouraged developing Islamic jurisprudence in Islamic countries 
such as Pakistan and Bangladesh,
371
 and the main reason for banning it in 
Bangladesh was its declaring of the independence struggle and war as un-Islamic and 
supporting West Pakistan’s oppression of Bengal.
372
  In the 1950s, most members of 
Jamaat were in West Pakistan, with few in the East, and though it only polled 4.5 




It was a significant responsibility and challenge for an independent 
Bangladesh to control or stop the move from secularism to having a state religion.  
Most scholars argue that the notion of nationalism and secularism was associated 
with the idea of Mujibur Rehman, the founder of Bangladesh, who was assassinated 
in 1975.  After that first period, the survival of secularism in Bangladesh was in some 
doubt, and indeed the next President, who imposed Martial Law, Sadat Muhammad 
Sayem, amended Article 38 and declared Bangladesh an Islamic state as well as 
lifting bans on the Islamic political parties.  That historic change meant that 
Bangladeshi nationalism reverted to ‘a traditional, conservative, and largely Islamic 
society,’
374
 with Islamic parties successfully empowered to take part in politics in 
Bangladesh.  Whether the nation would change the laws, including those on religious 
offences, became a critical issue.  Over time, the government was pressured to 
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change the law and make it Islamic, Jammat-e-Islami pressing hard to restore the 
Islamic ideals of the united Pakistan period in an Islamic state.
375
 
Even though the government of Bangladesh was requested by such Islamic 
parties to make changes in the law, it did not attempt to change the Penal Code of 
Bangladesh (BPC) particularly Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion.’  In 
1993, Islamic political parties started proposing changes to Chapter XV particularly 
wishing to add new sections to punish severely those who defile the name of the 
Prophet Muhammad and defile copies of the Quran.  However, the government 
rejected such pressure, declaring that punishment for hurting religious sentiments 
was already present in the legislation on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of BPC and 
that the government had the power and authority to confiscate or ban offensive 
published material which offends religious communities.
376
  The government of 
Bangladesh clearly felt that the law of religious offences covered in Chapter XV was 
enough to control religiously motivated issues.  However, there were demands, 
particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami, to declare the Ahmadiyya sect as non-Muslims 
and some attacks have been perpetrated on its centres, mosques and homes.  It also 
demanded that Shias be declared non-Muslim, but they have not yet come under 
physical attack.
377
  The government declared neither Ahmadis nor Shias as non-
Muslim, but did ban all Ahmadi Muslim publications on 9 January 2004.
378
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In short, it can be concluded that granting equal religious freedom and rights 
to non-Muslims was an issue in the initial history of India and Pakistan.  Though 
Bangladesh experienced Islamic pressure in terms of religious rights for those judged 
to be minorities, it did not make any changes in Chapter XV, unlike some Indian 
states whose anti-conversion laws opposed the spirit of certain chapters.  Whether 
Islamic parties in Bangladesh will achieve their aims is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which will now turn to the central issue of how West Pakistan dealt with 
religious offences. 
                                                                                                                                          






The Application of Chapter XV of Offences Relating to Religion in West 
Pakistan from 1947 to 1979 
While Pakistan took significant steps to bring changes in the constitution, it did not 
declare a full Shariat or Islamic law in the country, nor was there significant change 
in the legislation (other than as a result of losing part of the country) until 1979.  One 
of the major aims of this chapter, therefore, is to review the incidence and 
implications of ‘Religious Offences’ from 1947 till 1979, which in the light of post-
1979 Pakistan was a period of struggle to avoid or mitigate violence through 
toleration.  One of the major factors behind this effort was that the majority of 
politicians and leaders who ruled Pakistan between 1947 and 1979 tried to hold on to 
Jinnah’s dream of Pakistan who assured the people that the country would not 
become a theocratic state.  Despite the years of struggle for independence, there were 
still unresolved constitutional and political issues affecting the initial post-1947 
years, one of which was the nature of the country: could Pakistan be fully theocratic 
or was it firmly secular? 
It was a period in which some politicians brought Islamic elements into the 
constitution which others revoked to keep the balance.  For example, Ayub Khan 
(1907-1974), president of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, argued that there was a 
universal agreement that Pakistan had a democratic constitution that would enable it 
to organize itself according to the principles of Islam, but in which all communities 
of non-Muslims would be free to adopt their own religious principles.  The rights of 
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all Pakistani communities as a whole, he insisted, should pervade, allowing them to 
organize and to run their affairs without compromise or oppression.
379
  As the 
president of the martial law regime from 1962-1969, he revised the constitution in 
1962 to re-balance religion and polity.  The objective of this change was to declare 
Pakistan no longer an Islamic republic but just the Republic of Pakistan and it was 
declared that the legal system of Pakistan would not be Islamised.
380
  Ayub’s 
opposition, based on religious ideas then current in Pakistan, led him to ban the 
Jamaat-e-Islami in 1964 for its questioning of his refusal to Islamise Pakistan.
381
  
However, Ayub then championed Islam during the presidential campaign of 1964, 
promising to ensure an ‘Islamic way of life’ in the country, if elected.
382
  It can be 
said that although he himself was secular, by appealing to religious sentiments he 
also attempted to use religion for political advantage. 
On the one hand it was a struggle to keep the country secular and on the 
other, Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, though remaining active in their hope 
of achieving theocracy in Pakistan, have ‘never been able to establish any 
government’ but continued its agitation to ‘implement Sharia in the country.’
383
  The 
constitutional processes indicated an uneasy blend of politics and religion which 
remained significant in Pakistan.
384
  Such conflict did not only affect the unity of 
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East and West wings of Pakistan but also brought major changes in the legal history 
in West Pakistan, discussed in the next chapter.  Having looked at the post-1947 
experience of India and Bangladesh, in this chapter we shall examine how West 
Pakistan dealt with religious issues and religious communities in terms of providing 
religious protection under ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of Pakistan Penal Code 
(PPC).  It is therefore necessary to assess the religious communities and 
controversies in Pakistan which changed the legal history of Pakistan. 
Historically, the core objective for changes in the law, particularly Chapter 
XV on Religious Offences, related to religious controversies within and between 
communities and the political advantage to the law-makers.  It has been noted in the 
first part of this thesis that the extent of Hindu-Muslim controversies amid the pre-
Independence tensions and anxieties led British officials to make major changes in 
the legislation concerning religious offences to protect the sanctity of the Prophet 
Muhammad from offensive publications and speeches in the 1920s, and maintain 
their rule.  From 1947 in Pakistan, the gradual rise of the Ahmadi-Muslim 
controversies, especially those regarding Ahmadis’ controversial beliefs about the 
Prophet Muhammad, encouraged the Muslim community of Punjab to mobilize and 
agitate with all the legal and political power it could muster to introduce further 
additions to Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of PPC.  Before 
reviewing this, it is important to note how Ahmadi-Muslim tension rose up in the 
Punjab and how political, judicial and Muslim power in the Punjab dealt with 
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religious controversies and offences which later critically affected the legal system 
and all religious communities particularly minorities of Pakistan. 
 
4.1. Religious Communities of West Pakistan 
Pakistan is a largely Sunni Muslim country, around 75% being of that group, with 
between 15 and 20% Shia and according to Iftikhar Malik, 8% being other 
minorities: Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis, Baha’is, Buddhists, Jains, Kalasha (of 
Chitral), Parsis and Sikhs.
385
  This chapter discusses just the Ahmadis (declared as 
non-Muslims in 1974), Christians and Hindus, as their presence arouses more 
resentment in social and religious life as well as in the arena of Religious Offences.  
It is significant to note that most of these communities are in Punjab province and 
historically, most legal and religious controversies between Hindu-Muslim 
communities occurred in the North-West Punjab province of what was British India.  
However, the nature of the Religious Offences has changed and religious 
controversies now usually occur between Muslims and Christians, Ahmadis and 
Muslims and among Muslim sects. 
Historically, in the Indian subcontinent, some of the available evidence points 
to the establishment of Christianity in the North-West region as early as the coming 
to India of the apostle Thomas in the first century.  There are some indications that 
he visited the Indo-Parthian kingdom of King Gondosforos whose capital was in 
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Texila, in modern day Pakistan.  Though Christianity may have been established, it 
did not survive.
386
  Neither the Syrian Orthodox nor the Jesuits had any influence in 
this region.  In Pakistan today, Christians, mostly converted from lower castes in the 
early nineteenth century in Punjab, are the largest minority group predominantly 
living in Punjab Pakistan;
387
 groups of Megs, Chuhras, and Dalits, doing minimal 
jobs, and farmers converted to Christianity.  Chuhras were considered lower-class 
sweepers and cleaners, which became a derogatory word to insult Christians, and 
today even though not all are poor, this term is commonly used as a title to describe 
Christians.
388
  This historical legacy remains even in contemporary Pakistan where 
they can be harassed and accused of their lower caste status, discussed later.  Though 
ethnically Christians were long marginalised in social life they and Hindus, mostly 
located in Sindh province, were by and large protected from major religious 
controversies and violence in West Pakistan.  This will be demonstrated later in this 
chapter by discussing some religious cases, particularly Christian and Muslim 
accusations brought under Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ in the 
Punjab province. 
After 1947, the legislation on Religious Offences was not applied to protect 
the Ahmadiyya sect started by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1817-1898) in Punjab who 
constantly faced severe criticism in offensive speeches and publications for their 
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controversial beliefs about the Prophet Muhammad.
389
  This procedure raises various 
questions regarding Ahmadis’ religious and social status in Pakistan and their 
protection proclaimed by political and judicial authority.  Most importantly it also 
reveals the limited application and scope of the legislation on ‘Religious Offences’ 
even in early Pakistan as it had been applied in British India to protect all religious 
communities.  Before examining this, therefore, it is necessary to review Ahmadis’ 
historical existence and religious issues in Pakistan. 
It is not relevant to discuss the whole history of the Ahmadiyya movement 
but it is important to discuss their growth as Muslims in British India and how their 
beliefs were unacceptable to the majority of Muslims of Pakistan, some of whom 
agitated for their punishment.  Historically, the Ahmadiyya Movement was started by 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian, Punjab when he claimed his spiritual standing by 
introducing his book Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya, the truth of Islam, in the early 1880s and 
later formally established a new Islamic sect or community in 1889.
390
  Some of his 
controversial claims were his declaration that Allah appointed him as the renewer 
(mujadded) of Islam and the Messiah, being a second appearance of Jesus Christ 
(Masih-e-Mawud).  The Ahmadis’ view about Jihad (holy war) conducted through 
the pen, argument and proof rather than warfare was also suspicious to orthodox 
Muslims.
391
  Furthermore, Ahmad’s most controversial claims were that he was the 
                                                 
389
 Gibb, Islam, 93-104; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis (Lahore: 
Minerva Book Shop, 1943), 298-320; Malik, Religious Minorities in Pakistan, 10. 
390
 Several periodicals to propose Ahmadi Islam were published in Qadian, Punjab. Among those 
writings were The Review of Religions, published in English in 1902 and Badr and al-Hakam in Urdu 
language. Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continues: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and its 
Medieval Background (Berkeley: University of California Press 1989), 1-13. 
391
 Sadia Saeed, ‘Political Fields and Religious Movements: The Exclusion of the Ahmaddiyya 
Community in Pakistan,’ in Julian Go, Ed., Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 23 (Bingley, UK: 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012), 189-223. 
148 
 
Mahdi, the new incarnation of the Prophet Muhammad and that ‘I am a prophet of 
God. Every Muslim must obey me in religious manners.’
392
  It was a critical 
challenge to the core belief of Islam that declares Prophet Muhammad as the ‘seal’ 
and the last of the Prophets, so that after him no more messengers of Allah will be 
sent to the world.
393
 
The Ahmadiyya movement was a supporter of British rule because it allowed 
all religious communities to profess and propagate their beliefs.  Such loyalty of the 
Ahmadiyya, especially the Qadiani branch, towards the British remained after the 
death of Ahmad in 1909.
394
  During the 1930s and 1940s, during the struggle for 
independence from the British, Ahmadis were unsure whether to live in India or 
Pakistan.  However, it was declared by Mahmud Ahmad, the son of Ghulam Ahmad 
and successor of Ahmadiyya, that they would support Pakistan in 1942.
395
  Ahmadis 
did not support the Congress, a Hindu political party, due to Gandhi’s unwillingness 
to commit himself to allow missionary activities and conversion in an independent 
India.
396
  It can be said that initially Ahmadis were more concerned about religious 
freedom and later assumed that it would be secured in Pakistan. 
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From 1947 Qadian, the birthplace of the Ahmadi sect, became a part of India 
and Ahmadis moved their headquarters to Pakistan, in the piece of land called Rabwa 
which was bought to built a new town and office for it.  In the newly born Pakistan 
there was rarely any resentment between Sunni Muslims and Ahmadis at a social 
level.  Generally, Ahmadis enjoyed well-being as they were economically strong, 
serving in the important offices in Pakistan.  For example, Zaferullah Khan was the 
first foreign minister of Pakistan, appointed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder 
of Pakistan.
397
  It was noted in the third chapter that though West Pakistan objected 
to Hindus in East Pakistan serving in government offices, they initially allowed 
Ahmadis, to demonstrate their commitment to the rights of religious communities in 
the constitution. 
However, any Ahmadi-Muslim peace ended in the Punjab as encounters with 
Sunni and Shia Muslims gradually became critical on religious, social and political 
levels, bringing major changes to Chapter XV on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of 
the Pakistan Penal Code.  The Ahmadi-Muslim issues and beliefs were used to 
provoke people’s sentiments through offensive speeches and publications, 
particularly to mobilise Muslims of Punjab not only to judge Ahmadis but also to 
change the constitution of Pakistan.  Notably the ‘Report of the Court Inquiry 
Constituted under Punjab Act 11 of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 
1953’ delivered by Justice Mohammad Munir and Justice M.R. Kayani (known as 
Munir Report) of Lahore High Court is an important historical source through which 
we can see the major violent incidents, religious offences and judicial power, as well 
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as how religious and political leaders dealt with religious controversies and cases.  It 
will be helpful to set this out in more detail. 
 
4.2. Ahmadi-Muslim Controversies and Religious Offences from 1947-
1954 
In 1949, the Ahrar Movement or Majlis-e-Islam (Society of Free Men of Islam),
398
 
an Islamic party, first started public meetings and agitations to have Ahmadis 
declared non-Muslims as well as to exclude them from political office.
399
  Another 
prominent association Majalis Tahafuz Khatam-e-Nubuwwat MTKN (Association of 
Protection of the Finality of the Prophethood) was created by the members of Ahrar 
to protect the sanctity of the Prophet in 1949.
400
  Like the 1920s circumstances 
occurring in British Punjab to protect the Prophet Muhammad from offensive 
publications in Punjab, discussed in the second chapter, once again the issue of 
protecting the Prophet occurred in West Pakistan but this time with a more powerful 
and sensitive argument to preserve the finality of the Prophet which, according to 
Ahrar, was violated by Ahmad’s claim to regard himself as the last Prophet of Islam.  
Religious sentiments were incited and this movement succeeded in attracting large 
audiences at meetings, some political leaders speaking against Ahmadis, dealt with 
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below.  In December 1949 it was recommended by a police investigator, Anwar Ali 
that certain Ahrar leaders be prosecuted under section 153-A of PPC for creating 
animosity between religious classes or the Punjab Public Safety Act but this was 
rejected by the politician, Malik Muhammad Anwar, who said: ‘the Muslims are 
very touchy on the point of Ahmadism and to prosecute the Ahrar for their 
vituperations against the Ahmadis would give them an air of martyrdom in the eyes 
of the public which they do not deserve.’
401
  This is one of the early examples where 
the law on religious insult was disregarded, not only section 153-A for creating 
animosity between classes, but also 295-A of Chapter XV for outraging the feelings 
of any religious class by speech and publication.  Though the government claimed to 
protect Ahmadis by refusing to accept the religious demands of declaring them non-




Between 1950 and 1953, the agitation of Ahrar along with other Islamic 
parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, (Islamic party) increasingly demanded that the state 
declare Ahmadis non-Muslims.  The ulama and Jamaat-e-Islami not only agitated to 
declare Ahmadis non-Muslims but also started campaigns to change the direction of 
Pakistan by arguing that the government should avoid having any traces of western 
nationalism but should follow the principal objective of establishing an Islamic 
Pakistan.
403
  The Jamaat-e-Isalmi under Maududi attempted to articulate the anti-
Ahmadi demands as a constitutional issue.  This agitation, using political and social 
levers, laid the groundwork to change the application of ‘Religious Offences.’ 
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According to the Inquiry Report of the Lahore High Court, the method of 
agitation chosen by Islamic parties was organising large-scale meetings to deliver 
disruptive speeches and producing offensive publications to incite violence against 
Ahmadis which spread across Punjab.
404
  Let us examine some of the religious 
publications and their impact on Muslims in Punjab.  In 1952 some publications and 
newspapers such as Azad (free), published articles with offensive themes and words 
which described Ahmad as an adulterer, drunkard, knave, slanderer, liar and many 
other names regarded as offensive.  In December 1952 the Home Secretary was 
approached to take action by arguing that warnings in the past had no effect on the 
publishers as this newspaper ‘had continued to indulge in publishing matter which 
outraged susceptibilities of a class of people in Pakistan.’  In December 1952, the 
Inquiry Report recorded that defamatory articles of Azad against Ahmadis were 
punishable under section 295-A for outraging the religious feelings of any religious 
community and section 153 for creating animosity between Muslims and Ahmadis 




Mazdoor (labour), another Urdu newspaper published in Multan, Punjab by 
Sayyad Abuzar Bukhari, threw itself into the controversy and consistently carried on 
the campaigns against the founder of Ahmadism, Ahmadi leaders, and their beliefs as 
well as the official leader, Zafferullah Khan.  One of the issues of 13
th
 June 1952 
gave a vulgar description about the head of the Ahmadi community which the 
Inquiry Report did not detail.  However, the Inquiry Report declared that ‘if those 
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words have been uttered in the presence of the member of the Ahmadiyya 
community…the result would have been a broken skull.’
406
  The article was 
examined by the Director of Public Relations but a mere warning was given to 
publishers without taking any legal action. 
Some books and pamphlets were also regarded as offensive, such as a 
pamphlet, Marziyon ke Napak Azaim, Impure Aims of Marzayis, Ahmadis, noted by 
the Criminal Investigation Departmenton on 4
th
 August 1952.  It was regarded as 
offensive as it attacked Ahmadi beliefs, regarding their existence in Pakistan as 
traitors and as unfaithful to Pakistan’s creation.  According to the Lahore High Court, 




Some publications declared that Ahmadis should be executed, such as a 
pamphlet, Ash-Shahab written by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani who constantly 
published fatwa declaring that the Ahmadis were apostates (murtadds) and that the 
appropriate penalty in Islam for apostasy (irtidad) is death.  The pamphlet cited the 
execution of two Ahmadis: Rahman Khan who was executed and Abdul Latif who 
was stoned to death in Afghanistan in 1903.  In March 1950, it was reported to 
Anwar Ali, who drew Government attention to take possible steps to deal with this 
publication which was inciting the Muslim community of Punjab to kill Ahmadis.  
Some thought the pamphlet should be banned but others that a ‘strong warning 
would be sufficient’ to control the issue.
408
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Abul A’la Maududi (1903-1979) was arrested for writing a pamphlet 
‘Qadiani Masala’ (Qadiani problem) published in March 1953.  In the pamphlet, he 
quoted from Ahmadi literature challenging the Ahmadi faith and Prophethood, 
arguing that ‘Pakistan had to excise a cancer (Ahmadiyya) from Muslim society.’
409
  
Maududi was sentenced to death for his anti-Ahmadi agitation and publication when 
finally Martial Law was applied in Punjab in 1953.  However, later his punishment 
was commuted to two years imprisonment.
410
 
After this short review of some publications, mentioned above, it cannot be 
denied the nature of some publications was written intentionally to insult Ahmadis, 
and thus fell under 295-A.  However, the procedure for dealing with such writing and 
publication was significantly different and controversial.  Before analysing the 
application and the role of politics and the judiciary in dealing with offences in West 
Pakistan, let us examine some speeches delivered against Ahmadis in Punjab. 
In the Inquiry Report, various speeches are recorded which were delivered 
between 1950 and 1953.  It is not relevant to discuss all events where speeches were 
delivered in meetings, processions and mosques but just those where religious speech 
not only became a threat to maintain law and order but also caused riots as well as 
the loss of life and property of Ahmadis.  The protest through speeches and meetings 
was based on the beliefs and claims of Ahmadis, particularly the Prophethood of 
Ahmad which caused agitation to declare them non-Muslim.  Therefore according to 
the Lahore High Court, various speeches were delivered in different cities of Punjab 
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by using derogatory remarks and abusive words and language for Ahmadis and 
Zafferullah Khan such as waladuzzina, waladul-haram (bastard), khanzir (swine), 
harlots, whores, bitches, drunkard, fornicator, adulterer, cheat, goonda, bloody, 
immoral, shameless, a juggler, a wretched person, nonsense and many other vulgar 
words.
411
  Some speeches marked Ahmadis as the lowest religious class of Pakistan.  
For example, at an Ahrar meeting on the 25th August 1952 in Montgomery (known 
as Sahiwal today), it was said by Muhammad Ali Jullundri that Ahmadis ‘were 
worse than sweepers or cobblers, [they] should not be allowed water from water taps 
or to sit with you in the same tonga…’
412
  Clearly Ahmadis were regarded as lower 
than sweepers, the term historically used for indigenous Christian citizens of 




Various speeches not only socially marginalised Ahmadis but also incited 
Muslims to break the law in taking action to judge Ahmadis.  For example, Sadia 
Saeed checked one of the speeches of Ata Ulla Shah Bukhari, one of the Ahrar 
leaders, who often stated that if Ghulam Ahmad had claimed Prophethood in his 
lifetime, he would have killed him with his own hands: such statements provoked the 
killing of Ahmadis.
414
  In various speeches, for example in 1952, a speech was 
delivered in meetings held in Rawalpindi that ‘Mirzais were zindeeq [unbeliever and 
an apostate] and punishable with death. Every Muslim should add the word kazzab 
                                                 
411
 Lahore High Court 1954, 195-6.  
412
 Ibid., 328, 331. 
413
 Disrespect to the dead of any religious class was liable to be taken under Section 297 of Chapter 
XV which examines the intention of insult, ignoring religious sentiment, in respect of the dead and 
sepulchres but it was not applied. 
414
 Saeed, Political Fields and Religious Movements, 202.  
156 
 
(liar) to the name of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Whoever kills a pretender gets the 
reward of a hundred martyrs.’
415
  One such listener, Muhammad Ashraf, a 19 year 
old man, murdered Ghulam Muhammad, an Ahmadi school teacher in Okara, Punjab 
in 1950.  He confessed that he ‘killed a kafir (unbeliever),’ after hearing a speech in 
Okara where the name of Illam Din Ghazi, who killed Rajpal for publishing the 
offensive book in 1920s as discussed in the second chapter, was mentioned which 
provoked him to take the decision to kill an Ahmadi.
416
  The main cause of all this 
religious violence in Punjab was anti-Ahmadi speeches and writings.  One of the 
reports given by Anwar Ali will suffice to show the consequences of speeches 
particularly delivered by Ahrar: 
The Ahrar have exceeded the bounds of decency and have been making sacrilegious attacks 
against Ahmadis. They have even been responsible for provoking violence against the 
Ahmadis… At a village near Okara, Ahmadi preachers were waylaid and their faces 
blackened. At Rawalpindi, an Ahmadi was killed, although it could not be clearly established 
that the murder was communal. At Samundri, an Ahmadi mosque was set fire to and reduced 
to ashes [and]… a young…doctor, who was an Ahmadi, was attacked at Quetta and stoned to 
death...
417 
This report not only shows the critical consequences of speeches but also the various 
kinds of religious offences which could be prosecuted under the legislation on 
Religious Offences (Chapter XV) within its meaning: but the actual nature of the 
religious controversies and their proper application is unclear.  For example, burning 
Ahmadis’ places of worship could be prosecuted under section 295 which protects 
places of worship as well as protects objects of any religious class from damage and 
defilement as discussed in the first chapter.  Moreover, the report clearly shows that 
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Ahmadi preachers and their religious assemblies or worship were disturbed on 




 February 1952, one of the meetings 
organised by Ahmadis in Sialkot included their Tabligh Conference (Conference for 
Propagating).  Despite being protected by police, it was disturbed with shouting and 
offensive slogans such as kufr ka jalsa band karo (stop assemblies of the unfaithful). 
Ahmadis reported these disturbances on many occasions and claimed that 
protecting religious faith, its propagation and practice should be ‘an absolutely clear 
policy of the government.’
418
  Section 296 of Chapter XV of PPC could have been 
applied to protect religious assemblies and processions of any class from aggressive 
disturbances and interruptions as has been discussed in the first chapter.  Failing to 
support Ahmadis, or any other religious class, ignored section 298 of Chapter XV 
which allows all religious communities to discuss their religious views and propagate 
their faith without aggressive and abusive action and language.  It can be argued that 
not only section 295-A, dealing with offensive publications and speeches, as Lahore 
High Court mentioned in the Report, but the entire Chapter XV on ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion’ of the Pakistan Penal Code, could have been used to deal with 
anti-Ahmadi controversies.  However, the Lahore High Court declared that there was 
a complete breakdown of law and order concerning religious issues and analysed the 
historical application of religious controversies and cases, especially the British way 
of dealing with religious offences: 
…Dissension had admirably suited the British who wanted the people over whom they 
were ruling to be engrossed in religious differences, as long as such controversies did 
                                                 
418
 Among some incidents are: a meetings were disturbed and interrupted which were held on the life 
of the Prophet on the occasion of Seerat-ul-Nabi held by Bashir Ahmad, the successor of Ahmadis in 
Lahore on 22
nd
 November 1951 and in Lyallpur (Faisalabad) on 18 November 1951. Lahore High 
Court 1954, 35-9. 
158 
 
not amount to a threat to law and order…the British looked upon such disputatious with 
complete equanimity, perhaps with satisfaction.
419
 
According to this statement, Justice Munir seemed to have wanted to avoid fanning 
religious dissension by controlling conflicts between Muslims and Ahmadis, 
although ignoring the evident conflict did precisely that, increased the problem, 
against the intention of the ‘Religious Offences’ in British India Act.  It was also 
observed on some occasions that the anger of Muslims was more aroused when 
Ahmadi leaders made comparison between the religious intolerance prevailing in 
Muslim countries and the liberal religious policy followed by the British.
420
 
The government had ultimate power to deal with religious issues.  Between 
1950 and 1953, it was constantly informed that religious publications and speeches 
were a threat to ‘the stability of the state’ and such ‘aggressive sectarianism should, 
in the opinion of the Central Government, be suppressed with heavy hand.’
421
  
According to the Lahore High Court, several prosecutions under section 153-A and 
section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code were recommended for publishing matter, 
speeches and slogans against Ahmadis but ‘no prosecution was ever ordered or 
launched under these sections.’
422
  However, it was admitted in the Lahore High 
Court Report that ‘if the Punjab Government had made judicious use of sections 153-
A and 295-A of the Penal Code, the situation would not have deteriorated to the 
extent.’
423
  The question arises why section 295-A was not used and whether its 
application could have controlled the issue of offensive writing and speech. 
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Historically, section 295-A was applied in 1927 though the demand of 
judicial, religious, political leaders and Muslims especially in Punjab to protect the 
Prophet Muhammad from the offensive publications and speeches written by the 
Arya Samaj to insult Muslims.
424
  The aims of section 295-A have been reiterated by 
various lawyers and legal experts such as Shaukat Mahmood, a Lahore High Court 
advocate, who noted that in terms of religious writing and a speech, the inquiry has 
to be confined to the question of ‘malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings 
of a class of citizens.  Even a true statement may outrage religious feelings.’
425
  The 
same presumption can be applied when any argument in favour of one religion 
reached the level of abuse of another.
426
  However, such application of section 295-A 
was not used for anti-Ahmadi publication and speech.  It can be assumed that section 
295-A as originally applied to protect the Prophet Muhammad and subsequently holy 
personages of other religions could have been used to declare Ahmad and his 
successors persons to be protected by the law within the meaning of the section.  
However, the declared Prophethood of Ahmad was so unacceptable for non-Ahmadi 
Muslims that the laws relating to religious order were not applied.  The main concern 
here is to what extent religious communities can profess their faith and have freedom 
of expression. 
According to the Inquiry Report, the judges clearly expressed the view that 
all religious communities of Pakistan should enjoy equal rights.  The Report regarded 
sectarian agitation as a threat to the religious freedom of all who have the right to 
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proclaim from the pulpit whatever they believe even if it is unacceptable or 
offensive.  For example, what Christians teach regarding Christ as the son of God is 
unacceptable and offensive in Islam, but they have a right to practise this faith as it is 
their basic belief.  According to the Inquiry Report by agitating against Christians, 
Shia Muslims and Ahmadis: ‘is it the intention to make this country [Pakistan] a 
battle field for warring groups and religions with the ultimate object that the 
vanquished will either perish or be converted?’
427
  It was also a question whether law 
and order could be prioritized over religious beliefs and communities to control 
controversies.  If not, then religious attack could indeed critically wound the 
religious feelings of any class without effective penalty as it was declared that: 
Faith is a matter for the individual and however false, dishonest or ridiculous it may 
appear to be to another, it may still be held sincerely and honestly by the person who 
professes it, and we have not the slightest reason to doubt that the Ahmadis hold the 
founder of their community and its subsequent leaders including the present head in 
deep reverence. Any attack on these personalities must, therefore, have deeply wounded 
the religious susceptibilities of the Ahmadis.
428
 
Though no one should suffer on the basis of personal beliefs, the historical revisions 
of all incidents discussed above suggest that religion, particularly Islam, did indeed 
become superior to law and judicial rules and other religious beliefs were critically 
marginalised and were unprotected.  Section 295-A, which was successfully applied 
to protect Prophet Muhammad from offensive publications and speeches in British 
Punjab, was also marginalised over other statutes to deal with anti-Ahmadi 
publications.  For example, though religious writings and speeches, mentioned 
above, were declared to be actionable under section 295-A the actual legal procedure 
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was different: some cases were tried under the Punjab Public Safety Act or section 
144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers the Government to issue 
orders to control processions and assemblies: the most common method was to warn 
agitators and leave them without any legal trial. 
According to Lahore High Court report, one of the meetings in Sargodha 
Punjab held by Ahrar was banned under section 144 in June 1952.  Later, it was 
decided by Ahrar that meetings could be organised in the mosques which was still a 
contravention of the order of section 144 which applied to meetings in the mosque.  
Various leaders such as Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari, Sheikh Husam-ud-Din and 
Muhammad Abdullah were prosecuted under section 144 and received sentence of 
six months’ rigorous imprisonment.  However, on 16
th
 July 1952, when the cases 
came up for hearing, it was declared by the District Magistrate that prayers and 
religious freedom were allowed in the mosque and the accused were acquitted the 
same day.
429
  Notably, it was observed that there was a difficulty over the religious 
issue: mosques were used to deliver speeches about the finality of the Prophet 
Muhammad Khatam-e-Nubuwwat, which is indeed a sacred, respectable and 
foundational right and faith of Islam, but according to the Report it was mostly done 
to protest against Ahmadis.
430
  The government as mediator had the power to control 
the proper use of mosques, loud speakers and speeches but it remained inactive.  
Therefore, on many occasions speakers were merely warned, which according to the 
Inquiry Report did not stop religious parties making provocative speeches.  It is now 
crucial to see how and why religious issues were dealt with in such a manner. 
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Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the prime minister of Pakistan (October 1951-April 
1953), did not wish to accept religious pressure to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims, for 
he held that religious freedom of expression should be equal for all communities. 
However, according to the Lahore High Court, he did not take firm action to control 
the violence and religious offences motivated by the Ahmadi-Muslim controversies 
even when such violence went beyond limits.  He supported the religious expression 
of Ahmadis by arguing that: 
Fatwas or kufr have been quite a feature of Islam since the Four Caliphs, but they have 
never resulted in the denial of civic rights to the individuals or classes against whom the 




It is essential to mention that the root cause of the trouble was the government 
officials and politicians themselves who had ‘made religion their source of slogans 
and strength’ for anti-Ahmadi demands.  For example, in many cities of Punjab, the 
members of the Muslim League, a political party, began to associate themselves with 
the association for protecting the Prophet Muhammad, Tahaffuz-e-Nubuwwat, taking 
part in agitation.  Apart from those who supported Islamic parties, the Inquiry Report 
particularly criticized the Chief Minister of Punjab Mumtaz Daultana who used 
Ahmadi controversies and agitation for his own political advantages.
432
  According 
to the Lahore Court, Daultana as a minister in charge of Law and Order was 
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responsible for religious crimes and cases, but either left them without legal trial or 
gave publishers, writers and speakers mere warnings.  Regarding such controversial 
application, the Lahore High Court declared that the opinions of the law were 
rejected and the religious controversies were treated as a ‘peaceful theatrical 
performance where processions [were] stage-managed and slogans raised for the 
benefit of a contented audience.’
433
  The Report concludes that civil and political 
authorities, who were supposed to be responsible for the maintenance of law and 
order, had become helpless and lost both the power and the ability to cope with 
religious offences, which caused major riots and the declaration of martial law in 
Punjab in March 1953. 
The Lahore High Court’s inquiry report clearly shows that law and order 
broke down which not only caused the riots but also the removal of the political 
authorities who were regarded as responsible for the critical circumstances and 
religious controversies.  Political figures such as Iskander Mirza (1956-1958) and 
Ayub Khan (1958-1969) continually faced religious pressure, but Ahmadis were not 
declared non-Muslims until 1974, when circumstances had radically changed.  Such 
a move was rejected in 1953.  Before discussing these changed circumstances, it is 
important to note a few religious cases tried under Chapter XV of the Religious 
Offences Act between 1956 and 1979, to show how the judicial system of Pakistan, 
even though under political control, remained neutral and impartial in religious cases, 
especially regarding the protection of Muslims, Muslim sects and Christians.  We 
shall also see whether Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ could have 
provided legal aid to Ahmadis. 
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4.3. The Application of the Religious Offences Act from 1956 to 1979 
It is clear that the application of the Religious Offences Act (Chapter XV) was 
limited in West Pakistan’s history but the most used clauses of ‘Religion Offences’ 
were section 295 to protect sacred places of worship and objects and section 295-A 
to protect maliciously motivated writings and speeches. 
 
4.3.1. Protection of Sacred Places of Different Classes under Section 
295 
Section 295 of PPC protects all sacred places and objects from any damage, whether 
those of Muslims or those of all religious minorities in Pakistan.  The section has 
been discussed in detail in the first chapter but here it is important to note that cases 
brought under section 295 were clearly judged on the base of ‘intention to insult.’  
Following the same objectives as applied in British India, religious communities of 
Pakistan could bring any case under section 295 as long as that included evidence 
that a certain place of worship was consecrated for religious practice.  For example, 
Noor Muhammad, petitioner, built a tharra, a terrace in Khasra No. 1270/492, 
evacuee land, in 1954 from subscriptions of some residents of Mohalla, Islamabad, 
and it was used as a mosque by members of the Shi’a sect.  It was demolished on 17
th
 
November 1967 with the permission and consent of the respondent and a new 
mosque near the same site built for the members of the Sunni sect.
434
  The Court 
reviewed the religious tension between Sunni and Shi’a to decide if there was 
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evidence to make an accusation of offence.  However, the evidence did not support 
the accusation and the court dismissed the case.  According to the evidence on the 
file, the 1954-built mosque was on common ground rather than waqf legally allotted 
property for religious worship, which could be considered as a sacred place of 
worship.  The Lahore High Court of Pakistan especially relied on the judgement 
passed in Bechan Jha v. Emperor in declaring that the hut could not be considered a 
mosque or sacred place of worship and thus did not fall within the meaning of 
section 295.
435
  It was accepted that the same rule applies to Islamic, Christian and 
Hindu places of worship in Pakistan.  The Noor Muhammad v. Fiaz Ahmad case 
ended with the decision that the tharra in dispute could not be regarded as a mosque 
and therefore the person who demolishes such a structure could not be convicted 
under section 295 of PPC.
436
 
In the second case it can be seen that the mere suspicion that a damaged place 
or object might be seen as sacred is not grounds for offence.  For example, the 
accused in Sharaqpur, Punjab, was charged on 4
th
 June 1976 with removing the 
inscriptions kataba jat written on Ya Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani Rehmat Ullah Elaheh 
“May God have mercy on Sheikh Abdulqadir Jilani” from the arches and outer gate 
of a mosque.  It was alleged that in so doing, the accused injured the religious 
feelings of the Sunni Muslims.
437
  The High Court made some cautious observations 
about the requirements of section 295 PPC lest they prejudice the proceedings before 
the magistrate.  The petition was dismissed and it was held that inscriptions are not 
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sacred objects nor could the petitioners be said to have offended or insulted the 
religion of any class as inscriptions are not a part of the religion of any Muslim. 
The cases discussed above clearly show that the legal system and courts in 
Pakistan successfully declared the context and meaning of section 295 to protect 
Muslim sects in dispute over what constitutes defilement of mosques in Punjab. 
Judgements make clear the danger of people being, or being made to be, roused to 
anger on religious grounds or by appeal to their sentiments. 
The following important examples discuss how in Punjab, Christian and 
Muslim beliefs were discussed comparatively in a broad way as part of maintaining 
the notion of religious freedom of expression through speech or publication.  They 
also show how these communities were protected when ‘insults or attempts to insult 
the religion or the religious beliefs’ were upheld in cases taken under section 295-A 
of PPC. 
 
4.3.2. Protection of Christian Community from Offensive Publications 
under Section 295-A 
In 1952, an advocate of the Lahore High Court, Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, published a 
book called Jesus in Heaven on Earth.
438
  According to the Punjab Government, the 
book was offensive on the grounds that it was an attack on four fundamental 
Christian beliefs.  According to the book, Jesus was born of the matrimony of Mary 
and Joseph and he did not die on the cross but was removed from the cross while still 
alive.  After his wounds had healed, Jesus and his mother went to Murree and her 
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grave is said to be found there.
439
  Justice M. R. Kiayani, a Judge of Lahore High 
Court, found the contents of the book clearly fell under section 295-A.  He described 
the author, Nazir Ahmad, as full of ‘religious fervor, touching occasionally the high-
water mark of fanaticism, so essential for a missionary.’
440
  On 16
th
 April 1953, the 
Governor of Punjab forfeited all copies of this book to the Government of Pakistan 
by declaring that it was written intentionally ‘to insult the religious beliefs of one of 
the classes [Christians] of subjects of Pakistan.’
441
  Justice Kiayani also had some 
advice for the government, which had taken two years to take action against the 
book, adding by way of warning against the misuse of the laws that: 
Although the religious beliefs of the Christians have been insulted by this book, it will 
not be easy to presume on the strength of the words used, that the author had ‘deliberate 
and malicious intention of outraging’ their religious feelings. The intention is burdened 
by so many heavy adjectives that attack [sic] be very clearly abusive, obscene or vulgar 




It should be noted the book Jesus in Heaven on Earth was not written by a Sunni or 
Shi’a Muslim but an Ahmadi.  At the time of the Jesus in Heaven on Earth case in 
1952-1954 the Ahmadi community, though called Muslim, was constantly facing 
criticism through offensive publications and speeches in Punjab as discussed above. 
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This case does not mention the Ahmadi background of the author and it cannot be 
said that the judgment was based on religious or sectarian difference.  The judge not 
only passed judgment on the above case on the publication of Jesus in Heaven on 
Earth but also gave orders that the defenders control their social and religious 
protest.  Justice Kiayani declared of two Christians, Mr. C.E. Gibbon and Mr. S.P. 
Singha, both representatives of the Legislative Assembly, who sought to be made 
party to this case, or for that matter anyone who sought to bring a private prosecution 
for religious offence, that: 
It was unnecessary for Mr. Gibbon to file an affidavit, and it was futile to argue that Mr. 
Gibbon alone was offended. We do not expect Mr. Gibbon to arm himself…and preach 
violence from the steps of the Assembly building to a very peaceful community. But if 
we look for resolutions and protests meetings, and processions carrying blackened faces 
on donkeys and fireworks and tear-gas before we take action, then we foster cold 
contempt and hatred and sap the foundations of the State.
443
 
Justice Kiayani was concerned and personally felt that the matter was between the 
Government and the publishers.  Though the judiciary used their power to dissuade 
the Christian community from protesting, particularly if that would criticize 
government officials, the judge ruled in a neutral manner making clear Muslims 
were, by and large, to be discouraged from wounding the feelings of Christians. 
Continuing the discussion of section 295-A in West Pakistan, it is also 
interesting to see other religious cases regarding tolerance for religious discussion 
and speech, especially where Islamic faith was evaluated in Christian publications. 
Such publications were brought under section 295-A on the bases of wounding the 
religious feelings of Muslims.  The following cases indicate to what extent religious 





communities could be allowed to evaluate each other and what kind of judgments 
protected Islam from assault under section 295-A. 
 
4.3.3. Protection and Discussion of Islamic Publications and Faith 
under Section 295-A 
A Christian book published in British India was considered offensive and a case was 
brought under section 295-A of PPC.  According to Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD) 
in the Punjab Religious Book Society versus the State, the book Mizan ul-Haq 
(Balance or Scale of Truth) was considered offensive under the section 295-A in 
1959.
444
  The book was written about a hundred years before by a German Christian 
missionary, C. G. Pfander (1803-1865).
445
  He was initially affiliated with the Basel 
Mission and was appointed a missionary in Shusha, Azerbaijan from where he also 
visited and did some missionary work in Persia, Baghdad, and Teheran.  He was 
expelled from the Persian borderland by the Russian authorities because Christian-
Muslim controversies were linked to his missionary activity.  He was later appointed 
by the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in Agra and Peshawar, India from 1837 to 
1857 and his focus was to address the ashraf, the noble class in general and Muslim 
Ulama in particular, in the hope that through them the Christian message would filter 
down to other Muslims of British India.
446
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Pfander was known for writing apologetic literature for Muslims
447
 and was 
involved in proselytization to defend the Christian dogma and Biblical text.
448
  His 
most important apologetic work was Mizan-ul-Haq, originally written in German 
entitled Waage der Wahrheit, (Balance of Truth) translated into Armenian and first 
published in Moscow in 1831.  It was later translated into Persian as Mizan ul-Haq 
that established ‘the evolution of controversy between Christianity and Islam’ which 
particularly displeased the Ulama of Northern British India.
449
  One of the reasons 
for regarding this offensive was that it was written to defend biblical scripture and 
revelation which according to the Islamic view was corrupted.
450
  William Muir 
notes that Pfander’s whole argument was based on the Gospel being preached to the 
entire world ‘preparatory to the glorious advent of Christ; and with a solemn parting 
admonition to the Moslem [Muslim] reader.’
451
  Avril Powell notes that in his 
‘Address to Muslims,’ Pfander expressed his ideas in an ingratiating tone, for his 
words were not written ‘in order to revile Muhammad.’
452
  Pfander even quotes 
various Quranic references to prove that the Quran itself testifies to the reliability of 
the Christian scriptures and Christ.
453
  However, it was also observed that Pfander 
                                                 
447
 Gerald H. Anderson, Ed., Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions (London: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 1998 ), 532. 
448
 Pfander preached and distributed books on several occasions and conducted Munazra, an open 
religious discussions with Muslim Ulama of Agra not only to defend  Christianity but also to invite 
people to convert to it. See Cox, Imperial Fault Lines, 58-9. The point is discussed in detail in ‘New 
Focus on Islam: The Reverend Carl Pfander and the Mizan Al-Haqq’ in Powell, Muslims and 
Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India, 132-57, 163-71. 
449
 Pfander to Venn, 4 January 1856 in Cox, Imperial Fault Lines, 137-9. 
450
 Pfander, Mizan ul-Haqq, Part 1 and 2. 
451
 William Muir, The Mohammedan Controversy: Biographies of Mohammed, Sprenger on Tradition, 
The Indian Liturgy, and the Psalter (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1897), 22-4; Pfander, by using various 
Quranic references, argued that the Quran itself testifies to the reliability of the Christian scriptures 
and Christ. See Pfander, Mizan ul-Haqq, 398-9. 
452
 Powell, Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India, 145, 151. 
453
 Ibid., 398-9. 
171 
 
‘sowed the seeds of enmity and hatred in the hearts of Indian Muslims [who] started 
to suspect the missionary efforts as a plot to destroy Islam.’
454
 
Despite all these controversies, Mizan ul-Haq was used by generations of 
Christian missionaries and Christians as an apologetic tool to defend Christianity, 
was translated into various languages such as English, Arabic and Urdu, and 
reprinted many times in the colonial and post-colonial periods.
455
  In Pakistan, the 
Punjab Religious Book Society (PRBS), Lahore, had published the Urdu translation 
of Mizan ul-Haq in 1891 and had been selling it since that time in British India.  The 
fifth edition published in Lahore, West Pakistan in 1953, the sixth year of Pakistan’s 
independence, was the one particularly considered offensive to Muslims of West 
Pakistan.  The issue started when, according to the Gazette of West Pakistan of 27
th
 
of April 1959, an order appeared on the issue of offensive writing.  It was said in the 
order that: 
The book entitled Mizan ul-Haq published by the Punjab Religious Book Society 
(PRBS), Lahore, and printed in its Pakistan printing works, Lahore, contains matter 
which is calculated to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan, 
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Upon this complaint the Government of West Pakistan exercised its power conferred 
by section 99-A of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898, to ‘declare forfeit every 





 June 1959, PRBS submitted an application under section 99-B of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure to have the above order set aside.  F. M. Najmud Din in 
an affidavit said that ‘the deponent had been in the service of the PRBS since 
February 1920, that the book entitled Mizan ul-Haq was being sold by PRBS, Lahore 
when he joined services, that all through his service the book had been sold and that 
so far as he knew no one had objected to any portion of the book in question.’
458
  
Noting the history of the book, he asked how it was that only now should the book be 
regarded as an outrage to the religious feelings of Muslims of West Pakistan. 
A significant reason for questioning the application was that no indication 
was given about which passages of the book were said to be malicious.  Aftab 
Husain, Advocate, brought some offensive passages from Mizan-ul Haq to Court and 
read those which he believed could be said to be offensive and thus fall within the 
section 295-A of PPC.
459
  When the passages were read out it was clear to the Bench 
of the Lahore High Court that though they could not be said to be entirely 
inoffensive, most of the passages did not appear to fall within section 295-A of PPC.  
Advocate Aftab Husain proposed that according to section 99-D of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, it is clear that: 
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If the law relied upon by the provisional Government for passing an order under section 
99-A of the code of criminal procedure of 1898 is applicable even to some of those 
portions of the forfeited writing which were considered objectionable by the provisional 
Government, an order passed under section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
could not be set aside.
460
 
Mr. Jeremy, the counsel for the application, argued that no order under section 99-A 
had been passed earlier and that the book, circulating for a century, contained no 
objectionable matter.  He argued that even if action had been considered necessary, 
section 99-A could not have been invoked before 1922.
461
  Jeremy presented another 
fact when arguing against the accusation that Mizan ul-Haq was considered 
malicious and hurtful for many Muslims of West Pakistan. He said: 
Before the coming into being of Pakistan in 1947 real power with regards to matter of 
this kind was in the hands of persons a vast majority of whom were non-Muslims and 
even if action was not taken by them deliberately, their inaction cannot be a conclusive 
circumstance... This contention would have had quite some force if there had been 
evidence either to the effect that the book had been read by a number of Muslims and 
they had declared that book to be open to no objection or to the effect that the contents 
of the book had been given so much publicity that it could be presumed that its contents 
were known to everyone and yet no Muslim had raised a protest against the book.
462
 
Jeremy argued that the book in question had been published earlier and no objection 
had been raised and the applicant believed that the book did not contain offensive 
matter.  Although the Lahore High Court in dealing with this case was sympathetic to 
the possibility that the book in question could outrage the religious feelings of the 
Muslims of Pakistan, the Court agreed that the publisher of this book did not violate 
section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code because the requirement of ‘intention’ had 
not been satisfied.  It was held that though the book was ‘not entirely inoffensive in 
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tone so far as liability under 295-A, P. P. C was concerned— the order of forfeit was 
set aside on counsel’s assurance that offensive passages would be deleted from the 
next edition and the present edition would not be circulated.’
463
  The Court also 
ordered that the Provisional Government should pay the applicant’s cost of this 
application and Rs. 300 for the opposing party’s legal costs because the Government 
was judged at fault in bringing the case. 
The first significant point in the above case is that the Court, by and large, 
emphasized that the Pakistan judiciary must consider religious disputes, written or 
spoken, under section 295-A from the objective viewpoint of normal susceptibility 
and not from an oversensitive perspective.  Secondly, to pass any judgement or to 
convict any book as offensive, the issue must be fundamentally ‘intentional and 
malicious’ within the meaning of section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, to avoid 
an individual, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, from turning innocent comment into 
offensive attack.  The third significant point in the above case makes clear that the 
Pakistan court allowed vigorous religious discussion to clarify the case, which 
significantly preserved freedom of expression.  In judgements of this nature, the 
Lahore High Court recognized that when evaluating alleged violations of section 
295-A, the Court must put itself in the place of a ‘neutral person,’ that is a party with 
no religious bias, in order to discuss the issue impartially.
464
  In reviewing this case, 
it can also be argued that the judicial system seemed, by and large, committed to 
protect all religious communities and also to give room to the expression of religious 
views which, however, were in practice actually limited to anti-Ahmadi publications 
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and speeches.  However it can also be seen that the Court, despite holding to a 
secular system of neutral judgement, did not feel free to leave the controversial texts 
or books in their original form, which may concern restoring community peace.  
Despite much of the text in question being declared inoffensive, the whole was 
nevertheless ordered to be edited. 
The most important point of the above case is that Pakistan, having a majority 
of Muslims, appears increasingly to have had to deal with religious issues even if 
those issues had not been previously considered offensive for a particular religious 
class in British India.  Let us look at another case where a book was considered 
offensive, outraging the Muslim community, brought under section 295-A.  The core 
of this particular case was an assault on the most sacred values and beliefs of 
Muslims who declare the Prophet Muhammad as the ‘seal’ (i.e. the last) of the 
Prophets of Allah.  Yet the case also demonstrates that though opinions about the 
Prophet were a sensitive matter, religious freedom was still given to review, discuss 
and analyse the offensive writing. 
The case was brought under section 295-A on 4
th
 October 1960 against the 
book entitled Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional 
Theory, which was regarded as offensive to the Muslims of West Pakistan.
465
  This 
book was originally written by a Scottish-born Christian author, Duncan Black 
Macdonald (1863-1943) and published in America in 1903.
466
  Macdonald later 
became a professor at Hartford Seminary, USA, and was known as a scholar in the 
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field of Christian approaches to Islam.
467
  Unlike Pfander, he did not serve as a 
missionary in any Islamic country but his aim was to establish the field to prepare 
missionaries to serve in Muslim countries and to introduce the study of Arabic and 
Islam to United States.
468
 
His Development of Muslim Theology discussed the historical development of 
the Muslim state in Arabia, in which the legal ideas and schools of law were 
developed and the theology of Islam was established and embodied in a form that has 
endured until now.
469
  He discusses the Prophet Mohammed’s life and contribution to 
the legal system of Islam.  According to Temple Gairdner, Macdonald’s interest was 
less in Christianizing Muslims than in understanding Islam.
470
  Bodine argues that 
Macdonald, in his writing, approached Muslims as individuals, as human beings who 




His book was published and used by missionaries and Muslims alike in 
British India until the post-colonial era, being published in Pakistan in 1960 and 
recommended by Punjab University, Lahore, as a text in political science for the 
degree of Master of Arts.
472
  However, in the court case of 1960, the defendant, 
Sheikh Muhammad Khalil, proprietor of the Premier Book House, Lahore, was 
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accused on the grounds that it was a malicious publication.  The prosecution alleged 
that the book: (a) is offensive in terms of promoting feelings of enmity between 
different sects of Muslims of Pakistan (b) is written with deliberate and malicious 
intention of outraging the religious feelings of Muslims.
473
  It was also asserted that 
the book had been written as an attempt to insult the religious feelings of different 
sects of Muslims of Pakistan and Muslims in general.  If proved, the publication 
would be punishable under both section 153-A for creating enmity between Islamic 
sects and section 295-A for insulting the religious feeling of these sects.
474
 
The case raised several questions particularly regarding its publication in the 
Pakistani context.  During the trial, the first point taken into consideration was 
whether section 153-A, texts creating enmity between sects through malicious 
writing, is applicable.  It was observed that section 153-A was intended to cover a 
case where a Shi’a, for instance, hurt the feelings of Sunnis, or Muslims hurt feelings 
of Hindus or another minority group and created enmity between them.  The Court 
clearly observed that there was no intention in the book to set one Islamic sect 
against another.  It was further held that section 153-A could not be applied to D. B. 
Macdonald who wrote a book in 1903 containing opinions which subsequently 
displeased Muslims in Pakistan in 1960.  Considering this context, it was held that 
generally the book did not fall within the section 153-A as it did not intend to cause 
any enmity among Islamic sects or classes of Pakistan. 
The second point taken into consideration was whether the case falls under 
section 295-A for outraging the feelings of Muslims.  Section 295-A clearly shows 







that to be found guilty there must be a deliberate and malicious ‘intention’ to outrage 
the religious feeling of a class in Pakistan.  It was held that section 295-A could not 
be applied as there was no deliberate intention, either from the original author or 
from the publisher in Pakistan, to hurt the feelings of Muslims of Pakistan.  
However, the Court declared that in its opinion some passages are offensive and the 
defendant, Sheikh Muhammad Shafi, who did not want the book banned, offered to 
edit some passages of the book to mitigate the problem.  In doing so the Court took 
those passages into its consideration, deciding whether they should be removed or 
left unedited as in the original text.
475
  Most of the problematic pages talk about the 
life of the Prophet Muhammad as a legislator, but the Court firmly declared that it 
did not find any objection to those passages nor did it agree that those passages were 
written with the intention of wounding Muslims.  However, some pages were edited 
and the Court proposed some revision.  For example, one such passage, page 59, 
brought to the Court, deals with the Prophet as a legislator: 
Till his death, ten years later, he ruled his community as an absolute monarch, as a 
prophet on his own right. He sat in the gate and judged the people. He had no need of a 
code, for his own will was enough. He followed the customary law of the town, as it has 
been described above, when it suited him, and when he judged that it was best. If not, he 
left it and there was a revelation. So the legislative part of the Quran grew out of such 
scraps [sic] sent down out of heaven to meet the needs of the squabbles and questions of 
the townsfolk of al-Madina. The system was one of pure opportunism; but of what body 
of legislation can that not be said. Of course, on the one hand, not all decisions were 
backed by a revelation, and Muhammad seems, on the other, to have made a few 
attempts to deal systematically with certain standing and constantly recurring 
problems—such, for example, as the conflicting claims of heirs in an estate, and the 
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whole complicated questions of divorce—but in general, the position holds that 
Muhammad as a lawyer lived from hand to mouth.
476
 
The words objected to in the paragraph were: ‘absolute monarch’ and ‘opportunism.’  
After reviewing the whole paragraph, the Court declared that nothing has been found 
objectionable in the words of ‘absolute monarch.’  The word ‘opportunism,’ although 
derived from opportunity is used to imply a sacrifice of principle and is, therefore, 
repugnant.  The reference to revelation is clearly sarcastic. The Court therefore 
proposed to reshape only two lines of the passage: ‘He followed the customary law 
of the town, as it has been described above...when he judged that it was best.  If 
not...there was a revelation.’  The dots indicate that some words or lines have been 
omitted from the original writing.  So in the proposed edited version only ‘when it 
suited him,’ and ‘he left it’ were deleted and the rest of the passage remained as it 
was in the original text.
477
  Another objectionable paragraph on page 70 of the book 
was considered offensive, discussing revelation to the Prophet Muhammad: 
From time to time he got into difficulties. A revelation proved too wide or too narrow, 
or left out some important possibility. Then there came another to supplement or 
correct, or even to set the first quite aside—Muhammad had no scruples about 
progressive revelation as applied to himself. Thus through these interpretive acts, as we 
may call them, many flat contradictions have come into the Qur’an and have proved the 
delight of generations of Muslim Jurisprudence.
478
 
In this passage only two lines ‘From time to time he got into difficulties,’ and 
‘Muhammad had no scruples about progressive revelation as applied to himself’ 
were offensive.  Accepting this, the Court proposed the passage be reshaped thus: 
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.... A revelation proved too wide or too narrow, or left out some important possibility.  
Then there came another to supplement or correct, or even to set the first quite aside.... 
Thus through these interpretive acts, as we may call them, many flat contradictions have 




It is also important to note that while some paragraphs were edited by the Court 
others which were subject to objection, such as this paragraph on pages 121-2, 
remained unaltered: 
Traditions, too, which have reached us, even show him setting his face against all 
discussions of dogma and repeating again and again, in answer to metaphysical and 
theological questions, the crude anthropomorphisms of the Qur’an. But these questions 
and answers are probably forgeries of the later traditional school, shadows of future 
warfare thrown back upon the screen of the patriarchal age.
480
 
After reviewing this passage, the Court declared that apart from the fact that the 
second sentence qualifies the author’s opinion (in so far as it finds expression in the 
word ‘crude’) there is no doubt that a section of Muslims are themselves guilty of 
ascribing a human form to the deity.  They lose sight of the figurative meaning which 
is intended to be conveyed by the use of the terms ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ in relation 
to God.  The Court therefore did not find any harm in the use of the word ‘crude’ 
particularly when used by a non-Muslim, American author who will no doubt read 
first the plain meaning of the Qur’an.
481
  So the passage, in the opinion of the Court, 
was not offensive at all and was allowed to remain as it was in the book. 
On the whole, after reviewing all paragraphs, the court declared that ‘we do 
not think that the description [of the book] is incorrect or insulting’ as outrageous 
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and malicious intention is not involved to write as well as publish the book.
482
  The 
court also set aside the order of forfeiting and directed that all forfeited copies be 
restored to the applicant to make minor modifications as agreed.  Significantly, the 
‘research purpose,’ declared by Macdonald for analysing and evaluating religious 
discussion was one of the main reasons for passing such judgment, as the court noted 
that ‘in English, German or French there is no book to which a teacher may send his 
pupils for brief guidance on the development of these institutions.’
483
  At this point, 
addressing the students of Pakistan, the Court declared that: 
The research value of the book has to be preserved and that certain passages even 
though somewhat offensive, should be left intact in order to give an idea to the research 
students of the personal opinion which the author held about Muslim Theology.
484
 
The declaration given above in terms of protecting the opinion about the Prophet 
under section 295-A of PPC demonstrates that the law as constituted in Punjab, 
Pakistan before the 1980s, provided religious freedom of expression to a very 
considerable extent in Pakistan’s legal and judicial history, even allowing reflective 
and critical discussion of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his teaching as 
questioned in the Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and 
Constitutional Theory.  After viewing these passages of the book it can be argued 
that this is one of the most famous cases of an alleged insult to the Prophet 
Muhammad registered under section 295-A in Lahore prior to the introduction of 
section 295-C known as the Blasphemy Law, for which the penalty was death. 
                                                 
482
 Muhammad Khalil v. The state, PLD 1962 Lahore 850. 
483
 Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, vii. 
484
 Muhammad Khalil v. The state, PLD 1962 Lahore 850. 
182 
 
Significantly this case was dismissed by the Sessions Court following its 
withdrawal by the Government.  It is also important to note that after this case in 
which, according to the appellants, the Prophet’s life was disgraced, there was no 
chaos, critical protest or violence such as occurred in anti-Ahmadi agitation as 
discussed above and indeed currently in Pakistan.  The hypothetical question arises 
whether if this book were to be accused under section 295-A today in Pakistan, it 
could be discussed at all, setting aside the fact, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, that a new section, 295-C, prescribes the death sentence for committing 
blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad.  In 1960, the whole issue was discussed 
calmly: even if it could be discussed today, would the same calm reign?  Section 
295-A still stands in Chapter XV of the ‘Offenses Relating to Religion’ of Pakistan 
Penal Code to protect against malicious writing, but it has little or no power today to 
deal with cases like this which will be discussed in the following chapter, Section 
295-C having virtually nullified it. 
Returning to the pre-1979 position, and regarding the application of section 
295-A particularly dealing with the crime of offending Islamic faith, Pakistani courts 
continued to dismiss prosecutions where the act was not done with malicious 
intention.
485
  It is also important to note that people were accused not only over 
writing or publications but also speeches, and in dealing with the issue of offensive 
speech, section 295-A relied on what has been said intentionally to offend.  The 
following case showed that accusations based on any personal reason were not 
deemed to be liable under section 295-A.  One example will suffice.  Major-General 
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Fazal-i-Raziq, the Chairman of WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), 
Lahore gave a speech to the officers of WAPDA on 18
th
 June 1977.  He impressed 
upon the officers the importance of huqooq-al-abad, (rights of people) the need to 
earn an honest livelihood and to complete Tarbela Dam in Punjab Province as early 
as possible in order to rebuild the economy of the country.  A few months later, Riaz 
Ahmad, the office superintendent in WAPDA House, filed a complaint against Fazal-
i-Raziq, under section 295-A of the PPC on the grounds that the speech was a 
deliberate and malicious attempts to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims.
486
  
The complaint was quashed on technical grounds, with the Lahore High Court 
holding that prosecutions under section 295-A, as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898, were to be taken up only on the authority of the Federal or Provincial 
Governments, and not by way of private complaint.  The Court also reviewed the use 
of the law for private issues or feuds.  Riaz Ahmad allegedly misused the law as he 
was the office superintendent in WAPDA House, Lahore, and had been removed 
from his post on 5
th
 July 1977.  It might be worth noting that other sub-sections of 
section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal Code do not have such safety provision, 
rendering the legislation susceptible to abuse by private individuals for reason other 
than faith. 
The case also demonstrates that before passing judgement the Court was 
aware of the accuser’s personal beliefs, situation and religious zeal.  The decision in 
this case clearly demonstrates that to convict anyone under section 295-A in 
Pakistan, the determining factor was whether the speaker or writer had the deliberate 
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and malicious intent to incite religious hatred by an intentionally offensive speech.
487
  
Considering this case it can be said that people tried to misuse the law to settle 
private matters, Riaz Ahmad filing his complaint in his private capacity, but this was 
not accepted by the Court. 
All cases occurring between 1956 and 1979 clearly reveal that the judiciary 
had the capacity and generally the will to protect religious communities, Muslims 
and Christians, from any social or personal matter passing for religious hurt.  It can 
also be argued that the judiciary could have dealt with religious controversies of 
Ahmadis but anti-Ahmadi speeches and writings were not prosecuted under section 
295-A.  Before going into the details, it is important to see how circumstances 
dramatically turned violent in Punjab following the anti-Ahmadi controversies and 
riots of 1974, with similar religious agitation, protest through publications and 
speeches as occurred in 1953.  Let us examine how the social and religious 
controversies brought amendments in the constitution of Pakistan as well as the 
definition of religious status of Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. 
 
4.4. The Anti-Ahmadi Riots and Religious Offences from 1974 
The decade of the 1970s brought major changes in the political and religious life of 
Pakistan, the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 also seeing major changes in 
religion and politics.  Islamic norms were further empowered in what had been West 
Pakistan after the loss and separation of Bengal Province which had put pressure to 
maintain secularism as discussed in the previous chapter.  The issue of publication 
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and speech against Ahmadis remained but major events took place, particularly anti-
Ahmadi agitation in 1974.
488
  As discussed earlier in the chapter, numerous religious 
cases against Ahmadis were not prosecuted under the legislation on Religious 
Offences law from 1949 till 1974.  However, one incident, a fight between Ahmadi 
and non-Ahmadi students, was regarded as a religious insult which revived anti-
Ahmadi agitation and became a major force leading the government to accept the 
religious demands to change the constitution of Pakistan and declare Ahmadis a non-
Muslim minority. 
According to the case, discussed by Sadia Saeed, a group of non-Ahmadi 
Muslim students of Nishter Medical College, Multan, were attacked by Ahmadis at 




  People took the incident seriously 
before any explanation, legal opinion and reason of the fight was declared. 
According to Saeed the protest resulted in a social boycott of Ahmadis which later 
caused violence against Ahmadis, including throwing Ahmadi students from hostel 
rooms, stoning and burning Ahmadi shops and factories as well as beating 
Ahmadis.
490
  Saeed notes that there was a wide emotional coverage given to the 
event by newspapers which later became a pretext for religious groups and parties to 
re-launch a social movement demanding Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims.
491
 
Various religious announcements, publications and speeches were produced to incite 
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Muslims against Ahmadis.  For example, on 16
th
 June 1974, the front page of the 
National Newspaper, Nawa-e-Waqt wrote that: 
It is the Religious Duty of all Muslims that the deniers of the Finality of the 
Prophethood of Prophet Muhammad (PUBH), the Qadianis, be completely boycotted. 
That they [the Muslims] maintain no relationships with them [the Qadianis] and do not 
buy and sell products made by them.… And on the Day of Judgment, with the Shafa’at 
[intercessions] of the Last of the Prophet PBUH earn a high place in Heaven.
492
 
One of the major causes that shook Pakistan was a ‘Nation-Wide’ protest led by 
major Muslim parties including students and trade unions, members of the union 
parties in the national and provincial assemblies and local clerics and mosques who 
supported the movement to protect the finality of the Prophet Muhammad (Khatam-
e-Nubuwwat) demanding Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslims minority and 
removed from key jobs.
493
  Such critical circumstances led the Government to 
investigate the case. 
According to Saeed, the Government appointed a High Court Judge, K. M. A. 
Samdani to investigate the incident in Rabwah.  The Ahmadi students maintained 
that they had been provoked into the fight with the Nishtar Medical College students 
who had shouted offensive slogans at Ahmadi students in addition to verbally 
harassing a group of girls at Rabwah station.  The non-Ahmadi students of Nishtar 
Medical College denied the charges and claimed that they were provoked by Ahmadi 
students shouting blasphemous slogans and distributing offensive Ahmadi literature 
to the Nishtar Medical students.  Saeed further notes that Justice Samdani saw the 
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fact that the Ahmadi community was a distinct and separate sect was relevant to the 
case, although the lawyer acting for the Ahmadiyya community of Rabwah protested 
that Ahmadiyya religious beliefs were irrelevant.
494
 
According to the statements, it can be assumed the issue was based on 
allegedly offensive speech, slogans or distributed religious publications.  Once again, 
section 295-A would be applicable if the case was based on a genuine religious 
insult.
495
  However the application of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
of the Pakistan Penal Code had already sealed the outcome.  The ambivalence in the 
case is shown in the comment of the High Court Judge, Samdani, that the claims of 




Though there was no final judgment which declared whether the case was 
based on a religious quarrel or not, throughout the inquiry the non-Ahmadis’ position 
remained strong, for they insisted that the attack was pre-planned and was authorised 
by the ‘Ahmadi administration of Rabwah, as part of their strategy to overturn Islam 
and institute the Ahmadiyya religion in Pakistan.’
497
  According to Saeed ‘the exact 
status of the Ahmadi community was not discussed but the “heretical” and 
“blasphemous” practices of the community were neatly threaded in with discussions 
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It can also be seen that the judicial system was not seen as crucial to the 
religious issue, as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan People’s Party- PPP- Prime Minister 
from 1971-1977) declared in a speech on 13
th
 June 1974 that the Ahmadi issue would 
be resolved in a Special Committee of the National Assembly, who would debate 
whether Ahmadis were Muslims or not.  Bhutto himself was not present in the 
Assembly meeting when various Ahmadi leaders were invited to the Assembly to 
discuss their religious views and to answer questions about their faith.  The 
discussion was mainly about the Ahmadis’ political history and their association with 
the British, regarded as a threat to Muslim unity, Ahmadis’ beliefs about Jihad and 
beliefs as a threat to Islam and Ahmadis’ social and political endeavours as a threat 
to the state. Most importantly discussion on the finality of Prophet Muhammad, 





  To rephrase the definition of a Muslim, the 
National Assembly adopted the Constitution Amendment Act which added Ahmadis 
to the list of minorities and made changes in the Article 260 (3) of 1973 of the 
constitution which took Ahmadis out of the definition of a Muslim which defined a 
Muslim who believes: 
In the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be 
upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or 
                                                 
498
 Saeed, Politics of Exclusion, 217; In 1999, the name Rabwah, Ahmadis’ headquarter was also 
changed and is known as Chanab Nagar today. See ‘Changing name of Rabwah,’ 31 December 2010, 
available on http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/change-of-name-of-rabwah/. 
499
 The discussion on Ahmadi in the National Assembly was later published. Mufti Taqi Usmani and 
Moulana Sami-ul-Haq, Qadianis on Trial: The Case of the Muslim Ummah against Qadianis 
Presented Before the National Assembly of Pakistan (Karachi: Adartul Maruf, 2005). 
189 
 
religious reformers, any person who claims to be a prophet, in any sense of word and 
any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him)… 
And non-Muslim means: 
A person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, 
Sikh, Bhudhist or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or the Lahori Group 
who call themselves Ahmadis or any other name of a Bahai, and a person belonging to 
any of the Scheduled Castes.
500
 
The statement given above clearly differentiates minorities on the basis of their 
religion without mentioning their citizenship or religious rights.  Malik notes that 
historically ‘a regime, through Parliament, assumed the role of arbiter on faith.’
501
  
Jalal notes that ‘defining a Muslim from a non-Muslim was a particularly explosive 
device in a context where the state’s Islamic posturing was already at odds with the 
basic principles of a nation-state.’
502
  However, it was done to declare Ahmadis as 
non-Muslims and to expel them from the Muslim community. The constitution of 
Pakistan as an Islamic country asserted that only Muslims could hold government 
office by declaring their faith in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad which simply 
excluded Ahmadis from such office.  The non-Muslim status of Ahmadis also caused 
their social and economical decline as it threatened their admission to government 
jobs, educational institutions and provincial legislatures on the basis of their minority 
status, determined by quotas reserved for other minority groups such as Christians 
and Hindus of Pakistan.
503
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It can clearly be seen that a long awaited declaration about Ahmadi religious 
status and Muslim definition was a significant step in changing the direction of 
Pakistan towards theocracy as intended by Islamic parties who initially ‘opposed 
Jinnah and League’s movement for Pakistan.’
504
  Such demands can be heard by 
Islamic parties speaking in the National Assembly rephrasing the status of Pakistan 
and its citizens. As reviewed by Saeed: 
Anti-Ahmadiya demands were couched within public narratives about the state, its 
functions, its ideology, its responsibility to the majority of Pakistanis, its relationship to 
Islam [because] the basis of the origins of Pakistan were founded on Islam and that 
Islam alone provided justification for the existence of an independent Pakistan.
505
 
From 1974, another major concern was whether Ahmadis could practise and 
propagate their faith as a non-Muslim minority or not.  After declaring Ahmadis non-
Muslims, the initial report written for Bhutto declared that the ‘permanent solution’ 
of the Punjab disturbances and religious agitation had been found, and declared 
Ahmadis a ‘minority living in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, their rights and 
privileges to be protected.’
506
  Such claim can be seen in one of the cases Abdur 
Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah in 1978, when the Lahore Court, on the question 
whether the Ahmadi community after being declared non-Muslims are prohibited 
from using mosques, held that ‘there is no positive law investing the plaintiffs with 
any such right to debar the defendants [the Ahmadiyya community] from freedom of 
conscience.’
507
  Significantly, Justice Hussain of the Lahore High Court, following 
the Sunna, tradition of the Prophet and the Quran, declared that the religious rights of 
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non-Muslims must be respected like those of Muslims; therefore Ahmadis cannot be 
prohibited from calling azan or building mosques as it is a duty of Muslims to protect 
non-Muslim subjects.
508
  Interestingly sections 295, 296 and 298 of Chapter XV of 
‘Religious Offences’ relating to religious freedom and protection of sacred places 
and worship given under the law were never applied or declared but in this case 
article 20 of the 1973 Constitution was invoked, granting fundamental rights to all 
minority citizens of Pakistan. 
A crucial issue is whether Chapter XV of PPC, rarely used in practice, could 
be fully used to protect all religious minorities, including Ahmadis, and for how 
long.  Though Ahmadis were non-Muslims by definition, they could still practise 
their faith as a minority under section 298 of Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ 
law which allows all religious communities to profess as well as discuss religious 
faith.  Generally, their places of worship, objects, rights of religious funeral services 
and burial grounds with Christians, Hindus and other religious communities as 
discussed in the previous chapters were protected under the legislation on ‘Religious 
Offences.’  However, the initial support for their rights did not last long. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
It cannot be denied that the somewhat unclear balance between the religious and the 
secular in Pakistan’s constitution, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, evolved 
into a real source of difficulty for minority communities and eventually affected 
judicial approaches to religious offences in Pakistan.  The changed political context 
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and anti-Ahmadi controversies affected various areas in the legal history and 
perception of the law producing perhaps the most critical impact on the definition 
and implication of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ in the Pakistan Penal Code in 
Pakistan’s history.  This procedure reveals two aspects: the continuing maintenance 
of communal violence and the political and judicial ability to incite communal 
agitation as well as to protect and maintain the law and order. 
Communal violence is not new to Punjab Province but goes back to Hindu-
Muslim violence based on the same issue of insulting Islam through offensive 
writing and speech.  However, the nature of re-created communal and mob violence 
and agitation in the Ahmadi-Muslim encounter seemed more critical in Pakistan. 
Such conflicts also reveal that there is no clear record of cases formally tried under 
the legislation on ‘Relgious Offences,’ as various religious issues, though noticed, 
were not prosecuted in the early history of Pakistan.  A critical approach has been to 
see how governing authorities used agitation for their own political advantages.  The 
British had used the law for their political advantages, as has been discussed in the 
case of Angare, but the political advantages accruing to the governing authorities of 
Pakistan led to some extraordinary and indeed unprecedented applications of law and 
order. 
From 1947 to 1979, Chapter XV of the ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ law 
was not used to protect the Ahmadis from religious controversies and violence, 
although it still remained an important piece of legislation without any change or 
amendment in accordance with the original meaning, procedure and intention to 
protect religious communities in Pakistan.  There was a successful attempt by 
governing officials to change or at least control the former law and its proper 
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procedure to deal with anti-Ahmadi controversies and cases, and the judiciary and 
courts clearly tried to maintain a degree of independence to give full freedom to 
discuss religious contradictions that may have been considered offensive, as occurred 
in publications discussed above in Pakistan.  However, in 1974, the procedure of 
Islamization was officially begun by governing legislation and constitutional change.  
One of the main concerns of this thesis is how this procedure critically affected 
judicial decisions and procedures of the legislation on Religious Offences (Chapter 
XV) and made its future use controversial if not ineffective in terms of the original 
intention.  In 1979, Chapter XV was amended to allow Ahmadis to be prosecuted for 
performing their own religious practices, and after the early 1980s the religious 
clashes and controversies affected religious freedom, the law on ‘Religious Offences’ 
and the use of the category ‘blasphemy,’ with severe punishments, which is the main 





The Legislation on Offences Relating to Religion and Islamization of 
Pakistan (1979-1988) 
Historically, the law has been challenged and amended to preserve certain beliefs 
when people felt threatened and wounded or governments needed support from a 
particular constituency.  For example, Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
of the Indian Penal Code was significantly amended in the 1920s particularly after 
the protest of the mob and judiciary to protect the Prophet Muhammad from 
offensive publications in the British Punjab.  After independence, this pattern also 
affected the application of Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ of the Pakistan Penal 
Code especially regarding the extent to which it can be used to maintain religious 
peace in the society and how the ruling powers and judiciary regard it.  The 
particular issue concerning the finality of the Prophet Muhammad underlay all the 
Ahmadi-Muslim arguments which later led to changes in Chapter XV. 
In the process of amendment after the Ahmadi disaffiliation, it may be 
suggested that sectarianism was intensified as Chapter XV changed from its original 
meaning, procedure and intention.  The original maximum sentence for committing a 
religious offence in Chapter XV was two years with a fine, which was also 
successfully applied in Pakistan, as the last chapter clearly demonstrated.  However, 
between 1979 and 1986, the question of religious offences became critical, indeed a 
matter of ‘life and death’ amid sectarian Pakistan as the ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ law changed in its application, especially but not only for minority 
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religious communities.  The outcome was that both the intentions of Chapter XV of 
PPC and its penalties were drastically altered, the new rules altering the intention and 
outcome of the legal history of the legislation on ‘Religious Offences’ in Pakistan.
509
 
Before analyzing the results, it is helpful to note the source and aim of these 
changes, both of which were based on popular religious demands and political 
interests in Pakistan during the 1970s.  Firstly, we shall examine how this related to 
political interests especially under Zia ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988) and the demand 
by Muslims and Muslim religious parties to protect Islamic beliefs.  Secondly, we 
shall see if and how judicial power was able to deal with religious issues 
independently from the 1980s onwards. 
 
5.1. The Political Power of Zia ul-Haq and Religious Offences 
After taking power from Bhutto, Zia ul-Haq was aware of the religious demands for 
theocracy as well as the religious-based criticism aimed at Bhutto: by following these 
demands and using Islamic norms, this military leader would be able to stabilise his 
political position.
510
  According to Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, Zia was inspired by 
reading Islamic books written by Maulana Abul A’la Maududi of Jamaat-e-Islami 
who had placed significant emphasis on applying theocracy in Pakistan.
511
  The 
process started in 1977 when Maududi and his party Jamaat-e-Islami put forward 
their proposal for a more Islamic Pakistan to Zia ul-Haq in the year he became 
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president.  Maududi claimed that under Islamic law in Pakistan an independent 
Islamic political state would not only restore Islam but that Islamic law would 
equally protect non-Muslims and their rights.
512
  This last claim regarding minorities 
and freedom of expression will be examined later in this chapter. 
The Islamization of Pakistan was largely motivated by Sunni militancy. 
Historically, we have seen how major ethnic and religious issues and sectarianism 
had already separated East and West Pakistan and expelled Ahmadis from the 
Islamic community.  Furthermore, such sectarianism, according to Nasr, controlled 
the Islamic discourse of Pakistan and brought another sectarian division that viewed 
Shi’a Islam as a threat, quite apart from the threat the new Sunni militancy would 
pose for powerless minorities.
513
  According to Malik, the Sunni-Shia conflict took 
place when a group such as the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (the Army of the Friends 
of the Prophet) from Jhang, Punjab demanded that ‘Pakistan should be declared a 
Sunni state.’
514
  Most of the Shias living in the Kurram Agency, surrounded by Sunni 
tribes, were inspired by the Iranian Revolution, angering those around them.  
Sectarian clashes took place when one of the Shia from Kurram, Maulana Mausavi, 
was murdered, bringing sectarian agitation and killing in Jhang, Karachi, Lahore and 
Peshawar.  Tehreek-e-Fiqh-e-Jafria was established to push for the Shia version of 
Sharia which further caused Sunni-Shia agitation and specific assassinations and 
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  Sunnis and Shias saw Pakistan’s reformation through their own sectarian 
visions, although as has been noted, Shias are targets of Sunni power and feared they 
would face the same fate as Ahmadis.
516
  However, one of the most important 
consequences of this conflict is to note that such sectarianism later defiled mosques, 
damaging them with bomb blasts and not only assassinating worshippers but also 
causing serious disturbances to religious assemblies, which again attacked on the  
‘Offences Relating to Religion’ laws. 
Zia-ul-Haq with his religious interests aimed to bring Nazame-e-Mustafa, the 
Islamic Order of God, and proclaimed his vision that, ‘Pakistan was created in the 
name of Islam, [and] will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.  That is why I 
consider the introduction of the Islamic system an essential pre-requisite for the 
country.’
517
  The number of ulama, Islamic scholars on the council of Islamic 
ideology, was increased
518
 to promote and implement a thorough-going program of 
Islamization, determined to see Pakistan reach this goal of becoming an Islamic 
state.
519
  It is important to note that through the Islamization procedure, Zia did not 
aim to bring full ‘Sharia Law’ but to strengthen the Islamic system by establishing 
and imposing some Islamic Penal Codes between 1979 and 1986
520
 which created a 
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division between secular and Islamic laws.
521
  Before viewing this change, it is 
necessary to note how such legislation was brought and maintained by refashioning 
the judicial system of Pakistan. 
 
5.2. Islamization, Law and Order and the Creation of Federal Shariat 
Court 
The judiciary was affected by political control in the 1980s as indeed in earlier 
periods, although under Zia a more direct confrontation was essential for him to 
ensure the passage of his ideas.  The legislation dealing with religious offences was 
clearly controlled by Zia through reforming the judicial structure of Pakistan, not just 
Chapter XV but also the basis of the judicial system inherited from the British.  From 
1980, firstly, Zia wished to bring the existing laws of Pakistan into conformity with 
Shariat Islamic law and therefore secondly, created a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) 
and Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court with the major aim to ‘examine 
and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to 
the Injunctions of Islam.’
522
  In contrast to British law it was observed that: 
None of the system of Penal Law established in British India has any claim to our 
attention except what it may derive from its own intrinsic excellence. All those systems 
are foreign. All were introduced by conquerors differing in race, manners, language and 
religion from the great mass of people… that of [an Islamic] criminal law which is 
certainly the last system of criminal law which an enlightened and humane Government 
would be disposed to receive.
523 
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Following the new rules of Islamic law, in 1979 the Hudood Ordinance
524
 was 
promulgated to replace the British Criminal Code with an Islamic one, after Zia and 
the Islamic Council of Islamic Ideology reviewed all laws dating back to 1834 to 
eliminate those repugnant to Islam.
525
 
In 1981 Zia promulgated the provisional Constitutional Order to reconcile 
military rule with the constitution and limit the power of the judiciary.
526
  It was 
claimed that the dual judicial system would provide speedier justice over the 
cumbersome Anglo-Saxon law.
527
  However, one of the main aims of Federal Shariat 
Court was to reject any law repugnant to Islam and advise the government to alter 
such laws. According to Anita M. Weiss: 
[The FSC] did not restrict the power of either the civil or military courts operating 
concurrently in Pakistan, except to ensure that the laws were not repugnant to Islam. 
Nor was there an overhaul of the legal system, placing all law into conformity at once. 
Instead, only when a law was challenged as repugnant to Islamic injunction did a 
shari’a bench became involved. In addition, the question of legal derivation was not 
raised; laws were decreed as conforming to Islamic shari’a, but no attempt was made to 
derive the legal system directly from the shari’a.
528
 
To Islamize the judiciary, Zia wished to ‘decolonize’ and ‘Islamize’ the judicial 
system thus, it has been said, ‘diverting attention from the executive’s encroachment 
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on the powers of the judiciary.’
529
  The new way minimized the High Court’s power 
especially when it found error in any statute or sentence or intention.  For example, 
the question of abolishing the death sentence for defiling the name of the Prophet and 
substituting life imprisonment was debated but withdrawn, which will be discussed 
later.  Likewise, the Federal Shariat Court intervened to annul any laws seen as not 
Islamic.  The entire Pakistan Penal Code of 1860 was reviewed by the Council, 
appointed by Zia, who played a significant role in revising many codes as well as 
adding new ones, significantly to Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion.’ 
 
5.3. Amendments in Chapter XV of Pakistan Penal Code from 1980 to 
1986 
Initial amendments to Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of PPC were 
by and large a result of the continuing protest against Ahmadis.  Though Ahmadis 
were already considered non-Muslims, their religious practices and expressions were 
still outrageous to Muslims.  For example, anti-Ahmadi agitation concerned the fact 
that Mirza and Ahmadi successors use Islamic titles for their own Prophets including 
the Prophet such as Amir-ul-Momineen (the successors of the Prophet), Ummul 
Momineen (sacred name of Prophet’s Wives) or Sahab-e-Karam (companions of the 
Prophet) which became outrageous to Muslims,
530
 who insisted only they could use 
such words, excluding Ahmadis.  In 1980, this controversy was controlled through 
creating section 298-A and inserting the following into Chapter XV of the ‘Religious 
Offences’ of Pakistan Penal Code (added by Ordinance XLV of 1980) which 
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prohibits Ahmadis from linking themselves to the family of the Prophet and the 
Islamic caliphate: 
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any 
imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of 
any wife (Ummel Muminn), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of the Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him), or any of the righteous Caliphs (Khulfa-e-Rashideen) or 
companions (Sahaba) of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term for a term which may extend to three 
years, or with fine, or with both.
531
 
The process of Islamising the legislation on ‘Religious Offences’ and the new 
additions in some respect significantly segregated the Ahmadis from the family of 
the Prophet.  Ahmadis as previously self-defined Muslims had various common 
religious objects and practices such as reading and teachings of the Quran which was 
outrageous to many Muslims of Punjab.  In 1982, section 295-B was added to 
Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ mainly to preserve the Quran as a final revealed 
word of God, as discussed later in the chapter.  According to section 295-B, not only 
Ahmadis but also ‘anyone’ who defiles and damages the Quran is liable to be 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an 
extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall 
be punishable with imprisonment for life.
532
 
Ordinance XX applied in 1984 cut Ahmadis off from their accustomed social and 
religious life and practices as, similar to the 1950s and 1970s, anti-Ahmadi demands 
were again made to the state.  Islamic parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat-
e-Ulama-e-Islam (Society of Ulama of Islam) and Jamaat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan 
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(Society of Ulama of Pakistan), re-launched the Tehrrik-e-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat 
(movement to protect the prophethood).  Tehrrik-e-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat was the 
leading movement which was used to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims and changed 
the constitution of 1974 as already discussed.  In the 1980s it was re-launched and 
used by Zia to declare punishment for those who defile Islamic beliefs.  Following 
the previous agitation, they campaigned for the complete removal of Ahmadis from 
all levels of the bureaucracy and the military on the ground that they were traitors to 
Pakistan.  The demands of religious parties were declared in the meeting held in 
Rawalpindi on 1-2 January 1984: 
(a) Introduction of death sentence for apostasy; (b) complete ban on publication and 
distribution of Ahmadi literature; and (c) state take steps to curb the anti-Islamic and 
anti-national activities of Ahmadis. (d) Ahmadis should be prohibited from naming their 
places of worship as mosques and their call for prayer as Azaan; and (e) implementation 
of death sentence for those who use derogatory language about Prophet Mohammad.
533
 
This protest was by and large similar to those occurring between 1950 and 1974, but 
went further, demanding separate legislation to punish these ‘non-Muslims’ as 
blasphemers.  The Islamic parties not only demanded such legislation but also 
threatened the government that they would take action, even breaking the law, to 
achieve their aim.  For example, in February 1984, the Ulama threatened to launch a 
nation-wide anti-Ahmadi campaign and pushed the government to demolish all 
Ahmadi mosques by 30
th
 April 1984, insisting that if it this was not done by the 
government the Ulama would be compelled to do so themselves.
534
  Like the 
previous agitation discussed above, in the 1980s publications also played a role in 
inciting people.  For example, one of Pakistan’s official newspapers (Nawa-e-Waqt) 
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wrote that Ahmadis should not be allowed to preach against Islam (Lahore: 4
th
 April 
1984), they should not be allowed to distribute their pamphlets (Lahore: 14
th
 April 





Clearly, religious tension, public agitation, threats and violence came together 
in Punjab province to affect and even alter long-standing legislation clearly intended 
to deal with religious offences and conflict.  While the label of mob-rule would be 
inaccurate, as the government itself was part of the agitation, pressure from below, 
from religious authorities and from pragmatic politicians, did encourage the 
government to accept their demands even though the government itself thereby broke 
current laws.  For example, at the point when attacks on Ahmadi buildings began, 
damaging and breaking any places of worship was still punishable under section 295 
of Chapter XV of PPC and prohibiting them from preaching and practising their faith 
violated section 298 of Chapter XV as well as Article 18, 19 and 20 of the UDHR, 
which Pakistan supported in 1948.  The religious demands for more laws to punish 
Ahmadi demands were a threat to religious freedom. 
However, Zia, by following the Islamic parties’ demands and in line with the 
policy to Islamize Pakistan, created a space to discuss ‘the relationship between 
Islam and state and the basis of Pakistan’s national identity.’
536
  Ordinance XX of 
1984 was promulgated on 26
th
 April, prepared by Raja Zaffarul Haq,
537
 with the 
intention of prohibiting and punishing non-Muslims, entitled ‘Anti-Islamic Activities 
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of Qadiani group, Lahori Group and Ahmadies.’
538
  The new ordinance, Section 298-
B of Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion,’ provides for punishment for the 
use of derogatory remarks and writing with respect of holy personages. According to 
section 298-B: 
1.  Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 
Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written or by 
visible representation: 
a. refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the 
Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), as "Ameerul Momineen", "Khalifat-ul-
Momneen", "Khalifat-ul-Muslimeen", "Sahaabi" or "Razi Allah Anho"; 
b. refers to or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH), as Ummul-Mumineen; 
c. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-
Bait) of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), as Ahle-Bait; or 
d. refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid; shall be punished 
with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to three 
years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
2.    Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahore group, (who call themselves Ahmadis 
or by any other names), who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representations, refers to the mode or from of call to prayers followed by his faith 
as "Azan" or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and 
shall also be liable to fine.
539
 
Section 298-B is based on the misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles reserved for 
a certain holy personage of the Islamic faith.  But in the following addition, section 
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298-C, Ahmadis were prohibited from calling themselves Muslim or preaching and 
propagating their faith: 
Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or 
any other name), who directly or indirectly, posses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or 
refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to 
accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in 
any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and 
shall also be liable to fine.
540
 
It was explained in the previous chapter how groups and agitators were not properly 
prosecuted for delivering offensive speech and publishing offensive matter in the 
1950s and 1970s.  After new additions to the law, the Government of Pakistan 
printed a short pamphlet ‘Qadianis: Threat to Islamic Solidarity’ which asserted that 
imposing conditions on Ahmadis was due to their anti-Islamic activities and faith 
being repugnant to Islam, insisting that anyone who denied the absolute finality of 




It is also worth reviewing one case, Mujibur Rehman v. Federal Government 
of Pakistan, tried in the Federal Shariat Court in 1985 after the promulgation of 
Ordinance XX which dealt with the question whether the new law violated the 
constitutional fundamental rights of Ahmadis to profess as well as propagate their 
faith.
542
  The case resembles Abdur Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah tried by the 
Lahore High Court in 1978 which was prosecuted after the declaration of Ahmadis’ 
non-Muslim status in 1974, discussing the similar question of their religious rights to 
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profess their faith as mentioned in the previous chapter.  The judgment declared in 
the latter case, that non-Muslims’ rights were fully protected, is significantly 
different from the judgment declared in the subsequent case in 1985 which revoked 
Ahmadis’ religious rights on the basis of their beliefs especially their violation of the 
core belief in the finality of the Prophethood of Mohammed by Ahmadis calling 
Ahmad the last prophet.
543
  The revision of both cases reveals significantly different 
and controversial judgements.  In 1979 the first judgement made it legal for Ahmadis 
to use mosques, profess faith and call azan, prayer, whereas the second judgment 
forbade them to practice such religious rituals or even prohibited them from calling 
themselves Muslim in 1985.
544
  The gradual change in judicial outcomes also shows 
the tension between the Islamic Courts and High Courts dealing with existing law 
and its practice, the difference between secular and Islamic law and its previous 
applications, and the future of religious freedom and protection of minorities of 
Pakistan which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Though the promulgation of Ordinance XX was alarming for Ahmadis, given 
that they could be accused of numerous religious offences and practices, the final 
amendment in the law in 1986 affected not only Ahmadis but also all religious 
communities including Muslims of Pakistan.  The core belief in the Prophethood of 
Islam was finally codified in 1986 as section 295-C, known as ‘the blasphemy law,’ 
which prescribed the punishment of death for those who defile the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Before discussing the procedure for prosecution and exacting of the 
penalty, it is important to note that the word ‘blasphemy’ was not used in Chapter 
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XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ as applied in British India but has become so 
known in contemporary Pakistan.  The term ‘blasphemy’ was also not used in 
various historical cases and publications in which Arya Samaj published offensive 
books against the Prophet Muhammad in 1920s as the courts usually declared that 
the offence had wounded the feelings of Muslims.  Likewise, the term ‘blasphemy’ 
was not used for anti-Christian pamphlets and books published and banned in British 
India,
545
 nor when Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ was adopted in India and 
Pakistan after 1947.
546
  ‘Blasphemy’ was not adopted because Macaulay as a 
legislator involved in framing the law in India, regarded it as necessary to protect the 
religious feelings of diverse religious communities rather than following the same 




Giving full details of the meaning of blasphemy in the Islamic context is 
beyond the scope of this research.  Yet the death sentence for defiling the Prophet 
Muhammad has been discussed in various sources but with different arguments.  For 
example, Mohammad Hashim Kamali notes that the record of the Prophet’s early life 
does not show blasphemy punishments and also the Quran does not prescribe 
punishments of blasphemy against the Prophet (sabb al-nabi) and his companions 
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  Wiederhold comments that according to the collected 
canonical Hadiths, the vilification of the Prophet and his Companions was 
‘considered intolerable and therefore forbidden by some of the religious leaders at 
the time.’
549
  Abdullah Saeed and Hasan Saeed note that blasphemy has been 
established as derived from the idea of apostasy (riddah) which results in the death 
penalty under sharia law.
550
  Before the enforcement of the law of blasphemy in 
Pakistan, various Pakistani scholars and law enforcers were also concerned with 
whether the death sentence is according to Islam and can be legalised or not which, 
as we shall see, has become a crucial question in contemporary Pakistan.  However, 
the death sentence was significantly supported by various Islamic scholars and Ismail 
Qureshi who played an important role in promulgating this law by arguing that 
blasphemy in Islam is punishable with death and ‘the blasphemy law’ should be 
accepted and respected internationally as now it punishes all ‘words written or 
spoken’ against the Prophet Muhammad as it was used for Jesus Christ.
551
 
Though the blasphemy law remained on the statute books in Britain, it was 
later regarded as ‘ancient, discriminatory, unnecessary [and] illiberal’
552
 and finally 
abolished on 8
th
 May 2008 by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 on the 
basis of the religious diversity, immigration policy and cultural pluralism of the 
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United Kingdom which had increased after the 1950s.
553
  The abolition of the British 
blasphemy law was in part a result of discussion about the question whether the law 
could be extended to protect other religions in the United Kingdom.  In 1991, in the 
case of Salman Rushdie, it was argued by some British Muslims that the law of 
blasphemy should be amended to apply to books such as The Satanic Verses in 
United Kingdom which was originally written in 1988 in India and was later 
regarded as offensive to Muslims of India and South Asia and regarded as a serious 
blasphemy offence in the Islamic world.
554
  After viewing the case, the Law 
Commissioner noted ‘the duty of all citizens in our society of different races and 
people of different faiths and of no faith, not purposely to insult or outrage the 
religious feelings of others.’
555
  The case was regarded as inadmissible on the 
uncertain argument of whether ‘the law should be reformed or repealed’ because of 
the new make-up of the United Kingdom and the fact that blasphemy only referred to 
Christianity in general and the Church of England in particular.
556
  It is beyond the 
concerns of this thesis to comment on whether the subsequent British law known as 
‘Incitement to Religious Hatred’ differentiates various ethnic, religious or cultural 
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 or treats Christianity like other religions
558
 or may be described as a secular 
approach to protect religious pluralism.
559
  However, it is indeed important to note 
that the British blasphemy law is no longer alive but the British Indian law of 1860 
known as ‘Offences Relating to Religions’ though still existing with the same title, 
after amendments, especially including the death sentence for defiling the name of 
the Prophet Muhammad, has generally come to be known in Pakistan after 1986 as 
the ‘blasphemy law.’ 
The promulgation of section 295-C marks the first time in Pakistan that the 
death penalty was added to Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ to punish 
an accused for defiling the name of the Prophet.  The question arises of why Pakistan 
needed another law when section 295-A was already available in practice to protect 
the religious feelings of Muslims.  According to some sources the question of the 
punishment awarded to an accused for allegedly defiling the Prophet under section 
295-A was regarded not as accordance with Islam.  Ismail Qureshi notes that the 
need to apply the blasphemy law with full severity was made clear when a book 
entitled Heavenly Communalism written by a lawyer, Mushtaq Raj, was published in 
Lahore, Punjab in 1983, containing offensive matter against Islam and its beliefs.  
Though the author was prosecuted and the book banned under section 295-A for 
outraging the feelings of Muslims, the main concern was that the ‘blasphemy law 
should be enacted to protect the Prophet Muhammad with severe punishment 
regarding the intensity of religious insult.  Therefore, section 295-A was challenged 
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in the first petition, moved by Ismail Qureshi, held for hearing at the Federal Shariat 
Court (FSC) in 1984 when it was stated that a punishment of two years and a fine or 
both was not adequate and is repugnant to Islam, and that only the death penalty was 
adequate punishment for defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad.
560
 
Later, with political and official approval, the bill was moved by Jamat-i-
Islami’s Apa Nisar Fatima, MNA (Member of National Assembly) seeking the 
addition of Section 295-C in Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ and 
provided for the death sentence alone for acts constituting insult to the prophet 
Muhammad.
561
  Although this did not go unchallenged, as some National Assembly 
members including the law minister, Khan Iqbal A. Khan, were not in favour of it, 
especially the vexed issue of whether it was in accordance with the Quran or Sunna 
as already noted.
562
  After much discussion the bill was passed by the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 111 of 1986, adding Section 295-C in Chapter XV of PPC that 
prescribes the mandatory death penalty, with life imprisonment as an alternative 
punishment, for defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad.
563
 
Whoever by word, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any 
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or 
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
564
 
It cannot be denied that new additions in Chapter XV were initially added to punish 
Ahmadis and protect the Islamic faith from them or to protect Islamic faith from 
future written or spoken blasphemies.  Since the law has been amended, it has 
                                                 
560
 Qureshi, Namoos-e-Rasalat, 361. 
561
 Qureshi, Muhammad the Messenger of God , 65-7. 
562
 Qureshi, Namoos-e-Rasalat, 48-9, 358, 361. 
563
 Khan, The Pakistan Penal Code, 239. 
564
 The offence under section 295-C is cognisable and non-bailable. Ibid. 
212 
 
become a challenge for other religious communities, the judiciary as well as for the 
government to deal with blasphemy accusations. It affected all religious communities 
and the many additions contravened, and thus annulled, sections of Chapter XV of 
‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of 1860 applied by the British.  Before reviewing the 
relevant original 1860 sections, we should first focus more thoroughly on additions 
295-B with the mandatory punishment of life imprisonment for defiling the Quran 
and 295-C with the death sentence for defiling the Prophet Muhammad.  These were 
what gave rise to the accusations known as ‘blasphemy,’ which have significantly 
increased since 1984 in Pakistan legal history and have seriously affected all 
religious communities.  Though all religious communities, including Muslims, are 
also vulnerable to accusations of blasphemy for defiling the copy of Quran and the 
name of the Prophet, it has been observed how the accusations against minorities 
such as Christians, Ahmadis and Hindus, largely in Punjab province, have brought a 
level of chaos which breaches the peace of the society. 
To understand exactly how this 1984 addition to Chapter XV changed the aim 
and therefore the practice of the religious conflict law embedded in the 1860 Act, we 
need to look carefully at the legal meaning of and procedures for Section 295-B and 
Section 295-C, describing how an accusation for blasphemy can be made, and what 
areas of dispute have arisen since 1984 in the application of the law.  The use of the 
law as a tool by individuals is one problem.  The earlier judges of the Chapter, 
especially Section: 295-A had insisted on examining the context of an accusation to 
ensure personal vendettas were not unwittingly advanced by the court: Chapter 4 has 
already pointed out that attention to this issue saw a plaintiff’s accusation of religious 
bias rejected by the court.  Clearly from the 1920s if not before, the courts were 
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aware of the controversial nature of these laws and the fact that their application 
could result in extreme violence: the intention of both Chapter XV and the judiciary 
had been to maintain community cohesion or at least avoid violence.  Arising from 
this point, not only have the objectives of Chapter XV been changed but also these 
changes have affected the judgements, the judicial system and the religious 
communities of Pakistan.  Most importantly, the crucial issue of ‘intention’ in the 
original law of religious offence linked to what became called blasphemy in 1984 has 
been radically changed. Results of this change include not only the effect on the 
person accused of blasphemy but also the political leaders, police and most of the 
lower courts and lawyers, all of whom are at risk if they act in any way judged by the 
accusers to be less than harsh to the accused.  These three areas are the key to 
understanding the problems which were not thrashed out in the initial 1984 decision, 
and which over the years have increasingly come to haunt the judicial system of 
Pakistan and the lives of minorities as well as more critical, reflective or vulnerable 
members of the majority.  Before setting out and analyzing these various issues, it 
will be helpful to discuss the contents and objectives of the new blasphemy section 
295-B. 
 
5.4. Section 295-B 
The main objective of section 295-B is to protect the sanctity of the Quran from any 
usage in a derogatory manner with the punishment of life imprisonment.  According 
to Sections 295-B: 
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Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an 
extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall 
be punishable with imprisonment for life. 
Section 295-B of PPC can be applied where the Quran has been defiled, damaged or 
desecrated in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose.  Secondly, the 
prosecution can be brought where such acts have been done ‘wilfully’ to defile or 
damage the Quran. 
 
5.4.1. The Meaning of Defile and Damage in Section 295-B 
The words ‘defile’ and ‘damage’ in section 295-B were previously mentioned in 
section 295 applied by the British in 1860 in the Indian Penal Code, used for the 
physical protection of sacred places such as mosques, churches and temples and also 
for any necessary ceremonial or ritual protection to keep the sanctity of any objects 
held in such sacred places.  It is also important to note that words ‘defile and 
damage’ in section 295-B includes both physical as well as spiritual dimensions. 
Before viewing the legal procedure it will be helpful to recollect that Muslims 
esteem the Quran, the Book (al-Kitab) as Allah’s revelation for moral and spiritual 
guidance, and as highly respected both spiritually and physically.
565
  There are some 
physical rules that Muslims follow when holding, handling, touching, or reading 
from the mus-haf (the pages) of the Quran.  Being in a state of ritual purity is 
mentioned in sura 56:79 ‘none shall touch it [the Quran] save for those who are 
ritually pure.’  Some rules have been interpreted and reiterated from early Islamic 
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scholars: Wudu, (washing) is necessary before prayer as well as before touching the 
text of the Quran.  Al-Hilli deems it reprehensible for a ritually impure person to 
touch the Quran and Abu-l-Qasim al-Khudu’i mentions that one who is in a state of 
ritual impurity is not permitted to touch the writing of the codex or the vocalization 
signs.
566
  There are different explanations as some argue that purity or cleanliness of 
the heart is necessary. 
As a result of this general understanding, the following rules are usually 
followed in respect of reading and touching the Quran.  Physical respect is 
maintained by keeping the Quran properly wrapped on a high place either a high 
shelf or on top of a bookshelf but never on the floor or an unclean place.  The Quran 
should be handled with respect and should not be thrown or torn, and anyone 
touching or reading it must be ritually clean, if necessary performing wudu or 
washing.  Ignoring such rules comes close to the word ‘defile’ used in section 295-B 
of PPC, meaning treating something holy with a lack of respect or making something 
foul or impure, filthy and polluted.
567
  According to Saeed, the Arabic word sabb 
similarly implies that ‘deliberately throwing a copy of the Quran into a dirty place 
such as a rubbish place’ is offensive.
568
  In short, physical respect includes certain 
rules for placing the Quran and physical purity for touching or reading it. 
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Section 295-B sets out both physical respect for the Quran, and for its spiritual 
meaning which is inseparable from the former.
569
  To describe the spiritual meaning 
for example, in Islam, the Qur’an, meaning to read or to recite, is the culmination or 
final revelation, wahy, of Allah that has been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.
570
  
Muslims believe that the Quran is the only accurately preserved word of God as well 
as the ultimate moral and spiritual guide in its nature and scope.  Disregarding or 
denying such realties can be considered offensive.  These physical and spiritual 
meanings were described by the Lahore High Court in one case, Syed Ijaz Husain 
alias Tahir Pir v. The State brought under section 295-B in 1992.  A Muslim putting 
the Quran in a bag with a pair of embroidered shoes lying near the accuser’s feet in 
the bus was guilty of committing blasphemy by physically disrespecting the Quran.  
Apart from the physical disrespect, he was also guilty of defiling the spiritual 
meaning of Quran by introducing himself as a Mureed, follower of a Pir or old 
person known as a master or Saint who guides and instructs followers in a sufi path: 
the perpetrator apparently claimed a book containing film songs was more sacred 
than the Holy Quran.
571
  Though, in this case, physical and spiritual aspects were 
given as the basis for prosecution under section 295-B, most cases discussed below 
concern only physical respect for the Quran in Pakistan. 
Apart from discussing the meaning of ‘defiling the Quran’ it is also necessary 
to review the word ‘damage,’ used in section 295-B in making an accusation.  The 
word ‘damage’ according to the Law Dictionary means loss or harm to person, 
property as well as reputation but in the legal sense not all forms of damage give rise 
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to a right of action.  For example, the law generally gives no compensation to the 
loss of particular material things or people that occurred accidentally, but it is 
actionable where ‘damage’ has been caused.
572
  Section 295-B does not indicate 
exactly what ‘acts of damage’ are liable to prosecution, perhaps to catch any and 
every act due to possible shortcomings in the drafting of the law.  However, 
according to some blasphemy cases discussed in the following points, section 295-B 
was used where the whole or any page of the Quran was found torn, burnt or thrown. 
In many cases, such physical damage to the Quran or parts or pages of the Quran 
have been regarded as blasphemy under section 295-B. 
Even though it is clear that 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code for defiling the 
Quran, as discussed above, is applicable either for physical or spiritual damage, such 
allegations should not be declared as blasphemy unless done ‘wilfully’ to defile or 
damage the Quran, thus maintaining the 1860 basis for guilt. 
 
5.4.2. The Meaning of ‘Wilful’ Action in Section 295-B 
‘Wilful’ action to defile the Quran is the core clause necessary for conviction on the 
grounds of the defilement or damage of the Quran under section 295-B.  According 
to the Law Dictionary, the word ‘wilfully’ means a deliberately intended act which is 
‘usually used of wrongful actions in which the conduct is intended and executed by a 
free agent.’
573
  According to the Peshawar Court: 
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Wilfully means the act of defiling, damaging and desecrating or distorting the original 
texts of the Holy Quran or part of it must be with intention to achieve a nefarious 
objective contemptuously and showing disrespect to Holy Quran which he has 
forbidding by law to do. Act to wilfully defiling, damaging and desecrating of the Holy 
Quran or part of it, would constitute the offence committed intentionally, knowingly, 
purposely for achieving the detestable objectives while in the absence of such intention, 
necessary ‘mens rea’ would be absolutely lacking and in that eventually the person 




This means that if ‘wilfully’ is accepted as essential for successful prosecution, not 
every incorrect physical or spiritual action or act can be regarded as blasphemy.  For 
example, a Muslim who reads the Quran badly, or drops the copy of Quran by 
accident without any malicious intention of defiling the text, should not be held 
guilty of blasphemy.  In one case before the new law came in, Ubaid Ullah, a Muslim 
was found throwing a booklet entitled Nizam Mutarajjam on the ground and 
trampling it on 6
th
 April 1982.  He was accused under section 295-B in Bahawalpur, 
Punjab of defiling a copy of the Quran.  Ubaid denied the allegations and said in his 
defence that on the day of the incident some unknown persons had given him 
cigarette filled with charas, a drug which made him senseless, and they put the 
booklet in his pocket.  After thorough examination in court, it was declared that the 
statement of the accused seemed both reasonable and plausible and the record of the 
accused revealed that he was absolutely illiterate and had no reason to carry the 
booklet.  On these grounds it was held that the accused had not committed 
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Likewise, in another case a Qadiani, Muzaffer Iqbal was accused when it was 
reported that a copy of the Quran was desecrated in the Mosque in Sanghar and 
Muzaffer was standing near the Mosque.  In 1993, the judge set the case aside by 
declaring that Section 295-B applied to the circumstances and he thus had no 
jurisdiction in the matter as the initial report was filed under section 295 for defiling 
a sacred place of worship rather than under section 295-B for defiling the Quran.  
The case was dismissed.
576
 
The above cases clearly reveal that without wilful intention of defiling the 
Quran an accusation cannot be maintained under section 295-B but cases have been 
successfully tried where such intention is present.  For example, Muhammad Asghar 
and Zafar Mehmood, two Muslim accused, were prosecuted under section 295-B 
when they burnt the Holy Quran along with other Islamic books in Lahore on 20
th
 
October 1999.  It was declared that they were aware of the sanctity of the Quran and 
yet intentionally committed the act which is liable to be accused section 295-B.
577
 
There are some notable points in the above cases such as how the judiciary 
deals with cases and how people bring accusations.  The first two cases clearly show 
that people can easily misunderstand what is sacred or not and in what condition 
anyone can be said to defile a copy or sacred pages of the Quran.  It also reveals that 
merely being in the vicinity can lead to prosecution, such as the Qadiani (an Ahmadi) 
standing nearby the mosque.  There are two areas of concern here.  Firstly, while the 
latter case was thrown out, that depends on the attitude and might one say the 
integrity of the judge, not on the actual law, and thus not all accused people may be 
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treated fairly.  Secondly, and just as important, in many cases people do not wait for 
the judicial verdict as to whether a certain act has been done or not, or even if there is 
merely suspicion: they, the mob take the law into their own hands, judge and then act 
as discussed later in the chapter. 
 
5.4.3. The Prosecution on Suspicion under Section 295-B and Mob 
Violence 
Historically social protest and mob violence over religious issues have occurred in 
the Punjab province as discussed earlier. Such patterns of mob protest have been 
revived by blasphemy accusations which resulted in riots, protest and violence.  
Though all religious communities are equally vulnerable to accusation, given the 
unclear meaning of section 295-B, minorities such as Christians, Hindus and 
Ahmadis have been punished by the mob, their places of worship, religious books 
and other property belonging to them damaged.  The most critical examples can be 
seen where section 298-B and the execution of the law falls into the hands of local 
communities. 
Whether unintentional or wilful, it is useful to see how easily accusations under 
295-B became explosive and where the merest suspicion of defiling the Quran is 
enough to punish the supposed miscreant.  For example, on 11
th
 November 1995, 
Yousaf Masih, a Christian resident of Sangla Hill, was accused of burning a few 
pages of the Quran, charged and arrested by local police.  Even though he had been 
arrested and the case was under inquiry, the Christian community of Sangla Hill in 
the Nankana District in Punjab Pakistan experienced the effects of this ‘blasphemy’ 
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defilement accusation on the following day, when a mob burnt down three churches, 
a missionary run school, two hostels, and several houses belonging to the Christian 
community.
578
  According to the National Commission of Peace and Justice (NCP), 
which provided legal add to the accused, 88 Muslims were arrested on charges of 
taking the law into their own hands and damaging the Christian community.
579
  
According to the commission, the matter was first brought up to the Session Court, 
referred to as an Anti Terror Court.  The complainant testified in the court that he had 
accused Yousaf on a mere suspicion.
580
  This kind of incident illustrates the 
problematic application of the law where punishment for defiling the Quran has been 
inflicted on the Christian community that had nothing to do with it, without a trial, 
much less a conviction. 
One of the most critical and sensitive examples can be seen where any page on 
the ground with Arabic text is assumed to be Quranic, resulting in an accusation of 
defilement easily made against any local, usually a non-Muslim.  It is important to 
make clear that before asking whether an act represents the religious offence of 
defiling the Quran, there has been a clear tendency for local Muslims to make 
announcements from mosques to incite followers to judge the accused, usually from 
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a minority, with dramatic and often violent consequences.  The following is a typical 
example of the process. 
Near and in Gojra, Punjab on August 2009, an incident targeted the Christian 
community.  According to the case, Imran Aslam, a local Muslim cleric, and his two 
followers first alleged that three Christians, Mukhtar Masih, Talib Masih and his son, 
Imran Masih, had defiled sheets of paper inscribed with Arabic verses of the Quran 
by throwing them up in the air during a wedding.  However, other accounts of the 
situation state that children were celebrating by throwing papers in the air that, again 
according to the accuser’s claim, were bits and pieces of pages of the Quran.  
According to Inkisar Khan, District Police Officer, this blasphemy case was 
registered under section 295-B for defiling the Quran.  The allegations were not 
investigated by the police and no evidence was ever found as to whether pages of the 
Quran were actually thrown or not.
581
  After the accusation, the local cleric spoke 
through loudspeakers and asked Muslims to attack Christians instead of waiting for 
the proper trial.  Mostly Christian residents therefore fled to safety.  Later, a group of 
masked men, armed with firearms and explosives, came from Jhang to lead the 
violence against Christians on the pretext of their having defiled the Holy Quran.
582
  
According to Rafiq Masih, a local resident, ‘they were shouting anti-Christian 
slogans and attacking our houses’ while the uncontrollable mob went on a violent 
rampage.
583
  Approximately forty houses and a church were set on fire by a mob.  
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The most shocking outcome of this incident was that eight innocent Christians, 
including two children and an elderly man, were burnt to death.
584
 
In this blasphemy case it was not clear whether the papers were really inscribed 
with verses of the Quran and thrown up in the air during a wedding or whether 
children were celebrating simply by throwing papers in the air which were assumed 
to be scraps or pages of the Quran.  However, it is clear that the blasphemy 
accusation under section 295-B radically disadvantaged the Christian minority which 
is vulnerable to lynch-justice in the absence of effective rights and protection.  
Whether or not the case is dealt with in the courts, the existence of 295-B seems to 
incite those opposed to minorities to take direct action. 
There is no doubt that section 295-B has been misused by accusers, by mobs, 
and even by the judiciary (who usually strive to stay above the fray) and has changed 
the application of religious offences and the legal history of Pakistan.  The actual 
meaning of defiling and damaging the Quran with ‘wilful’ intention is totally ignored 
and rarely used beyond making an accusation – if the process reaches that level of 
formality.  Before analysing the implications of this statement, it is important to see 
the effect on religious freedom of expression and practice, a serious issue under 
section 295-C of Chapter XV which prescribes the death sentence for those who 
defile the name of Prophet Muhammad. 
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5.5. Section 295-C 
Whoever by word, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any 
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or 
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Generally, defiling the name of the Prophet is offensive for Muslims to whom the 
Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet as well as the bearer of the final revelation of 
Allah.  Anyone is liable to be punished with death who ‘defiles’ the name of the 
Prophet Muhammad in various conditions such as ‘by word, either spoken or written, 
or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly 
or indirectly’ as described in section 295-C. 
For example, ‘innuendo’ means an oblique allusion, hint or insinuation, 
particularly a veiled or equivocal reflection on character or reputation by using such 
allusions.  In law, it means ‘an indirect hint or remark’ used in lawsuits for 
defamation (libel or slander), usually to show that the party suing was the person 
about whom the insulting statements were made or to make clear why the comments 
were defamatory.
585
  Another word in section 295-C - ‘insinuation’ - generally gives 
a similar meaning such as an indirect sly expression, subtle, and usually derogatory 
utterance or suggestion.
586
  Regarding the meaning of terms used in section 295-C, it 
can be said that any hint, doubt, imagination, or statement of a single witness who 
has seen an incident either directly or indirectly can bring punishments on those who 
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are thereby assumed to have made an utterance in contempt of the Holy Prophet.  
The Federal Shariat Court gives a definition of blasphemy law: 
Reviling or insulting the Prophet (peace be upon him) in writing or speech; speaking 
profanity or contemptuously about him or his family; attacking the prophet’s dignity 
and honour in an abusive manner; vilifying him or making an ugly face when his name 
is mentioned’ showing enmity or hatred towards him, his family, his companions and 
the Muslims; accusing or slandering the prophet and his family, defaming the prophet, 
refusing the prophet’s jurisprudence or judgment in any matter; rejecting the Sunnah al-
Nabawiyya; showing disrespect, contempt for or rejection of the rights of Allah and His 
prophet or rebelling against Allah and His prophet.
587
 
Though such conditions can bring various accusations other than that of blasphemy, 
the crucial issue regards the death sentence for any gesture even if it is done 
unintentionally.  Prescribing the death sentence under section 295-C was initially 
debated and discussed in the National Assembly but was not a foregone conclusion 
and only passed into law in 1986.  The death penalty has later generated a lot of 
discussion in Pakistani media, mainly revolving around whether the punishment of 
death is justified in light of Islamic injunctions.
588
  Let us consider the background to 
the debate over the death sentence given under section 295-C. 
 
5.5.1. The Discussion over the Death Sentence and Life Imprisonment 
and the Issue of ‘Intention’ in Section 295-C 
In 1983-4, Ismail Qureshi campaigned to enact section 295-C which was later 
applied in 1986 with the death sentence for defiling the name of the Prophet.  Later 
he attempted to move the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) to make further changes to 
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section 295-C such as reviewing the death sentence and clarifying the proof of an 
intention for accusation of blasphemy in 1991.  He clearly mentioned his assumption 
of the misuse of the law in future when he said: 
In my opinion, it is absolutely necessary to further amend section 295-C so as to bring it 
in harmony with the Quran and Sunna. Otherwise if this section stands in its present 
form, there is a danger of it giving birth to ambiguity and legal complications. Quran 
and Sunna have laid down certain conditions for hadd and tazir punishments. Islam 




Qureshi also insisted that evidence of tazkiat ush-shahood (purity of the witnesses) 
should have been held essential for the legal prosecution.  Some ulema appointed to 
discuss the death sentence, argued that blasphemy was a forgivable offence and some 
even said that the ruler could award a lesser punishment than death.
590
  Various 
references were discussed, where it was stated that the Prophet himself had condoned 
the killing of those who offended him.  Some contra-references were also given 
where the companions of the Prophet, Khulfa-e-Rashdeen killed such people who 
had defiled the name of the Prophet.
591
 
The council relied on the Quran Surah Anfal verse 13 ‘That is because they 
opossed Allah and His Messenger and whoever opposes Allah and His Messenger—
indeed, Allah is severe in Penalty and Surah al-Nisa verse 65 ‘But no, by your Lord, 
they will not [truly] believe until they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning 
that over which they dispute among themselves and then find within themselves no 
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discomfort from what you have judged and submit in [full, willing] submission.’  
The council also relied on some traditions of the Prophet called Hadith in support of 
his pleas that only a sentence of death is the appropriate punishment and no court 
should be given the authority to pronounce the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.  
Efforts were made to discuss and even change the sentence but those forwarding the 
debate withdrew their opposition.
592
 
Amid the argument over the death sentence, the omission of the crucial legal 
ingredient of ‘intention’ from the code has been debated.  While the various 
references given by all the judges and lawyers, the central question is whether 
blasphemy under section 295-C could be committed intentionally or unintentionally.  
Qureshi notes that in the discussion on intentional prosecution, Muhammad Tahir-ul-
Qadir, one of the best-known politicians and religious scholars in the Federal Shariat 
Court, not only supported the death sentence in section 295-C but also argued that 
‘the intention and the motive of the offender are irrelevant and cannot be taken into 
consideration while deciding the case [and] a blasphemer must not be given an 
opportunity of a hearing to prove his intention and motive in his defence.’
593
  Ismail 
Qureshi argued, following the Hadith of the Prophet advising Hazarat Ali when 
appointing a Judge of Yaman to ‘decide the cases after hearing both parties’ [as] 
‘according to Islamic injunctions an accused person has the right to defend himself 
and no one could be condemned unheard.’
594
  Qureshi noted some of the traditions of 
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the Prophet that ‘certainly all actions are to be judged by intention.’
595
  Even 
‘Hudood punishments should be avoided where there is doubt.’
596
 
The FSC discussed the importance of ‘intention’ and, as discussed in the case 
of Qureshi v the State, how it plays a role in convicting the blasphemer.  It was 
declared that ‘the mere fact that words uttered sounded contemptuous of the Prophet 
is not an offence until it is based on malicious action.’
597
  In some of the jurists’ 
opinion, if contempt for the Prophet has been expressed ‘in words [either spoken and 
written] the contemnor will not be asked what was his intention but if the words are 
such which bear or have the capacity of bearing different meanings and senses out of 
which only one amounts to contempt, he will be asked as to what was his 
‘intention.’
598
  Some even discussed that the meaning and import of words in 
different regions and contexts may also suggest different meaning, so that an accused 
must be allowed an opportunity to explain lest an innocent person is punished.  It is 
related to the tradition of the Prophet saying that: ‘The mistake of qazi (judge) in 
releasing a criminal is better than his mistake in punishing an innocent.’
599
 
Some Quranic references were also mentioned to support the argument to 
provide evidence in blasphemy accusation, such as ‘there is no sin for you in the 
mistakes that ye make unintentionally, but what your hearts purpose (that will be a 
sin for you), Allah is forgiving, merciful’ (Q. 33.5).  Likewise, ‘anyone who, after 
accepting faith in Allah, utters unbelief, except under compulsion, His heart 
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remaining firm in faith but such as open their breast to unbelief, on them is Wrath 
from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty’ (Q. 16:106).
600
 
It is also significant to note the legislature’s discussions regarding the tradition 
of the Prophet in relation to dealing with non-Muslims and their subjects in Islamic 
territory.  For example, Islamic principles of justice were expressed such as Islam 
does not advocate aggression, extremism and injustice to others or killing innocent 
people.  It is a religion of peace (Salamah) and moderation in every aspect of life as 
described in the Quran (2:143): ‘Thus we have appointed Muslims a midmost nation 
that you might be witness to mankind.’
601
  Likewise, one of the references was 
mentioned: ‘We believe in Allah and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, 
Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus and that given 
to the Prophet from their Lord. We make no difference between one another of them; 
and we bow to Allah’ (Q. 2:136).
602
  Significantly, various scholars were agreed that 
minorities should be given equal status and should be protected where necessary.  In 
view of the above discussion, it can be clearly seen that many scholars and lawyers 
as well as many members of the Government Assembly were not fully in favour of 
the death sentence, many supporting and declaring ‘intention’ as an important 
judicial element for blasphemy prosecution. 
Despite these various arguments, it was declared that the alternate punishment 
of life imprisonment as provided in section 295-C was ‘repugnant to the Injunctions 
of Islam as given in Holy Quran and Sunnah.’
603
  It was suggested that a section may 
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further be added ‘to make the same acts or things when said about other Prophets.’
604
 
A copy was sent to the President of Pakistan under Article 203-D to take steps to 
amend the law so as ‘to bring the same conformity with the injunctions of Islam.’
605
  
The government could have filed an appeal to challenge the decision but it did not 
and, according to the upheld judgment, ‘the penalty for contempt of the Holy 
Prophet…is death and nothing else…no one after the Holy Prophet…exercised or 
was authorised the right of reprieve or pardon.’
606
  An offence committed under 
section 295-C has been regarded as hadd which means no one can change or amend 
it as it is a commandment of Allah.  This means that neither the courts nor the 
government have an obligation or capacity to reduce or do away with the penalty 
imposed by law of Hudood.
607
 
Not only the death sentence and failure to consider intention in section 295-C 
was upheld but also section 295-A, a clause added by British in 1927 that originally 
prescribed punishment of two years and fine for outraging the feelings of any class, 
was also edited.  Its punishment was amended from ‘two’ years to ‘ten’ years by the 
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, XVI of 1991.
608
  As discussed earlier in the 
chapter, Qureshi challenged the two years of sentence under section 295-A as not 
enough for those who defile the name of the Prophet or subsequently other Prophets 
such as Jesus Christ.  Though it can be claimed that Pakistan protects other religions 
under section 295-A, in practice it has been rarely used in Pakistan to protect 
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minorities especially Ahmadis as discussed in the fourth chapter.  After the 1990s, 
this section was rarely used to protect Christian and Hindu communities, as we shall 
see below. 
It is clear that the death sentence is the final verdict for defiling the name of the 
Prophet under section 295-C which is and will be hard to repeal, even though the fact 
that under section 295-C, unintentional acts also deserve death for anyone, including 
Muslims, threatens all religious communities.  Subsequently the law has been 
debated by national and human rights activists and by representatives of the minority 
religious communities of Pakistan who have regarded it as a threat to religious 
expression as well as freedom, not to mention an issue of life and death, especially 
where the context of the law is misunderstood as discussed below.  Yet despite 
intention being omitted from section 295-C, the judiciary, particularly the High 
Court, has endeavoured to test the evidence and released many who were mistakenly 
accused.  Upon the approval of the death sentence, and given the omission of 
intention, registrations of blasphemy cases under section 295-C increased, and 
became another tool to harass and persecute all religious communities and citizens of 
Pakistan.  Let us now examine section 295-C as far as it pertains to the major 
ingredient, offensive ‘writing or speech.’ 
 
5.5.2. The Meaning of Defiling the Prophet in Speech and Writing in 
Section 295-C 
According to section 295-C, anyone can be prosecuted for blasphemy who defiles the 
Prophet Muhammad by word, either spoken or written, or by visible representation.  
232 
 
The words described in section 295-A, applied by the British in 1927, ‘by words, 
either spoken or written, or by visible representation’ have been adopted and added 
to section 295-C.  The question arises whether section 295-C has the same meaning 
and therefore application as 295-A.  In section 295-A, ‘words’ covers an attempt to 
write a book or to voice a religious opinion but the offensive speech and writing must 
have been done with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious 
feelings of any religious class of citizens.
609
  ‘Outrageous and malicious attention’ 
was added to section 295-A to prosecute written books such as Rangila Rasool and 
Trip to Hell that actually offended the Muslim community of Punjab province in 
British India in the 1920s as discussed in the second chapter.  From 1947, in some 
cases section 295-A was successfully used for any offensive ‘words, either written or 
spoken,’ lest they should insult through malicious intention as discussed in the fourth 
chapter.  New sections by and large contain the same description as they were 
recorded in Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ of 1860.  For example, 
offensive speech, opinion or publication clearly fall under section 295-C just as 
under 295-A: publications or speeches which critique the Prophet’s life, such as 
challenging and changing the meaning of the rasalat, prophethood and toheed, 
believing in one God, in Islamic belief and similar themes are offensive in both 




It is clear that section 295-A is now effectively in abeyance, and the question 
arises concerning the execution of 295-C, which is the only section in Chapter XV 
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that does not include any reference to ‘intention’ in connection with defiling the 
name of the Prophet Muhammad.  Given this omission, the prosecution of offensive 
writing and speech under section 295-C after 1986 became highly contested. 
First, it is important to view how religious freedom, discussions and speeches 
were gradually discouraged and later became vulnerable to accusation for blasphemy 
under section 295-C.  Let us examine the first case where a Christian, Daniel Scot, 
from Punjab, a student at Islamia College Guru Mandir Karachi, had already had 
difficulties when speaking about his faith in the 1960s.  Daniel had entered into 
debate with Ahmadi students who criticised both him and Jesus, and responded by 
criticizing the founder of the Ahmadiyya sect.  As a result, approximately 25 students 
gathered to harm him, but he was saved when a professor intervened.  Daniel was 
accused in 1969 by Muslim students of being an American spy propagating a 
Western religion.
611
  Before the 1986 amendments, though Christians or other 
minorities came under pressure for expressing religious matters, religious 
controversies were still controllable without violence. 
However, in later years his speech and words on religion were to be turned into 
‘blasphemy’ when he started teaching at Government Degree College Okara, Punjab 
in 1986.  He was asked what he thought about the Quran and he answered by giving 
differences between the Bible and the Quran concluding that both could not have had 
the same source.  In response he was asked to give up preaching Christianity and 
convert to Islam which he refused to do.  Later, a case was registered under the 
newly passed section 295-C and later the First Information Report (FIR) was 
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registered on 24/26 September 1986.
612
  In response to this, he and his family hid in 
various places and he eventually fled to Australia.  This first case was on the basis of 
making derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad, which he was said to 
have done.  Thus not only were he and others discouraged from general dialoguing 
with their Muslim neighbours, but the application of the law prevented him from 
being open about his faith.
613
  It is also important to mention that according to the 
1860 previous section 298, utterances made during the course of religious discussion 
or argument could not be constituted as religious offence unless based on threatening 
or insulting language.  There was no legal clarification of any malicious intention to 
wound the feelings of Muslims in this early example of the prosecution of religious 
discussion or personal opinion, which may not intentionally have insulted the 
Prophet under section 295-C. 
Apart from religious expression or speech, it is also important to see how 
writing was judged offensive under section 295-C.  For example, in 1988, in another 
early case, Emmanuel Luther, sub-editor of the daily ‘Jhang’ newspaper of Lahore, 
was accused of committing blasphemy under 295-C for using insulting remarks 
about the Prophet Muhammad, about whom he had earlier written a book in English, 
‘A Lamp Spreading Light’ and been given an award for it by Zia ul-Haq.  Some 
Muslim clerics later claimed that Emmanuel used derogatory remarks about the 
Prophet and Islam in the Urdu translation of the book.
614
  The writing of Emmanuel 
Luther could have been prosecuted under section 295-A, which is still on the statute 
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book although in abeyance after section 295-C.  Luther was threatened and urged to 
convert to Islam, which he refused.  Initially after the allegation, he was forced to 
leave his job and hid in different places.  A Muslim, Maulana Abdul Rehman Luter, 
was killed in Gujranwala, in mistake for Emmanuel Luther, who then went into exile 
and did not return to Pakistan to see his family again.
615
  This and other examples 
illustrate how religious communities and individuals became vulnerable if they 
discussed Islam even if their writing was not obviously offensive.  One of the crucial 
issues was that accusation of blasphemy created a climate and led people to declare 
an accused guilty without hearing his/her case.  This and other early examples of the 
1986 amendment shows the changed milieu, very different from the period when the 
accused had a proper trial to review offensive books in Pakistan as discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Some case studies show that the use of ‘writing and speech’ on any surface, 
papers or walls could be used as the basis for an accusation.  Such prosecuting of 
‘writing and speech’ not only changed the mode of prosecution but also the 
procedure of the trial, the liberty of courts and lawyers as well as bringing extra-
judicial judgments from society.  One important case which received national and 
international attention, in which 13-year old Salamat Masih was sentenced to death 








 Salamat was also convicted under section 298-A for insulting the family of the Prophet, however 
throughout the trial his conviction under section 295-C with death penalty was mostly discussed. 
Salamat Masih v. The State, (1995) 28 P. Cr. J. 813 (Lahore). 
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According to the case, Salamat Masih v. the State, three accused, Salamat 
Masih, aged 13, and 37-year old Manzoor Masih, both residents of Ratta Thodran, 
and 48-year old Rehmat Masih, resident of Phokarpur, District Gujranwala, were 





It was also reported that objectionable words about the Prophet were discovered 
written in the mosque’s toilet and after some time a piece of paper containing 
‘derogatory words about the Holy Prophet’ was thrown at the door of the mosque.  
After some days, offensive words were written in another mosque on a poster 
displaying a Kalima Tayyiba.
618
  The complainants: Fazal-e-Haq, an imam of the 
mosque, along with witnesses Haji Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Bakhsh 
Lamberdar, claimed to have seen all the offensive acts.  Though the case was filed at 






Salamat’s statement in his defence was recorded in which he denied all 
allegations imposed on him.  He denied writing anything on the wall of the mosque, 
as he was illiterate, and said the case had been filed because of his quarrel with 
Mujahid, a nephew of Muhammad Akram, one of the witnesses of the case.
620
  
Likewise, Rehmat Masih also denied the allegations and gave an explanation of why 
he was accused of blasphemy: Master Inayat, a teacher and resident of Kot Ladha, 
had refused to teach Christian children and complained about the loud speaker in the 
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church and its effect on his students.  He further stated that he respects all religions 
and refused to produce any further evidence in his defence.
621
 
All statements concerning the blasphemy allegations of the case were discussed 
in the trial.  Before any verdict was passed on the accused, on 5
th
 April 1994 three 
armed men attacked them after a hearing of the case they were leaving the district 
and session court.  Manzoor Masih died on the spot, but Salamat and Rehmat were 
injured.  Though Manzoor Masih’s case was closed with his sudden death, Salamat 
and Rehmat’s trial continued. 
Haji Fazal-e-Haq, a complainant and the first witness in the blasphemy case, 
stated that his allegation of blasphemy was correct but that he did not wish to pursue 
the case, fearing for his life, although not directly from the accused.
622
  Likewise, the 
second witness, Muhammad Akram, described the blasphemy incident, saying that 
he, along with Muhammad Fazal-e-Haq and Muhammad Bakhsh, had seen Salamat 
Masih writing offensive words on the wall with a stone while the other two were 
standing nearby.  He further stated they read those words written on the wall by the 
accused but refused to express the words to keep the sanctity of the prophet.  Even 
though he did not say those words, he admitted that the local cleric Fazal-e-Haq had 
wiped out those sentences, which contain five or six words, with a piece of cloth.  He 
also claimed that ‘unknown persons used to throw chits in the toilets’ but no action 
was taken as it was not known who was behind these acts. During cross examination, 
he agreed he first mentioned the chits two days after registering the case.
623
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The third witness, Muhammad Bakhsh, gave the same story under examination 
of how he, along with Fazal-e-Haq and Muhammad Akram, saw all three accused 
writing remarks on the wall.  He also said that he could not speak those words out of 
respect for the prophet Muhammad.
624
 He admitted that two chits with offensive 
words that were found in the Mosque’s toilet were produced by Fazal-e-Haq before 
the police in his presence.  In the cross-examination regarding the quarrel of Salamat 
Masih with Mujahid, he insisted the blasphemy accusation was not linked to religion 
or to a quarrel as stated by the accused, that Mujahid, his nephew, had no dispute 
with Salamat, who was not illiterate.  He also rejected Rehamat’s evidence that 
Master Inayat had refused to teach Christian children as well as stated that there had 




The fourth witness, the police officer Aman Ulla Khan, stated that he 
investigated the case on the basis of and after the registration of the FIR and kept two 
chits in his possession.  Like the first three witnesses, he also said that written words 
on the wall were not readable.  Notably, the most important question was raised 
whether anyone can be convicted for blasphemy under section 295-C if the accuser 
out of reverence for the Prophet, refused to read or say the derogatory remarks said 
or written by the accused.  After reviewing all statements given by the four witnesses 
and not finding enough evidence, Asma Jahangir, council for the appellants, stated 
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that: The case against the accused was false and frivolous and the court suffered from 
several flaws.  She elaborated that: 
The first complainant, Fazal-e-Haq, stated on oath that he did not want to pursue the 
case and was declared hostile on the ground of intentionally suppressing the truth. In 
cross-examination...he was a hostile witness and his statement lost all its evidentiary 
value... He stated nothing in the court regarding the occurrence concerning writing on 
the wall or the production of the chits..., therefore his evidence was of no value... There 
is a serious contradiction between the versions of the P.W2 and P.W.3 [Witnesses].  
P.W.2 stated that Salamat Masih was writing something of the wall with a stone. 
Rehmat Masih and Manzoor Masih were also standing there. While P.W3 Muhammad 
Bakhsh stated that Salamat Masih, Rehmat Masih and Manzoor Masih were writing on 
the wall with stones in their hands. It is a serious contradiction between the versions of 
two eye-witnesses which makes their evidence doubtful and unreliable... they have said 
nothing with regard to the offence under section 295-C and 298-A, P.P.C... 
[Objectionable] words were not reproduced and stated in court by witnesses. The 
impressions and opinions of these witnesses cannot be made the basis for a judicial 
finding under the law. With regard to chits...the prosecution has failed to prove that 
these were written by the appellants or recovered from them or had any connection 
whatsoever.  This objectionable material was kept...for a year and was produced for first 
time on 11-5-93 at the police station...after two days of the occurrence...
626
 
It is critical to note that the Judge declared the sentence of death on Salamat and 
Rehmat with the following words: 
He had no doubt from the overall appraisal of the evidence that in fact the accused had 
written objectionable material to defile the sacred name of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) on 
account of minor disputes. He further stated that if the stone with which the words were 
written on the wall or the cloth—with which the words were wiped off –was not taken 
into possession, it did not have any effect on the prosecution. Salamat had specifically 
stated that he was illiterate but a judicial notice of School Leaving Certificate was 
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Mujahid Husain Shiekh, the Additional Sessions Judge, declared the death sentence 
on Salamat (at that time only 14 years old) and Rehmat, under section 295-C on 9
th
 
February 1995.  The judgement shook the nation, particularly minorities, and it was 
realised that anyone even young children can be awarded with death sentence. 
On 13
th
 February 1995, the case was filed for appeal at Lahore High Court.  
Justice Muhammad Ilyas, the chief Justice of Lahore High Court, heard the appeal.
628
  
The High Court declared all witnesses as ‘unreliable’ and announced a review of the 
case, after which it declared that there are ‘serious contradictions which reflect on the 
veracity of these witnesses and makes their statements doubtful’ especially when 
there is no evidence of exactly what the objectionable words were on the wall about 
the Prophet Muhammad.
629
  It was noted that those words, which according to 
witnesses were insulting, were rubbed off by the accuser and never described clearly 
throughout the blasphemy trial.
630
  Seven lawyers present before the High Court 
argued that the case the appellants were convicted of was founded on baseless 
evidence.  They also criticized the negligence of the lower judicial authorities for 
declaring a blasphemy death punishment on such uncertain evidence.
631
  Most 
importantly, it was discussed whether if a Muslim cannot repeat aloud any 
blasphemous words about the Prophet when it is required by the court, what kind of 
evidence would be required in future blasphemy cases?  Here it is important to see 
though although section 295-C does not include intention the courts still struggled to 
investigate the evidence on the basis of something very close to intention.  Advocate 
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Abid Hassan Minto, senior advocate of the bench, referred to the principles of 
Criminal Jurisprudence, saying that according to Qanoon-e-Shahadat, the law of 
evidence: 
The court decision must rest upon a legal grounds established by legal testimony. The 
prosecution must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the benefits of doubt 
had to go to the accused as in Islamic Law he is presumed to be innocent... the evidence 
should direct and the circumstances corroborating the evidence must be cogent.
632
 
Apart from the written words on the wall, the court also observed that the offensive 
writing, on chits found in the mosque’s toilet, was indeed offensive but was 
apparently planted by some person motivated to bring or to investigate the case.  
Advocate Sultan Ahmad referred to the investigating agencies such as police and 





 February 1995, the Lahore High Court set aside the death sentence for 
blasphemy imposed on Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih as the prosecution had 
failed to prove the charge.  The lower court, while accepting the appeal, declared that 
‘we will be successful in the eye of Allah and his Prophet. We are sure our decision 
is in accordance with the principles of the prophet’s teachings.’
634
 
Salamat and Rehmat were free at last – yet they continued to receive threats.  
The religious organisation Ahl-e-Sunnat, announced a price of million rupees while 
another religious party, Mutthida Ulema of Sarghodha, offered 300,000 rupees for 
killing them.
635
  It was clear that Salamat and Rehmat could not live in Pakistan even 
though they had been freed by the High Court.  Their families were forced to leave 
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the village and settle elsewhere.  Salamat and Rehmat, fled the country, finding 
asylum in Germany to this day. 
Not only the accused but also their legal advisor Asma Jahangir was threatened 
and Iqbal Bhati, the senior member of the High Court, continued to receive threats 
after acquitting Salamat and Rehmat, and was later murdered for his judgement on 
10 October 1997.
636
  This murder shows the risk of handling blasphemy cases by 
session courts and lawyers.  The critical events of this case such as the murder of 
Judge Bhatti and of the accused, Manzoor during the trial, the serious threats and 
injuries to Salamat and Rehmat, and the uncertain justice meted out to and the 
insecurity of religious communities led the National Assembly of Pakistan to debate 
the issue.  Supreme Court Justice Dorab Patel (also Chairman of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan) declared that the blasphemy law should be amended as it 
contributes to religious fanaticism.  Before he could finish his statement, a Sunni 
Muslim shouted, ‘Anyone who commits blasphemy will meet the fate of Manzoor 
Masih.’
637
  This indicates that any comment such as reforming the law for protecting 
minorities can fall under the catch-all of ‘blasphemy:’ all who oppose it must live 
with insecurity and anxiety. 
Like the case of Salamat Masih, many other cases reveal similar applications of 
the law where ‘writing and speech’ is not actually proper writing, publication or 
speech: the mere suspicion that something offensive has been written can risks 
anyone’s life.  For example, an incident in Okara, Punjab shows how the use of 
‘word’ in section 295-C can be misunderstood.  According to the case, a Muslim and 
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five Christian boys who used medicine to treat the wound of a donkey which then 
streamed into different shapes were accused of writing holy names on the donkey in 
2001.
638
  Though these boys were later released from the jail even the donkey was 
also detained briefly for examination: this is where blind application of the law can 
end, where shapes resembling words can put even children’s lives at risk. 
In several cases, the meaning of ‘writing and speech’ has gone beyond reason 
or propriety, and may not even be offered as evidence in accusations of blasphemy, 
the accusation being based on different reasons such as conversion or personal 
enmity.  For example, converts run a high risk of a blasphemy accusation, which is 
an alternative way of disciplining converts given that Pakistan does not have an 
apostasy law, meaning it is still generally legal to convert from one religion to 
another.  Converts may be accused of blasphemous speech against the Prophet.
639
  
For example, in one such case, 33 years old Tahir Iqbal was accused of blasphemy 
after his conversion to Christianity in December 1990 in Lahore from Islam.  After 
his conversion, his family broke any relationship with him and he began receiving 
threats.
640
  On 7
th
 December 1990 he was arrested by Peerzada Ali Ahmad Sabir, a 
local cleric, on blasphemy charges under section 295-C in Kotlakhpat, Lahore.  
Patrick Sookhdeo records an accusation: 
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Iqbal had converted from Islam to Christianity; that while coaching Muslim children 
free of charge he would criticise Islam; that he claimed that he could prove from the 
Quran that ‘illicit intercourse, drinking and sodomy are justified in Islam;’ that he had 
prepared a list of various chapters and verses in the Quran and marked and underlined 
those passages in the Quran; and finally that he had abused Islam and Muhammad.
641
 
The witnesses in Tahir’s case were teenage Muslim boys: Izhar ul-Haq, Dil 
Muhammad and Maqsood Ahmad.  Izhar claimed that Tahir’s behaviour was un-
Islamic therefore he committed blasphemy.  In the beginning of the trial, Tahir did 
not receive legal assistance and no lawyer was ready to defend his case; however, 
later the Human Rights commission took this case.  Asma Jahangir, who helped, was 
threatened by Sabir, a cleric who warned her that she could face ‘dire consequences 
if [she] continued to defend Tahir.’
642
  Tahir faced his trial in the court of Fakhar 
Hayat Chaudrey and an additional session judge in Lahore and pleaded not guilty.  
However, Tahir’s application for bail was rejected by the session court and a 
subsequent appeal for bail was also rejected by Lahore High Court.  In April 1992, it 
was reported that he was in a critical condition in the Kotlakhpat jail, Lahore.  On 
23
rd
 April, an application was given to the additional session court of Sabah 
Mohayiuddin requesting Tahir’s death sentence for converting to Christianity.  The 
Court rejected the application as there was no law or code against conversion. 
On 21
st
 June 1992, Tahir’s lawyer was not present to defend him in the court, 
and on the same day he told his councillors that his life was in danger and that he 
was receiving threats.  On 1
st
 June, he posted letters to the president, chief minister 
and Inspector general, police stating that he feared he would be murdered in the jail.  
The day before his next hearing in the court, Tahir died in the jail on 21
st
 July.  
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Neither the court nor his councillors were officially informed about his death, having 
to read about it in the newspapers.  Jail authorities claimed that he died after a 
protracted illness: Christian leaders and community suspected that he was murdered.  
Naeem Shakir, a lawyer, noted that he probably was poisoned just before his 
scheduled appearance in Sessions Court.
643
  However, the prison authorities refused 
to accept this charge of murder.  His funeral was done according to Islamic faith and 
he was buried in Faisalabad in a Muslim graveyard.  According to sections 297, it is 
a religious offence to bury a Christian in a Muslim graveyard.  However, the 
Christian community was mostly silent on the claim that the accused was a Christian 
and that they therefore had the right to bury him according to Christian custom. 
In reviewing this case, it can be said the accusation was simply based on the 
issue of conversion which was turned into blasphemy for punishment.  Tahir’s 
neighbour, Muhammad Saleem said that ‘Tahir was an intelligent and good person. 
His only offence was his conversion.’
644
  Naeem Shakir, a Pakistani lawyer, notes 
that ‘conversion from Islam to Christianity in itself is an offence.’
645
  However, the 
second crime, blasphemy, became a greater charge.
646
 
Continuing the discussion to review how offensive ‘words either written or 
spoken’ can bring prosecution under section 295-C, there are numerous underlying 
issues which can put any innocent person at risk of a blasphemy accusation. For 
example, it has been noticed by the judiciary that economic and poverty issues may 
lead to a person targeted for their job, land or property dispute if accused of 
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  Historically, economic prejudice was seen on a political level when 
Hindus of East Pakistan and Ahmadis in West Pakistan were forbidden to lead 
governing offices as discussed earlier.  Such tension became a religious slogan to 
remove them from their offices and prevented these minorities from enjoying full 
social and economic status.  Historically, some Christians who worked as farm 
labourers for Muslim, Sikh and Hindu landlords also migrated to Pakistan with their 
employers after independence, to whom they remained in some subjection.
648
  For 
many indigenous local village Christians employed as labourers by landowning 
Sikhs, partition also brought hardship as Muslims replaced them as a workforce.
649
  
In addition, previous caste influence and background disadvantaged many Christians 
from gaining new employment during resettlement,
650
 forcing most to adopt their 
traditional job of sweeping in the new Pakistani context.
651
  It cannot be denied that 
Christians in rural areas and large cities with the passage of time made progress 
economically. 
Resentment between Christian employees and Muslim employers and people 
mostly in rural areas has been linked to blasphemy accusations, playing an important 
role in settling economic disputes or eliminating opponents.  Though all communities 
are equally vulnerable to this threat however, the consequences surrounding an 
accusation against Christians and Ahmadis can be fatal.  For example in one of the 
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cases Ayub Masih (30) a Christian resident of Chak 353/E.B, Arifwala, Sahiwal 
district, Punjab province was sentenced to death on 27
th
 April 1998 on charges of 
blasphemy under section 295-C of PPC by a court in Sahiwal.  On 14
th
 October 
1996, Ayub Masih had been arrested following allegations made by a Muslim 
neighbour, Muhammad Akram, for hurting his religious feelings when he exalted 
Christianity, maligned Islam, uttered certain derogatory words about the Holy 
Prophet and advised the complainant to read the book, Satanic Verses, written by 
Salman Rushdie.  He was sentenced to death by the local court of Sahiwal but later 
after seven years he was found innocent and acquitted by the Supreme Court on the 
grounds that there was not enough evidence to prove the case.  It was revealed that 
there was a land dispute between the accuser and Ayub which was the main cause of 
the accusation.
652
  It is also important to note that where such an intention is present, 
even if the accused person is declared innocent and released, a person from a 
minority released in such circumstances does not come back to his land or job.  Such 
a person has a long journey to retrieve any social or economic stability they may 
have had. 
The judiciary has observed that the law of blasphemy has threatened some 
students, and even professors are at risk of being accused, whether for reading, 
discussing or delivering a lecture.  For example, in October 2000 a Muslim lecturer, 
Dr. Younas Sheikh, was accused by his students of saying that the Prophet was not 
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born a Muslim and was not a Prophet until the age of forty.  The court agreed that the 
accusation against the professor had been filed without realising that indeed there 
was a non-Muslim period in Arabia before the advent of Islam, a view which the 
student had rejected.
653
  He was found guilty and was sentenced to death on 18
th
 
August 2001 but was acquitted by Lahore High Court in November 2003.  In a letter 
he wrote from prison, he called the blasphemy law ‘wide open to abuse, through and 
by the miscreant mullahs for political, repressive and vindictive purposes…The law’s 
abuse is part of a rising wave of ignorance, incivility and intolerance as well as the 
medieval theocratic darkness.’
654
  However, in a number of cases filed under section 
295-C, similar claims have been accepted to prove blasphemy. 
The decade from the 2000s onwards brought more critical implications for 
section 295-C where the meaning of ‘speech’ even included severe punishments and 
the accusation of blasphemy for any, including Muslims, who show compassion for 
the accused, asked to forgive an accused or for repeal of the law.  For example, in 
November 2010 the death sentences of Aasia Bibi, a Christian accused, provoked a 
storm, particularly when it was argued that she should be pardoned or at least receive 
a lesser punishment than death.  One of the contemporary problems is that court and 
other legal officials are alleged of committing blasphemy, with fatal consequences, 
when they talk about the misuse of the law, a point in the next chapter. 
Today the application for the prosecution of an offence of writing and speaking 
offensively about the Prophet shows that ‘words either spoken or written’ of section 
295-C are not necessarily the basis for or cause of the accusation.  It has been argued 
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by accusers in various cases that those accused of blasphemy must be punished. 
However, the study of a considerable number of cases has revealed that victims were 
charged on spurious or questionable grounds and without intention being 
demonstrated.  This has made such judgments controversial.  Instead of protecting 
the innocent in particular and religious communities in general, the intention of 
Chapter XV maintained between 1860 and the late 1980s, the law has made it legal 
for extremists to persecute and even kill at will.  There is thus a very limited capacity 
to protect religious communities and their members.  Yet protests against the misuse 
of the law remain and efforts have been and are still being made to ameliorate if not 




After reviewing the new additions sections 295-B and C in Chapter XV of ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion,’ it can be said that the law has brought serious changes to and 
problems for the application of law in the legal history of Pakistan.  Religious 
communities and minorities face consequences as citizens which, as has been 
demonstrated, they did not face in the early years of Pakistan.  It has been stated by 
the Lahore High Court that the rising number of blasphemy cases from 1986 ‘shows 
that the law was being abused…to settle…scores.’
655
  According to Pakistan’s 
National Commission of Peace and Justice from 1986 to August 2009, at least 964 
were accused, of whom 679 were Muslims, 240 were Ahmadis, 119 Christians, 14 
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Hindus and 10 of unknown religions.
656
  It has been argued the law is not 
discriminatory as it affected all communities and the majority of those accused of 
blasphemy are Muslim.  However, it appears to be a difference in outcome.  An 
individual Muslim who is accused -dreadful though that person’s fate may be- is not 
seen as a representative of all Muslims as the accused represents only him or herself.  
Where a member of a minority is accused, the consequence of that accusation affects 
the entire community in that place and beyond, as that person is taken as a 
representative of that class, against which vengeance may be exacted. 
The introduction of new sections in Chapter XV of ‘Religious Offences’ has 
resulted mostly in near-anarchy in the country when these clauses are used as a tool 
to harass, intimidate, discriminate against and persecute religious communities of 
Pakistan.  Though the law, particularly sections 295-B and 295-C, exposes all 
religious communities to allegations of blasphemy, Muslims rarely face critical 
threats after such allegations unless they have supported the accused from minority 
groups.  For minorities in Pakistan, in addition to the physical death that threatens 
accused blasphemers, families are also at risk from social isolation as members 
scatter into hiding for fear of their lives, as is the property of any from that minority. 
The application of the law has also raised the question whether non-Muslims 
should be judged for blasphemy.  It has been argued by Muslim scholars that non-
Muslims should not be accused of blasphemy or heresy as ‘they are by definition 
unbelievers’
657
 and unbelief does not legalise the killing of a person.
658
  Moreover, 
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most of the people who die are by definition in Islam ‘people of the book’ (ahl al-
kitab): Christians.  Historically, Muslims have claimed to protect non-Muslims in 
Islamic countries by declaring their status as ahl al-dhimma (literally, the people of 
the protection).
659
  In addition to dhimmi, there is another proposed class of non-
Muslims called Mu’ahid, someone not conquered by Muslims but who has chosen to 
live among Muslims.
660
  Non-Muslims, particularly Christians, have debated the 
status of dhimmis, claiming that they are much more than a protected community in 
contemporary Pakistan.  They simply claim to be Pakistani citizens.  James Channan 
comments: ‘we are Pakistanis and would like to be treated as equal citizens...We are 
not dhimmis; we are sons and daughters of the soil.’
661
  The issue is certainly not just 
what Christians and other minorities should be called: but the outcome of these laws 
sits ill with the Muslim claim to protect non-Muslims in Islamic countries. 
A further effect of the new additions has been on Pakistan’s legal system and 
the erosion of an independent judiciary.  There is a serious struggle in the legal 
system of Pakistan dealing with blasphemy cases, as we have seen in the tussles 
between lower courts and the High Court.  For example, a person can be charged 
with blasphemy on testimony alone, without any details whatsoever, and be 
immediately and arbitrarily detained without opportunity for bail.  Trials became rare 
or controversial and many lawyers who are willing to take cases face ‘dire 
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consequences if [they] continue to defend [the accused].’
662
  The death sentence has 
been declared by lower local courts in a number of cases but the High Court 
successfully released the accused.
663
  Lower courts rely on one witness to declare 
guilt and assess punishment, and are vulnerable to local pressure, while the High 
Court does not just accept a statement to prove the offence. 
The working of the 1986 laws clearly show that the religious expression and 
rights of all religious communities been violated.  Regarding the human rights of 
Pakistani citizens, I. A. Rahim, a Muslim human right activist, stated that: ‘these 
laws are retrogressive, because they discriminate against minorities; impinge on their 
rights to freedom of belief and pose a serious threat to their right to liberty.  So these 
laws are in conflict with their constitutional and fundamental rights.’
664
  Though both 
Muslims and non-Muslim raise their voice, most people have been forced to remain 
silent.  Minorities have been left in a position where they have little or no power for 
self-protection.  The law became a continuing threat to the social and religious life of 
non-orthodox and indeed even non-Sunni religious communities.  The outcome is 
that ‘a sense of fundamental entitlement of citizenship in the hearts and minds of the 
embattled Christians and non-Muslim communities is lost [to which we must add 
certain Muslim communities as well].’
665
  It seems clear that the potential for the 
misuse of the law is considerable.  Consideration of how to control the violence to 
protect the communities will be discussed in the following chapter.
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The Blasphemy Law and the Question of the Protection of Religious 
Communities and Their Religious Rights 
Two issues related to religion have challenged Pakistan since its inception: the 
exclusion of certain religious communities and the opposition to certain religious 
beliefs and attitudes.  From 1947 to 1974 the question of whether and how to declare 
Ahmadis non-Muslims became increasingly critical with demands to criminalize 
their religious practices, ending in their expulsion from the family of Islam in the 
1980s.  This chapter will pick up on opposition to and use made of non-Muslims and 
minority Muslim groups in the socio-political evolution of the country. 
Previous chapters have shown how not only religious parties and communities 
but also political power was involved in making changes in the legal history of 
Pakistan.  According to Malik, although historically in Pakistan religious agitators 
were never able to establish a government, Pakistan still remains a country whose 
establishment was achieved by reformists such as the Muslim League which used 
Islamic symbols creating a ‘Muslim identity yet disclaiming any ideas of a 
theocracy.’
666
  He further notes that since the later 1980s, the press, the judiciary and 
numerous volunteer organisations have begun challenging the earlier conformist 
traditions with the aim of establishing basic human rights.  However, rather than 
consolidating political and constitutional norms through dialogue and consensus, 
‘Pakistani politicians frivolously consume their energies on internecine dissensions, 
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occasionally resorting to popular appeals for street agitation…and trespassing all the 
parliamentary norms.
667
  From the 1990s, religious parties, as well as agitators in 
general, had the capacity to influence governing officials and politicians to enforce 
their religious demands and slogans.  As in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s, as discussed 
in the previous chapters, popular agitation and religious demands still remain 
powerful.  However, the unresolved issue of religious violence motivated by 
blasphemy accusations from the 1990s has become critical in the protection of 
minority Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The misuse of the law of blasphemy has been recognised by the judiciary, 
government, non-Muslims and even Muslims of Pakistan but nothing significant has 
been done to reduce the violence.  From time to time, religious communities, 
government and officials have faced critical situations as well as much criticism 
concerning any efforts they might make regarding the protection of religious 
communities.  Having shown that the roots and growth of this problem lie clearly in 
the past, this chapter discusses how the protection of citizens of Pakistan, especially 
from religiously motivated violence, has become the crucial concern and issue of 
today and how politics anwd society is split between those who want reform of the 
law, especially those passed between 1980 and 1986 and those who agitate to keep 
all post-1980 clauses. To review this, we first need to see how religious communities 
of Pakistan raised the issue of their protection. 
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6.1. The Protest of Religious Communities for their Protection 
Even though there is a manifest danger in responding towards blasphemy allegations 
for all Pakistan’s religious communities, a number of political leaders, judges and 
religious communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have expressed their thoughts 
and concerns either in favour of or to reform the law to control its misuse of 
Pakistan.  The implications of the new sections on blasphemy promulgated between 
1980 and 1986 have been discussed in the previous chapter, showing that though all 
religious communities are equally liable to be accused of blasphemy, minorities are 
much more vulnerable both to an accusation and to critical and even fatal 
consequences.  Such communities are concerned that even though Pakistan claims to 
provide religious protection, they do not feel they are counted as equal to majority-
religion citizens in terms of protection.  One of the reasons for this may be that it 
appears the majority of Muslims are in favour of anti-blasphemy laws: in a 
democratic country officials may claim to protect religious freedom of all but follow 
the demands of the majority.  Despite the negative consequences of condemning the 
practice of these laws, minorities, along with supporters from the majority, have 
continually responded to the way the law of blasphemy is used. 
Historically Ahmadis were always vulnerable, even before the amendments in 
the law, and were long accused by the local majority community of Punjab for their 
unacceptable religious beliefs and practices.  From the 1990s, Christians have also 
been struggling for protection from religious violence.  Bishop Samuel Azaraiah, 
noting one verdict, said ‘the blasphemy sentence has shocked the Christian 
community,’ and another bishop, John Malik, said ‘the sense of insecurity would 
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increase following the convictions.’
668
 The Christian community (perhaps 
strengthened by overseas support) have been most vociferous in protesting the 
continued risks to their life, seriously threatened by both local communities as well 
as questionably fair legal trial.  Anees Jilani said: 
The blasphemy law now have become a tool in the hands of criminal minded persons. 
They have now started using them to embroil their opponents in highly questionable 
litigations which get so controversial and dichotomous during the course of trial that it 
becomes almost unfeasible to decipher the truth.
669
 
While there have been many individual protests against the blasphemy law, the death 
of Manzoor Masih in 1994 sparked agitation across the country as Christians were 
demanding repeal of the blasphemy law and security for their lives.  The initial 
conviction and death sentence against 12-year old Salamat Masih, discussed in the 
fifth chapter, and rising mob violence against Christians, especially that damaging 
their property and places of worship in Shantinagar in 1997,
670
 drew the attention of 
human rights activists all over world.  Many affected people have expressed how 
blasphemy issue has affected the social life and relationship of Christians and 
Muslims. For example, one of the victims said: 
We [Christians] and Muslims have been living here for generations. Both communities 
were on good terms, but, due to this incident, we have disconnected forever. In the past, 
we were friends. Now we are enemies. This incident has left long lasting effects. It is 
not possible for us to forget what Muslims have done to us. A personal dispute was 
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turned in to a communal dispute and as a result, unending enmity and abhorrence has 
emerged in the heart of both communities.
671
 
Perhaps the most desperate act of protest was by Roman Catholic bishop, John 
Joseph, a chairman of a Christian-Muslim relation commission and the National 
Commission for Justice and Peace Pakistan.  He said: 
Since the Government failed to fulfil its commitments, we have no alternative but to 
launch a countrywide agitation and to adopt other tactics for the abolition of blasphemy 
law…such ‘verdicts’ are not only detrimental to national unity, they created hatred 
among the minority community... we are united for our rights and are prepared to 
sacrifice even our lives…
672
 
Four years after witnessing the death of Manzoor Masih, Joseph shot and killed 
himself outside the Sahiwal Court in Punjab province after Ayub Masih was 
sentenced to death for blasphemy on the 5
th
 of May 1998, though later released by 
the Supreme Court for lack of evidence of blasphemy.
673
  To Bishop Joseph, it 
became clear that ‘lives destroyed by false allegations meant nothing to the 
authority.’
674
  Bishop Joseph, in his letter, faxed to the press just before his death on 
5
th
 May 1998 stated: 
Section 295-C is the greatest block in the good and harmonious relations between 
Muslims and the religious minorities in Pakistan. In order to achieve national harmony, 
let us give a push to this immense boulder, before it crushes all of us. Once the obstacle 
is away, each Pakistani will be able to live and work in peace and our beloved 
motherland, Pakistan will prosper…
675
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Bishop Joseph hoped his suicide would galvanize authorities and communities of 
Pakistan for the repeal of the blasphemy in order to create peaceful co-existence.  On 
the one hand, the Christian community discussed whether he was a martyr and great 
leader and protested against the misuse of the blasphemy law.
676
  However, on the 
other hand, religious and political organisations condemned the act of suicide by 
claiming that the bishop wanted to embarrass Pakistan in the eyes of the world.  
Some condemned misusing the law and argued that the law of blasphemy has added 
to the corpus of discriminatory legislations against minorities and led to distortion.
677
  
Whatever he may become for future generations of Pakistan, today his death is a 
symbol for a powerless minority which lives through continuing struggle under the 
threat of blasphemy laws.  The death of John Joseph also represents a loss of 
religious leadership in the Christian community in Pakistan. 
Muslim community and political leaders mostly condemned the death of 
Bishop Joseph, while sympathising with his family.  For example, in 1998, the Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed deep sorrow over the suicide of Bishop John and in 
a condolence message to the bereaved family and the Christian community, insisted 
that the constitution of Pakistan guaranteed full freedom and fundamental rights to 
the minorities.
678
  Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto also expressed shock and grief 
over the tragic death of Bishop John.  In a message she said, it is a traumatic event 
which focuses the deep sense of frustration felt by the members of the minority 
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communities at the misuse of the blasphemy law by extremist and bigoted elements. 
It also highlights the need for making the law foolproof against misuse as an 
instrument of personal vendetta and creating mischief in the name of religion.  There 
is, she said, clearly a need to punish false accusers and reform the law.
679
 
The question of protecting the minorities and especially the misuse of the law 
was mostly condemned by governing officials.  The Federal Minister of Religious 
and Minorities Affairs Raja Zafer ul-Haq, while insisting that the law is not against 
particular religions, urged the government to re-examine the law.
680
  However, most 
of those sympathetic to Islamic Parties who wanted the law to remain on the statute 
book feared that the government might take action towards making changes in the 
law.  They started criticizing Christians’ protests over the law and argued that section 
295-C is not discriminatory as it is the same for anybody found to have committed 
blasphemy.
681
  All communities are indeed equally vulnerable to accusation but who 
actually suffers is a critical question which remains unanswered.  There are clear 
attempts to silence people.  For example, the Minister for Religious Affairs Ijazul 
Haqq stated that ‘the people of Pakistan would come out on the streets if attempts 
were made to change the blasphemy law.’
682
  He also stated vehemently that even if 
100,000 Christians lost their lives under the Blasphemy Law it will not be 
repealed.
683
  The refusal to review the blasphemy law in terms of protecting 
minorities and the insistence on keeping the law even if minorities continue to suffer 
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suggests an uncertain future for, and status of minorities as well as others vulnerable 
to accusations because they support the repeal of the law.  A successful outcome of 
the argument among Muslim and minority groups on the issue of repeal may take a 
long time or it may not happen.  However, assuming the law stays, it will be helpful 
to examine how blasphemy accusations are dealt with by the apparently independent 
judicial system. 
 
6.2. Judicial Concern over the Misuse of the Blasphemy Law and the 
Safety of Religious Communities 
In general, the judicial system of Pakistan claims to follow the rules, providing 
justice to all, a point insisted upon by Jinnah in his informal talk to civil officers at 
Peshawar in April 1948, when he said: ‘you should try to create an atmosphere and 
work in such a spirit that everybody gets a fair deal and justice is done to everybody. 
And not merely should justice be done but people should feel that justice has been 
done to them.’
684
  However, the justice system of Pakistan, especially the lower 
courts, has become controversial and some have suggested even notorious in terms of 
dealing with blasphemy accusations.  The judicial system for dealing with blasphemy 
cases has been affected by the pressure and threats of the masses.  Justice Munir, 
who headed an investigation into anti-Ahmadi agitation in 1953 and reviewed how 
the legislation on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ was misused, discussed in the 
fourth chapter, commented ‘Pakistan is being taken [over] by the common man—
though it is not—as an Islamic state. This belief has been encouraged by the 
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ceaseless clamour of Islam and an Islamic state that is being heard from all quarters 
since the establishment of Pakistan.’
685
 
It has been observed that not only those accused of blasphemy but also the 
judiciary and courts are exposed to mob pressure.  The issue of repealing the law and 
the threats to the lives of minorities has also split the judiciary.  Various lawyers and 
judges support the inevitably arbitrary imposition of the death sentence under 
blasphemy accusation but others regard it as discriminatory and unacceptable for 
non-Muslims to face criticism and threats from Muslims.  For example, it was noted 
that the lower courts in cases such as Salamat Masih’s in 1994, discussed in the 
previous chapter, passed the death sentence against the accused despite inadequate 
evidence.  However, Salamat was released later from the High Court but the judge 
who ordered his release was threatened and later murdered.  We should also note that 
on 4
th
 September 1999, Lahore High Court Justice Nazir Akhter reportedly said that 
those accused of blasphemy ‘must be punished or killed on the spot without any trial 
and there is no need of the law.’
686
  Judgments mentioned above clearly show how 
the judicial system or individuals in it can fall under suspicion of failing to provide 
justice in some blasphemy cases.  According to Asma Jahangir, former Chairperson 
of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and current UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
The anti-blasphemy law has tended to be abused. Because of the public sentiment the 
allegation arouses, the law has also been liable to a miscarriage of justice. Clearly, the 
incidence of blasphemy was no greater than before the law came in than it is after 
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it.  There are certainly more allegations of it now. The experience points to the need for 
serious rethinking of the law.
687
 
Though the judicial system as a whole came under suspicion of not providing full 
justice to those accused of blasphemy, the High Court has generally struggled to 
provide justice on the basis of requiring firm evidence to prove the case, provided the 
accused survives to reach the High Court stage.
688
 
It has been expressed by the judiciary that it ‘must seriously consider the ways 
it [blasphemy accusation] can badly affect the innocent people.’
689
  Ismail Qureshi, 
though regarding the death sentence as the final verdict and seeing section 295-C as 
an important piece of legislation to prevent defiling the name of the Prophet, 
nevertheless emphasizes that Muslims should not take the law into their hands ‘when 
there is recourse to a court of law against the contemnor.’
690
  However, the 
contemporary practice of the law in the hands of local communities presents critical 
situation, and due process of law has been affected by violence motivated by 
blasphemy accusations.  The most critical examples of this disregard for proper 
practice can be seen when a local community does not care about the judgment of the 
courts concerning the innocence of an accused, preferring to kill them.  
Some judicial suggestions have been made by judges regarding both the law 
and its possible amendment, discussed in the case Riaz Ahmad v. State in June 1994, 
particularly the question of whether the language used by the accused which is said 
to be in accord with the teaching of the founder of any religion, in this case Ghulam 
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Ahmad, is derogatory to the Prophet Muhammad and constitute an offence under 
section 295-C.
691
  The case was tried on the behalf of Ahmadi and Christian parties.  
During the trial, the counsel representing Christian parties discussed and argued that 
section 295-C should be extended in order to prohibit contumacious reproaches 
against Jesus Christ so that those who indulge in defiling the name of Christ are also 
punished with death.  The trial Judge Mian Nazir Akhtar expressed his hope that ‘the 
provision be made more comprehensive to as to make blasphemy qua other Prophets 
including the Holy Christ, punishable with the same sentence.’
692
  The first problem 
here is that under such a suggestion Christians could be alleged to commit blasphemy 
against Muslim beliefs when they declare their belief that Jesus is the Son of God 
unless such a statement is allowed- as it would have been under the 1860 law 
allowing mutual and courteous discussion of faith.  Secondly religious leaders and 
founders such as the Prophet Muhammad and Jesus Christ are already included in 
section 295-A, the clause which can defend any religious community from outrage 
against their religious personages and faith through malicious speech and writing as 
discussed in the second chapter.  However, this clause was rarely in use in Pakistan, 
and after 295-C was enacted, it was annulled.  Therefore suggestions such as those of 
Akhtar do not seem particularly useful. 
Given the continuing protest and violence concerning whether the law should 
be repealed or not, a few changes in legal procedure were introduced by governing 
authorities concerning the procedure for accusation.  Abdulfateh Amor, the Special 
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Reporter of UN Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Religious Intolerance, concludes that ‘the blasphemy law should not be 
discriminatory and should not give rise to abuse… If offences against belief are made 
punishable…then procedural guarantees must be introduced and a balanced attitude 
must be maintained.’
693
  Let us see what kind of procedural changes were made by 
the government to reduce the critical implications on religious communities. 
 
6.3. Political Efforts to Bring Changes in the Legal Procedure of 
Blasphemy Accusations 
In 1988, Zia ul-Haq died in a plane crash and whoever came to power later was not 
able, or did not wish, to repeal the law to protect all citizens of Pakistan from 
religiously motivated violence, discrimination and persecution.  Bringing a few 
changes in the legal procedure of prosecution was tried by few politicians.  In 1988 
Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007) chairperson of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 
became Prime Minister and began arguing that the ‘Religious Offences’ law should 
not be misused.  During her regime, political authorities delivered various statements 
regarding the protection of minorities for religious motivated violence under 
blasphemy law but her political power collapsed in 1991.  In 1992 the Federal 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Mawlana Abadu Sitar Niazi, issued ‘a fatwa against 
her declaring her to be a kafir [unbeliever] liable to the death penalty.’
694
  A year 
later, ‘a case was brought against her in the Lahore High Court under section 295-
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C…accusing her of criticising the blasphemy law.’
695
  Though she was not convicted 
of blasphemy, this is an early example to show how the law started to be used against 
the governing officials to weaken their power. 
In early 1994, after being re-elected Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto again 
intended to introduce two procedural changes to lessen the possibility of abuse of 
Section 295-C, a formal authorisation by a judicial magistrate being required before a 
complaint of blasphemy could be registered and arrests made.  A false allegation of 
blasphemy would itself be made a criminal offence to be punished with up to seven 
years’ imprisonment.
696
  In February 1994, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the 
chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology and chief justices of the four provincial 
high courts sent an Amendment Bill to the Council of Islamic Ideology for further 
revision of the misuse of the law.  Mawlana Kausur Niazi, Chairman of the Council 
of Islamic Ideology commented that ‘the law needs modification to ensure that it is 
not abused… The procedure for police registration of a case, the judicial level at 
which it should be considered and the suitable criteria for admission of witnesses 
have to be looked at thoroughly.’
697
  There is no doubt that the judiciary has 
frequently agreed that the law of blasphemy has been misused, particularly where the 
accused was sentenced on false allegations as in cases such as Salamat Masih and the 
mob violence incited by unproven allegations of blasphemy which occurred in 
Shantinagar and other incidents like this as discussed in the fifth chapter.  Making 
knowingly unfounded allegations a punishable crime may have constrained 
malicious accusations and protected the innocent to a certain extent: but this proposal 




 Amnesty International Report on Pakistan, September 1996 (ASA 33/10/96). 
697
 Moulana Kausur Niazi quoted in Ibid. 
266 
 
did not become law.  On 28
th
 May 1995, Bhutto, after facing critical widespread 
strikes and protests across Pakistan against any changes to the blasphemy laws 




In the 1990s, Nawaz Shareef, elected twice as Prime Minister, also faced 
pressure and demands to apply Sharia as it was part of his political manifesto:
699
 it 
was his government which removed the optional sentence, life imprisonment for 
defiling the name of the Prophet, and imposed the mandatory death sentence in 
section 295-C of PPC in 1992.
700
  Although he was also one of those political leaders 
who condemned the misuse of the law, he remained convinced that the law should 
not be repealed.  Given this apparent impasse, the question of what should be done to 
stop the misuse of the law to protect the citizens of Pakistan became increasingly 
important. 
In October 1999, Pakistan’s political and constitutional evolution was 
interrupted by praetorian rule through martial law when General Pervez Musharraf, a 
military chief army officer, came to power as President of Pakistan till 2008.  During 
his presidency, he said publicly on several occasions that there needed to be 
procedural changes in the existing law to check its frequent misuse.
701
  In 1999, 
shortly after seizing power, Musharraf’s political and social agenda appeared to 
maintain a moderate Pakistan in which ‘minorities enjoy full rights and protection as 
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equal citizens and in the letter and spirit of Islam.’
702
  In 2000 he promised to amend 
the blasphemy law to allow only senior district officials to register blasphemy cases, 
but soon withdrew the proposed change under pressure from the religious lobby.  In 
2004, under critical pressure, he too was forced to back down and stopped reforming 
the law,
703
 although in 2005, parliament passed a law requiring that a senior police 
official investigate a blasphemy accusation before a complaint was filed in the 
courts.
704
  Later, in May 2007 a bill by a ruling party parliamentarian calling for 
changes that would make the blasphemy law less discriminatory was rejected.  The 
parliamentary affairs minister was quoted as saying: ‘Islam is our religion and such 
bills hurt our feelings. This is not a secular state but [the] Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan.’
705
  Musharaf resigned and went into exile in 2008. 
Thus from 1988 till 2007, the political and governing power represented by 
Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf all tried making some changes 
either to uphold the death sentence or making some procedural changes in blasphemy 
accusation. For example, Bhutto and Musharaf felt that changing the initial 
procedure of arresting anyone accused of blasphemy, especially giving authority only 
to the magistrate or the senior police inspector for investigating the reported incident 
before arrest would reduce the threat and misuse of the law.
706
  The main aim of this 
change was that the case should be properly investigated before people were arrested 
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on mere suspicion as clearly occurred in some cases discussed in the fifth chapter. 
However, it must be noted that this procedural change had little significant effect 
because it has rarely been implemented, and any blasphemy charge received by 
police and registered by FIR (First Information Report) immediately leads to the 
arrest of the accused.
707
  There are some reasons for this, the main one being that 
immediate mob action towards anyone, especially non-Muslim, accused of 
blasphemy is almost normal, as people do not wait for any police action or arrest.  In 
such circumstances not only the accused person but also the whole community is 
liable to experience loss of life and property, and even places of worship, all of 
which of course contravene the earlier religious conflict laws.  For example, it is still 
a general principle inherited from previous versions of Chapter XV of ‘Offences 
Relating to Religion’ that damaging or defiling the place of worship or object (under 
section 295), disturbing religious assemblies and worship (under section 296), 
disrespecting funeral rights and burial grounds (under section 297) and wounding 
religious feelings of any religious class and deliberate offensive action of religious 
discussion (under section 298) are religious crimes which are still on the statute 
book.  However, on many occasions, especially where non-Muslims are accused of 
blasphemy, even mere suspicion brings critical damage to lives and all religious 
objects of communities.  For example, it has been observed in many cases that before 
any prosecution and legal trial, churches and bibles, Hindu temples and religious 
deities, Christian schools and hostels, residences or neighbourhoods of an accused or 
their community are damaged or burnt with consequent loss of property or life of 
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innocent people, as occurred in Gojra, Korian, Shantinagar, Sanglahill, Sialkot and 
Lahore in Punjab. 
 Even the dead are attacked, in violation of section 297, such as when in July 
2010 the Liaqatabad police station was approached with the demand to remove the 
Islamic inscriptions such as kalmia tayaba, (there is no god but God and Muhammad 
is His Prophet) from the tombstones of Ahmadis’ graves.  Later in October, the 
police was ordered to do this in accordance with section 298-B of Chapter XV which 
prohibits Ahmadis from using such inscriptions: the words and phrases were painted 
over or removed from stones.
708
  Punishing the dead went further when about 15 to 
20 unknown persons deliberately entered the Ahmadi graveyard in Model Town, 
Lahore and desecrated and damaged 120 Ahmadis’ graves in December 2012.  The 
police registered the case under section 297 but no one has been charged.  Notably, 
both cases reveal the conflict where on one hand removing the text from tombstones 
is apparently not a crime and on other hand that the incident done by the group of 
people is a religious crime under section 297.  As mentioned in the first chapter, 
section 297 was applied not only for the specific religious community or religious 
feelings but to respect the dead.  However, today it has been expressed that in 
Pakistan ‘…violence is inflicted on the living as a matter of course, [but] the visceral 
hatred…on Ahmadis’ graveyard [dead people] is chilling’
709
 and such accusations do 
not allow them ‘to rest in peace even after [they] are dead.’
710
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For the Pakistani Government and judiciary, dealing with such conflict in law 
is not an easy task and it is a challenge whether such conflict and incidents can be 
controlled by changing the procedure of accusation and arresting accused of 
blasphemy today in Pakistan.  Providing security may be the initial responsibility of 
the police as proposed by Bhutto and Musharaf, mentioned above.  However, it has 
been observed that the arrest of an accused, his/her imprisonment and court 
procedure became controversial and suspicious particularly where during 
investigation some accused were killed either by the police authorities or in police 
custody.  For example, according to one of the blasphemy cases, Robert Fanish, (19), 
a Christian from Jatheki, Sialkot Punjab, known to be having an affair with a Muslim 
woman, was accused under section 295-B for throwing down a copy of the Quran in 
September 2009.
711
  Before his arrest, the local church, including all religious books 
and bibles, was set on fire.  Fanish was later arrested and before any trial and inquiry 
was found dead inside his jail cell.  All those who spoke at the news conference said 
that the death of Fanish raised suspicion of the involvement of jail officials in his 
murder.
712
  Suspected of murdering Fanish, assistant Superintendent Sibtain Raza, 
Head Warden Mohammad Yusuf, and Warden Javed Iqbal Awan were suspended 
and Salim Shahid Beg of Lahore said that the suspended officials would face an 
inquiry under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability 
Act.
713
  However, police have not yet arrested anyone in this case.  This situation 
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clearly shows that an initial blasphemy accusation can further frustrate and alienate 
minorities from the legal system, courts and jail custody.  Therefore considering 
these forces and incidents, merely giving authority to investigate the case properly is 
not enough to rescue the accused and cannot guaranteed the safety of her/his life.  
This change has not led to a significant reduction in blasphemy charges.
714
 
It can be said that governments of recent times have been unsuccessful in 
following through any agenda they might have had to protect religious communities 
from violence.  Government officials have insisted that the law should not be 
misused yet they are not able either to demonstrate this or deal with the issue of 
blasphemy properly to protect all communities.  Amnesty International notes that 
continuing complex religious issues are a result of long negligence of successive 
governments demonstrating an overruling concern for power and rule rather than 
principle.
715
  Amnesty International reiterates its call to the Government of Pakistan 
to ensure that: 
While the law remains on the statute book, everyone charged under the blasphemy law 
receives a fair trial and is not subjected to any form of ill-treatment; to declare a 
moratorium on carrying out the death penalty under this law and to take steps to abolish 
the death penalty for this offence; to take adequate steps to ensure the safety of 
members of the religious minorities in general and anyone at present charged with 
blasphemy in particular; and to implement international standards for the protection of 
the rights of religious minorities.
 716
 
It can be concluded that from 1988 till 2007 religious communities continually faced 
threats from blasphemy accusations but no proper rules or regulations were applied 
to protect them.  After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, once again the 
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government of Pakistan People Party came to power and faced critical problems with 
the imposition of the blasphemy law, the position of its political leaders, and the 
question of protecting religious communities and restricting the blasphemy law.  One 
of the most important steps was the tabling of the Amendment of Blasphemy Bill, 
which is the basis of the following discussion. 
 
6.4. Critical Implications of Blasphemy and Proposal for the 
Amendment Bill of Blasphemy from 2007-2012 
In February 2008, Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of the assassinated former PM 
Benazir Bhutto, became president of Pakistan.
717
  The period of this government was 
not free from religious agitation, as killings after accusations of blasphemy continued 
as did protests against blasphemy and disturbances of the public peace throughout 
this government’s rule.  The problem is well illustrated by the threats to the 
government and the religious communities resulting from the blasphemy accusation 
of Assia Bibi, a Christian accused, who was sentenced to death for insulting the 
Prophet Muhammad in 2010.  Subsequently, the government was shocked, or 
frightened, into silence when two prominent members of the Parliament, Sulman 
Taseer, the Punjab Governor and Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian leader, human activist 
and the first Pakistan’s Federal Minister of Minorities appointed by Pakistan People 
Party in 2009 were killed in early 2011 for raising their voice to reform the law of 
blasphemy and protect the minorities of Pakistan. 
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According to the case, Assia was accused of committing blasphemy when she 
was fetching water while working with other women in the field.  It was argued that 
Christian non-Muslims should not drink from the same cup and it was said by other 
women working in the field that the water was impure, haraam, and therefore 
undrinkable.  Amid the subsequent argument, Assia was asked why she would not 
give up her faith and convert to Islam, to which she replied with another question: 
why should she want to convert to Islam?
718
  Before discussing how this case revived 
the issue and its impact on the community it is important to recall from the first and 
second parts of this thesis that there were similar cases during British rule where 
particularly Christians were targeted for their lower and former caste status of 
untouchabilty, even after their conversion.  Holding fast to this memory, many 
Muslims in Pakistan, especially in rural areas, regard Christians as a lower caste than 
Muslims with whom one should not eat and drink – despite the official absence of 
caste in Islam.
719
  On the issue of drinking water from the same cup, Assia was later 
accused by the local cleric who was not even present when the supposed incident 
occurred.  She was arrested in June 2009 and received the death sentence in the 
district court in Nankana Sahib, Punjab based on the allegation that she passed 
derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad on 8
th
 November 2010. 
                                                 
718
 For the whole story see Assia Bibi, Foreword Anne Isabelle, Blasphemy: The True Heart Breaking 
Story of the Woman Sentenced to Death Over a Cup of Water (London: Hachette Digital, 2011). 
719
 The issue can also be seen where on 12
th
 May 2000 two Christians, Saleem Masih and Rasheed 
Masih, were each sentenced to 35 years imprisonment and fined on blasphemy charges. According to 
the case they were arrested following a dispute over ice cream service. Maqsood Ahmed, an ice-cream 
vendor in the village Sabomahal in Pasroor, district Sialkot refused to serve the Christians in the same 
bowls used by Muslims and sent them away to get their own utensils. A dispute began and the two 
parties struck each other in the face. After seeking opinion and advice from the local cleric, the vendor 
filed a complaint about being assaulted and beaten by the two Christians. Amnesty International, 
Pakistan: Insufficient Protection of Religious Minorities, 10. 
274 
 
Assia’s accusation and death sentence was condemned internationally. 
Amnesty International, a Human Rights organisation, demanded her death sentence 
be commuted and argued for the law of blasphemy to be reformed.
720
  Likewise, 
Pope Benedict XVI appealed for Assia’s release and commented that Pakistani 
Christians ‘are often victims of violence and discrimination’ and urged that their 
‘dignity and fundamental rights be fully respected.’
721
  Assia Bibi’s cases also 
provoked a storm nationally, when it was argued that she should be pardoned or at 
least receive a lesser punishment than death.  Mariam Faruqi notes that the 
conviction and death sentence horrified key government leaders and President 
Zardari ordered a ministerial review, which concluded that ‘the verdict was legally 
unsound and sought a presidential pardon for her [Assia].’
722
 She further notes, 
however, that on November 26, Pakistan’s law minister ruled out making any 
changes in the blasphemy law. 
The government gave in to a long-standing demand of its coalition partner; the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, and appointed a hard-line 
cleric from the party to head the Council of Islamic Ideology to decide whether the 
country’s laws are in conformity with Islam.  On 29
th
 November 2010, in a clear case 
of judicial overreach, the Lahore High Court barred the president from issuing a 
pardon despite this privilege being granted to him by the constitution.
723
  On 30
th
 
November Sherry Rehman, Member of National Assembly (MNA) of Pakistan 
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People’s Party submitted a bill to the National Assembly Secretariat seeking an end 
to the death penalty under the existing blasphemy laws in order to reduce misuse of 
the law, discussed below.
724
  Faruqi further notes that the Islamic groups and 
religious political parties intended to use the issue to rally popular support in 
preparation for the next elections as a number of public meetings were organised on 
the issue of amending the law.  Finally, on 30
th
 December, faced with a threat to its 
majority, the government publicly reneged on a commitment to review the 
blasphemy laws, announcing that it had “no intention” to repeal or amend the law.  
Sensing the government’s lack of resolve and supported by sections of the media, 
extremists offered head money to anyone who killed Assia Bibi and issued death 
threats to opponents and critics of the blasphemy law.
725
 
Assia’s case received serious attention when the Punjabi Governor, Salman 
Taseer, a Muslim, visited her in jail to help her to get justice.
726
  In December 2010, 
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Taseer took a huge step at a political level by asking for Assia’s forgiveness.  In 
reviewing religious intolerance and human rights in Pakistan, he concluded that ‘the 
sentence against Assia is inhumane...I have handed over the appeal (for Assia Bibi) 
for a presidential pardon, which I will take to the president and soon Assia will be 
pardoned’ and will be released from imprisonment.
727
  Helping Assia to get justice 
was offensive enough, but Taseer’s criticism of the blasphemy laws and their misuse 
was itself regarded as blasphemy.  He did not live to see any pardon or release of 
Assia Bibi as he was assassinated by his bodyguard, Malik Mumtaz Hussein Qadri 
on 4
th
 January 2011 in Islamabad. 
The reaction to the murder of Taseer was widespread in social life and the 
media, much of which supported the murderer.  The Jammat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat, 
Pakistan warned that those who expressed grief over the assassination could suffer 
like Taseer, insisting ‘no Muslim should attend the funeral or even try to pray for 
Salman Taseer or even express any kind of regret or sympathy over the incident.’
728
  
Moreover, Qadri’s appearance at the court attracted large crowds including lawyers 
who showered rose petals to welcome him and support him for killing Taseer.  Qadri 
admitted killing the governor and argued in the court that ‘I did not kill anyone 
unlawfully. I have taught a lesson to apostate Salman Taseer in the light of the 
teachings of the Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet.’
729
  This was another in the 
line of cases showing how one who murders the blasphemer becomes a hero, as did 
Qadri, following the legacy and example of Illam Din, still known as ‘the martyr,’ 
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who killed Rajpal for publishing the offensive pamphlet insulting the Prophet 
Muhammad in 1927 in Lahore, in British Pakistan.
730
  The killing of Taseer and the 
response to it shocked the government and weakened its already slight power to 
protect the religious communities and amend the law of blasphemy. Taseer’s 
daughter, Sarah said ‘this is a message to every liberal to shut up or to be shot.’
731
 
Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian Federal Minister of Minorities, and one of the 
supporters of the government making efforts to ameliorate the problems of all 
religious minorities, faced threats to his life for his stand against Pakistan’s 
blasphemy law.  He commented during a trip to Canada, recorded on video that: 
I have been told by pro-Taliban religious extremists that if I will continue to speak 
against the blasphemy, I will be beheaded... As a Christian, I believe Jesus is my 
strength. He has given me power and wisdom and motivation to serve suffering 
humanity. I follow the principles of my conscience, and I am ready to die and sacrifice 





 March 2011, Bhatti was murdered in Islamabad and his assassins left leaflets 
at the scene of his murder, proclaiming that they killed him because he committed 
blasphemy and warned others to be aware of meeting the same fate if they criticized 
the law of blasphemy.
733
  It is important to realise that just raising a voice to say that 
the blasphemy law impinges on the rights of minorities can be regarded as 
blasphemy.  Likewise, Salman Taseer’s intention to help a Christian accused and his 
commenting on how law affects non-Muslims was regarded as apostasy and 
unfaithfulness to Islam.  The essence of the crime is that amending the rather recent 
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blasphemy law is seen as an assault on the most sacred values of Muslims; therefore 
most Muslims defend it even to their death.  Maulana Manzoor Ahmed Chinioti, a 
leader of a right-wing Islamic party, said of Muslims’ response to changing the 
blasphemy law: ‘They should know that true Muslims will spill their last drop of 
blood to protect the sanctity of holy personalities and the book.’
734
  This kind of 
determination by Muslims makes it difficult to achieve the possibility of 
reconciliation and peace between religious communities or any reduction in the 
misuse of the law.  Moreover when Muslim and Christian political leaders who raise 
the question of protecting minorities or changing the law for the sake of peace in 
society are killed, this affects all potential critics and commentators.  After the 
assassination of Minister Bhatti, President Asif Ali Zardari stated in a local 
newspaper: 
This is a concerted campaign to slaughter every liberal, progressive and humanist voice 
in Pakistan. The time has come for the federal government and provincial governments 




The government was keen to investigate both murder cases but by and large kept 
silence over the future implications of the blasphemy law.  Yet despite the clear 
problems attached to change, a bill to amend the law was tabled. 
 
6.5. Amendments to the Blasphemy Laws Act 2010 
Sherry Rehman, former minister for information and Pakistan People Party 
legislator, proposed a Bill to amend the blasphemy laws and submitted it to the 
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National Assembly on 30
th
 November 2010.  For Rehman, repealing the law would 
be the ideal situation as ‘its formulation and mechanisms of implementation have 
serious implications for social, constitutional and natural justice in Pakistan.’
736
  To 
her, such change and amendment is needed for the sake of minorities and this ‘can be 
obtained if made politically palatable.’
737
  She declared that Pakistan People Party ‘is 
the government that can review the blasphemy laws. It is a moment in history that 
must be seized. Pakistan’s identity may be ambiguous, but it is precisely [its] space 
that can be used as an opportunity to steer our fragile nation-hood in another 
direction.’
738
  Some of the major objectives of the proposed Blasphemy Act were to: 
Avoid miscarriages of justice in the name of Blasphemy… and reduce the penalties to 
each offence so that punishments are proportionate and any incentive to use these laws 
to settle scores removed. Include the concept of premeditation or intent, which is key to 
criminal procedure. The terminology of the legislation has been clarified to include in 
the concept of ‘mens rea’ or intent behind the criminal act. Ensure that anyone making 
false or frivolous accusation under the legislation is penalised as befitting the section 
under which original claim was made.
739
 
Let us see whether these objectives were included in the proposed bill.  According to 
Rehman, the amendment bill, especially Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to 
Religion’ of Pakistan Penal Code, had their roots in colonial laws.  Though she did 
not mention if the law was misused or not in British India, she admitted that certain 
laws have become a source of victimisation and persecution of minorities in Pakistan 
from 1986. 
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The first change Rehman proposed was to change punishments given under 
sections: 295-A, 295-B, section 295-C.  According to the new Amendment Bill, it 
was proposed to amend the punishment given under section 295-A for outraging 
religious feelings through malicious writing and speech from ten years to 
imprisonment of either description up to ‘two years.’  Notably, Rehman intended to 
revive the originally prescribed punishment of two years and fine for outraging the 
feelings of any class under section 295-A, a clause applied by British in 1927 and 
amended in 1992 in Pakistan.  She also proposed to add the same ‘malicious and 
outrageous intention’ contained in section 295-A to the new sections: 295-C, 298-B 
and C.  Currently section 295-A, which had been successfully applied to deal with 
offensive writings in the pre-1980 period, is rarely if ever used.
740
  Though it has 
been said that Pakistan’s law of blasphemy protects other religions under section 
295-A this research clearly shows that this section has been effectively abandoned 
since the blasphemy laws were added.  Therefore whether changing the punishment 
of the clause will reduce the current issue of misusing the law is doubtful.  However, 
adding malicious intention to the new sections may be useful and does make a clear 
statement. 
According to the new Amendment Bill, the death penalty inserted in section 
295-C for defiling the name of the Prophet should be removed and any words, either 
spoken or written ‘should be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to “ten years” or with a fine or with both.’
741
  Likewise the 
punishment of life imprisonment for defiling the copy of the Quran given under 
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section 295-B should be replaced with ‘either description for a term which may 
extend to ‘five years’ or with fine or with both.’ 
In Pakistan, the death sentence for defiling the name of the Prophet has been 
regarded as hadd, with a fixed punishment as discussed in the fifth chapter.  
However, nationally this is still contested, especially where it has been maliciously 
used to persecute the minority.  It has also been strongly condemned internationally, 
although with little effect within Pakistan.  For example, in Pakistan death sentences 
are imposed for homicide.  Amnesty International notes that  
There is no reliable evidence to demonstrate that the death penalty helps avoid other 
serious harm, for example by deterring the crimes for which it is available. Indeed, there 
is some evidence, albeit inconclusive, that the death penalty can actually contribute to 




Amnesty International appealed to the authorities, urging the president to ‘use his 
powers under article 45 of the constitution to commute all death sentences.’
743
 
The second major change according to the Amendment Bill is related to 
‘intention’ which is the most important ingredient of the law and has been recognised 
as an error especially in section 295-C and section 298-A.  Notably, these sections do 
not distinguish between intentional or deliberate acts and unintentional acts, which is 
an important ingredient necessary to convict anyone in criminal law.  Section 295 
and 295-A, the previous clauses applied by the British, specify the ‘deliberate and 
malicious intention’ (to punish offensive writing and speech under section 295-A) 
and deliberate acts (to punish who defiles and damages the place of worship under 
section 295).  The new additions (section 295-C and section 298-B) though 
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containing most of the description of the old law, omit the crucial point of intention 
in defining the crime.  Rehman regards this error as one of the major reasons for the 
misuse of the law which leaves accusations open to widespread abuse, placing the 
burden of proving innocence on the accused in the face of prosecution witnesses who 
tailored their evidence through prejudice or malice.
744
  To deal with this issue, 
Rehman proposed to add intention with words like ‘malicious and deliberate 
intention’ to secure blasphemy convictions.  These terms were originally added in 
section 295-A in 1927 by the British to convict those who insulted the Prophet 




According to Sherry Rehman, the government must reconsider the introduction 
of the provision that ‘would make it easier to award punishment to those who file 
fake cases.’ To tackle this issue, it was proposed to add a new section, 203, to the 
legislation on ‘Religious Offences’ of PPC (Chapter XV) which could punish 
‘anyone making a false or frivolous accusation under any of the sections of 295A, 
295B and 295C… shall be punished in accordance with similar punishments 
prescribed in the section in which the false or frivolous accusation was made.’
746
  
Furthermore, anyone making false or frivolous accusations under section 295A, 
295B and 295C may be arrested without a warrant and such a person can be tried in 
Sessions Court.
747
  It is important to note currently these sections according to the 
Criminal Procedure Code are cognizable which give an authority and power to police 
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to register the blasphemy accusation and arrest the accused without warrant.  To 
Rehman, by enforcing this change, the complainants or accusers take full 
responsibility whether the case is false or true.  This change may bring little change, 
however, given that in many cases discussed above people do not wait for any trial or 
court orders once they hear that someone has apparently committed blasphemy.  It is 
also relevant to mention here that previous sections: 295-A for outraging the 
religious feelings through speech and writing and section 298 which protected 
religious freedom of discussion are non-cognizable. However, people are not only 
unaware of these sections in contemporary Pakistan but take no responsibility for the 
proper procedure of law and order. 
By reviewing various cases in the Amendment Bill, Rehman argued that the 
lack of a clear government response gave freedom to accusers to incite acts of 
violence and intimidation against religious minorities.
748
  Rehman further observes 
that malicious blasphemy allegations have resulted in an exponential rise of 
blasphemy cases, mostly based on personal reasons such as settling personal scores 
and grabbing property.  She further explains that this ‘would take away the impunity 
afforded to malicious accusers and inciters to hate, whose victims may find acquittal 




To reduce the risk of mob violence Rehman proposed to add a new section 
298-E in Chapter XV of the ‘Religious Offences’ law which prescribes punishments 
for seven years with a fine for ‘any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes 
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incitement to discrimination or violence…’
750
 It is indeed the case that people tend to 
accuse someone for personal reasons yet are rarely punished for a misuse of the law.   
However, merely saying that the law should not be misused is ineffective as the 
actual cause of such misuse must be considered before deciding what rule or 
regulation can be applied to control it. Historically, offensive speeches and 
publications and inciting the public to violence and to punishment of the accused 
without trial were done even before the blasphemy law was promulgated in the 
1980s, and nothing has been done then or since to stop such behaviour.  
According to Rehman, initial reports of blasphemy accusations, pre-trial, and 
trial procedures to convict the accused are frequently incorrectly done at the level of 
the lower courts.  Rehman proposes to amend the Court of Criminal Procedure by 
adding section 190 (3) to insist that: ‘all offences falling within sections of 295A, 
295B and 295C of Pakistan Penal Code shall exclusively be taken cognizance of by 
the Court Sessions and Tried by the High Court.’
751
  The change was proposed to 
prevent miscarriages of justice in lower courts, because the higher courts afford 




Rehman’s effort to bring changes to Chapter XV of ‘Offenses Relating to 
Religion’ and procedures of blasphemy prosecution was indeed a significant step 
with her intention to protect minorities.  There are two crucial points which need to 
taken into consideration: who is opposing this amendment and how can any law be 
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effective if discussing a case, even giving evidence of what occurred, is effectively 
ruled out?  We can reiterate here that historically many clarifications, rules and 
regulations were declared if it was clear people had misunderstood the context or 
purpose of a law.  Muslims successfully fought for their right to slaughter a cow, 
causing the government to extend the meaning and implication of the word ‘object’ 
to include animate objects such as cows and goats under section 295.  The issue of 
cow slaughter was so sensitive that section 295 was the only clause in which 
originally the punishment for defiling places and object was seven years, later 
reduced to two years.  Apart from this particular punishment, some procedural 
changes were made to allow genuine cases to be brought when it was observed that 
violent Arya Samaj protests over cow slaughter occurred in 1886 and 1890 in Punjab 
with communal riots.  This protest became critical from time to time in various 
states, and in 1920s legislative attempts were made to deal with the issue throughout 
British India
753
 as a policy to provide equal rights to all religious communities.
754
 
Noting Muslims’ minority status in British India, Justice Nawaz Chohan commented 
that historically Chapter XV was ‘enacted [and was amended in 1927] by the British 
to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim minority in the Subcontinent before 
the partition against the Hindu majority.’
755
  However, in Pakistan today, the 
majority of Muslims protest fervently when minorities and other human rights 
organisations fight for their rights of protection and freedom.  It is critical to see how 
even discussing changes to the procedure which might reduce misuse of the law has 
become an offence. 
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6.6. Reaction to the Amendment Bill 
By proposing the changes discussed above, Rehman was aware that it would stir up 
the community, saying; ‘it’s going to be a long haul but I don’t think it’s impossible. 
It just looks that way sometimes.  If we are to live in Pakistan, to invest in Pakistan’s 
future, then we do have to think about how to find this glass half full.’
756
  The 
Amendment Bill brought critical discussions among Pakistan’s religious circles. 
Though it had been under discussion since the law was changed by Zia ul-Haq, no 
one had dared formally to submit any such amendment bill or law due to the 
sensitive matter of blasphemy.  The Bill was likely to get cross-party support from 
liberal legislators but the religious parties as well as many other people strongly 
opposed it, which also threatened the political powers and thus political stability.  
The government halted the bill’s progress after violent protests demanded the bill be 
withdrawn and disbanded the committee set up under the Minister for Minorities, 
Shahbaz Bhatti, to review the law.  Both Rehman and Bhatti were declared ‘liable for 
murder’ by the rallies.
757
  In early 2011, the ruling government lost its two ministers, 
Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti as discussed above.  Sherry Rehman, who before 
proposing the amendments had insisted that repealing the blasphemy laws could 
protect the citizens of Pakistan later, withdrew her commitment to repealing the law.  
Though Rehman is still alive, ‘the blasphemy issue is still haunting [her]’ as she was 
alleged of having committing blasphemy for passing derogatory remarks against the 
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Prophet Muhammad in January 2013.
758
  Rehman, according to the petitioner, 
committed blasphemy on Dunya Television program Dunya Meray Aagay (‘The 
World in Front of Me’) on 30
th
 November 2010 while talking about the misuse of the 
law of blasphemy.
759
  However, she was not arrested but the case is under 
investigation and the court did not declare the exact derogatory words or remarks at 
issue.  It cannot be said whether Rehman will be convicted for blasphemy or not, but 
it is yet another example that today even Muslims are not secure and free to talk 
about the law in Pakistan.  Many suggestions have been offered to address this very 
difficult issue but nothing serious has been done to control either the misuse or the 
law itself.  Any endeavour to reduce misuse of the law to protect minorities seems 
impossible. 
Given the subsequent inadequate protection of religious communities in 
Pakistan, the Human Rights Watch annual report stated that ‘blasphemy laws have 
sparked outbreaks of violence against innocent individuals in violation of their rights 
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as lawyers, judges, and 
others defending the rights of those accused under the laws.’  The Human Rights 
Report also notes that ‘Pakistan’s elected government notably failed to provide 
protection to those threatened by extremists, or to hold extremists accountable.’
760
 
Despite national and international concern, it is clear that Pakistan’s minorities, 
potentially including the 20% of its citizens who are Shi’a, are critically vulnerable 
citizens, continually struggling for their rights and safety and routinely facing 
judgment without a fair trial or even without a trial at all, lynched by the mob.
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It is understood that the issue of the blasphemy law is complicated, and there are no 
simple solutions.  It cannot be said whether the law will be repealed, amended or any 
criminal procedural change made to protect minorities against religious violence in 
Pakistan.  However, one of the important questions is: who will protect religious 
feelings which are significantly affecting the life, property and dignity of the citizens 
of Pakistan? 
First it is important to recollect that the political and governing authorities 
have claimed to protect the communities from religiously motivated violence and 
hatred by applying and practising Chapter XV on ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ 
from 1860 until today.  Macaulay, the original author of the law, was aware that 
religious excitement was significant in British India and one of the aims of this law 
was to protect religious feelings and to control religiously motivated violence.  This 
survey of the historical evolution of the Religious Offences legislation has shown 
that places of worship and objects, religious assemblies, funeral rights and freedom 
to discuss religious opinions calmly were protected during the British occupation of 
the region, although they were threatened by Hindu-Muslim communalism expressed 
in publications judged offensive in the 1920s.  The ensuing revision of religious 
offences in the 1920s to 1930s clearly reveals that British political power acquiesced 
to the demands of Muslims by amending the law to prevent the Arya Samaj from 
writing and distributing maliciously intended attacks on the Prophet Muhammad.  
However, malicious intent is not evident in the successful prosecution of Angare, 
which appears rather to be part of the British determination to hold on to power to 
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which end they made use of, indeed misused, their own religious offences laws in a 
prequel to the post-colonial era of present day Pakistan. 
Religion and religious offences were and still are areas of significant 
legislation and a sensitive matter in South Asia especially in the Punjab, evidenced 
by many apparently religious riots in the region over the decades of Pakistan’s 
existence, which led to the revision or extension of the original 1860 religious 
conflict laws.  This law had been amended a little since its inception, but in Pakistan 
the outcome of these changes has become especially controversial.  Since the 
founding of Pakistan in 1947, religious groups linked to but not necessarily directly 
part of the majority Sunni tradition have not stopped trying to reform or amend either 
the constitution or the law on religious offences.  Saeed argues that ‘the very idea of 
the Pakistani state was contested and negotiated by different actors in the imagined 
political community of the nation.’
761
  Such negotiation, from Islamic parties who 
once opposed the creation of Pakistan, not only played their part in excluding 
Ahmadis from the Muslim community but also brought major changes in legal 
history which later turned the area of religious offences law into a very complex 
religious conflict.  The nature of the 1860 law against ‘insulting religious feelings’ 
has not only been turned into a blasphemy law, against the intention of the writers, 
but has also evolved into a set of laws which affect the mode of declaring judgements 
by the judiciary and of effecting punishment, legally or not, by the mob, as discussed 
in the second half of the thesis.  Today the reason for officials staying inactive, 
unable or uninterested in protecting victims is not only religious pressure but 
politically motivated threats from the local communities and leaders.  The socio-
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political context of this gradual change is clearly shows that ‘non-Muslim Pakistanis 
suffer discrimination in infinitely numerous ways both from the state and society.’
762
 
Today one of the most powerful demands is not to change the law or even 
touch the laws of the 1980s, intended to protect the Prophet Muhammad, for they 
have developed a quasi-sacred nature, although the nature of legal processes is in 
debate by critical Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  The first example can be seen in 
the case Qureshi v FSC in the fifth chapter in which various proposals supporting a 
lesser punishment than death, and including intention as an important ingredient in 
Islam, were discussed.  This issue has split religious and political leaders, judicial 
and religious communities.  The murders of political leaders have ‘exposed a deep 
fissure in Pakistan society between liberal politicians with Western lifestyles and 
religious leaders who hew to an Islamist view of the world and are gaining 
influence.’
763
  Nationally it is still in debate and internationally it has been argued 
that in the absence of any final theological definition or authoritative Islamic sources 
the law of blasphemy ‘remains unsettled.’
764
 
Of course, it is the case that religion is connected to every part of life, and 
this connection cannot be ignored, however delicately one treads, in the area of 
human rights.  The more liberal view would see a focus on human rights draws on 
the good of religions; the more conservative might see human rights opposing eternal 
truths.  Witte asserts in regard to such issues: ‘The proper response is to castigate the 
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vices and cultivate the virtues of religion, to confirm those religious teachings and 
practices that are most conducive to human rights, democracy, and rule of law.’
765
 
Yet the very acknowledging of the illegality within such incidents has started 
to be accepted such as when various Ulama and members of the Muslim community 
condemned the misuse of the law and stood with the Downs Syndrome child Rimsha 
(non-Muslim), defending her not only as a girl with Downs, but a person who had 
been wrongly accused.  That last point is certainly an important step for the Muslim 
community as a whole.  Yet whether such condemnations of illegality will safeguard 
future under-age children accused of blasphemy, like Rimsha and Salamat, or other 
persons unintentionally acting in a way construed as blasphemous, remains to be 
seen.  Unclear, too is whether quiescent Muslims fully realise the implications of the 
law of blasphemy on non-Muslims or whether those Muslims who condemn the 
misuse of the law are ready and willing to suggest ways out of the problem. 
The incident of Joseph Colony, mentioned in the introduction, again raised 
the question minorities have been asking for the last thirty years of whether it is 
blasphemy to burn churches, other places of worship, Bibles, and people’s property 
after a blasphemy accusation has been made or even just rumoured.  All such acts are 
still punishable under Chapter XV but are not seen as religious offences in 
contemporary Pakistan, where people usually refer to Chapter XV as Qanoon-e-
Toheen-e-Rasalat (the law to protect the Prophet from insult) rather than Qanoon-e-
Toheen-e-Mazhab or Mazahib (the law to protect religions).  Various scholars, in 
condemning the misuse of the law, imply Qanoon-e-Toheen-e-Mazhab is still the 
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basis of the law, arguing that Islam protects other religions in Pakistan: but their view 
is of limited value given the general confusion. 
People often fail to understand the nature of the religious offence and conflict 
and take immediate action to protect Islam.  For example, Samuel Masih was 
accused of ‘defiling the mosque’ (punishable under section 295 with imprisonment 
for two years) in Lahore in August 2003 but was murdered in his hospital bed, in the 
presence of police, by Faryad Ali saying that ‘it was his duty as a Muslim to kill 
Samuel [blasphemer].’
766
  Does defiling a mosque defile Islam or the Prophet?  This 
misunderstanding can be seen in Rimsha’s case where the local cleric was unable to 
understand that church assembly and music is a sacred object of Christianity and thus 
one to be respected under the law; a mob cannot understand that burning a church, 
temple or any religious place or religious books is likewise a religious offence under 
section 295.  Religious conflict followed by immediate judgements is a well-
established pattern in Punjab, outwith the law, and its ‘control over local population 
to the detriment of local administration is also well known.  The laws mean nothing 
under these circumstances.’
767
  People in such cases simply react to protect Islam 
rather than understanding that Chapter XV of ‘Offences Relating to Religion’ still 
expects all other religions to be protected: the law is disregarded. 
Many suggestions have been offered to address this critical ethical issue.  
Perhaps the most popular response has been discussed nationally and internationally 
concerning the religious rights and protection of religious communities which have 
developed a high profile in order to publicise the issue.  Internationally, the 
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implications of the 1980s laws have been condemned, and suggestions made to 
protect religious communities and religious rights – protections which already exist 
in the law of Chapter XV of PPC.  However, where suggestions merge into 
sanctions, the situation would become more difficult for Christians and other 
minorities.  Sanctions imposed by western governments would run the risk of again 
displaying Pakistani Christianity as a western religion, further alienating indigenous 
Christians from their Muslim neighbours, who would cause more harm to minorities 
if the economy suffered.  The Danish Cartoon incident of 2005 and an offensive film 
created in 2012 by an American each critically affected minorities in Pakistan, none 
of whom had anything to do with the cartoons or films but all of whom were 
scapegoats.  There is no easy solution to prevent personal quarrels being misused 
through blasphemy accusations unless the issue can be accepted at a political or 
social level as well as a merely religious level, as Jalal has commented: 
Pakistanis have the ‘state’ if not quite the ‘nation’ of their collective imaginings, and 
there are ways of overcoming contradictions that cannot be resolved. Without sustained 
debate on citizenship rights, not just political but also social and economic Pakistan 
cannot take the elementary steps towards forging a collective ethos as a nation-state.
768
 
How can citizens in Pakistan work toward the peaceful co-existence for which 
Joseph, Taseer, Bhatti, and many accused of blasphemy have already suffered and 
died?  Not only Christians but the blood of thousands of Ahmadis, Shias, and Hindus 
is at the doors of our churches, temples, mosques and other places of worship, 
weakening the minorities and Pakistan day by day, and threatening those Sunnis who 
want no part of these attacks.  The law has also weakened the state, for ‘if 
the government tries to finish it [or even to amend the law for the sake of protection], 
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the government itself will be finished.’
769
  It has even discouraged those who would 
‘open the door for a dialogue of reason…and values of justice and good against 
hatred and violence.’
770
  Who will be left to talk on the behalf of religious rights and 
protection of the religious communities of Pakistan?  If it is to continue to be a 
habitual way of life the country, as the Lahore High Court declared in the Report 
(1954), will become a battle field for warning groups and religious communities who 
may perish one by one.  As Martin Niemöller put it after World War II,  
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out-- 
Because I was not a Socialist. 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out--  
Because I was not a Trade Unionist. 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out--  
Because I was not a Jew. 
Then they came for me--and there was no one left to speak for me.
771
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